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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with the ontology, epistemology, and methodology of
intuitions in philosophy. It consists of an introduction, Chapter 1, and three
main parts.
In the first part, Chapter 2, I defend an account of intuitions as appearance
states according to which intuitions cannot be reduced to beliefs or belief-like
states. I argue that an account of intuitions as appearance states can explain
some crucial phenomena with respect to intuitions better than popular accounts
in the current debate over the ontology of intuitions.
The second part, Chapters 3 to 5, is a reply to Timothy Williamson’s (2004,
2007) view on the epistemology and methodology of intuitions. The practice of
appealing to the fact that we have an intuition as evidence from thought exper-
iments has recently been criticised by experimental philosophers. Williamson
argues that since thought experiments reliably lead to knowledge of the content
of our intuition, we can avoid this criticism and the resulting sceptical threat
by appealing to the content of the intuition. I agree that thought experiments
usually lead to knowledge of the content of our intuition. However, I show that
appealing to the fact that we have an intuition is a common and useful practice.
I defend the view that for methodological reasons, we ought to appeal to the
fact that we have an intuition as initial evidence from thought experiments.
The third part, Chapter 6, is devoted to a paradigm method involving intu-
itions: the method of reflective equilibrium. Some philosophers have recently
claimed that it is trivial and could even accommodate scepticism about the re-
ii
iii
liability of intuitions. I argue that reflective equilibrium is not compatible with
such scepticism. While it is compatible with the view I defend in the second
part of the thesis, more specific methodological claims have to be made.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Philosophical Methodology
There has recently been much discussion about the methodology of philosophy
and how it compares to the methodology in other disciplines, such as the sci-
ences. Some philosophers claim that philosophy has a distinctive methodology,
namely appeal to intuitions (e.g., George Bealer [6], [7], Alvin Goldman & Joel
Pust [46], Joel Pust [96], and Ernest Sosa [115]). Defenders of this methodol-
ogy often take intuitions to be sui generis propositional attitudes that provide
a genuine source of knowledge, separating philosophy from the sciences.
So-called ‘experimental philosophers’ (e.g., Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich [135],
Machery, Mallon, Nichols, & Stich [81]) think that philosophers should not rely
on their intuitions. They have tested laypeople’s intuitions on diverse philo-
sophical questions in several areas of philosophical research. They found these
intuitions to be sensitive to diﬀerent kinds of factors irrelevant to the truth
or falsity of their contents. First, they point to various types of framing and
order eﬀects people are sensitive to when presented with thought experiment
scenarios.1 Second, they have detected variations of intuitions due to eth-
1See, e.g., Knobe [60] on how people’s judgments concerning intentionality vary depend-
ing on whether the eﬀects of the relevant action are positive or negative, Nichols & Knobe
[89] on how people’s responses to questions about moral responsibility vary depending on how
the question is formulated, and Swain, Alexander, & Weinberg [119] on how some epistemic
intuitions vary depending on the order in which the cases are presented.
1
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nic diﬀerences, gender diﬀerences, socioeconomical status and other factors.2
These factors are clearly irrelevant to the truth or falsity of the content of the
intuitions. The evidence from experimental philosophers’ studies questions the
epistemic value of intuitions in general.
Some philosophers attempt to defend philosophical methodology against
the attacks of experimental philosophers by denying that intuitions play an
important epistemic role, or perhaps any epistemic role at all in philosophy
(e.g., Timothy Williamson [138], [140], Herman Cappelen [12]). They suggest
that thought experiments are best understood as involving judgements, rather
than intuitions. Instead of thinking that philosophy’s methodology is excep-
tional, they see it as continuous with methodology in the sciences. In this way,
they hope to defend philosophy’s methodology from a variety of attacks.
In this thesis, I look at the methodology of philosophy, and in particular
defend the appeal to intuitions as evidence. I argue that intuitions are appear-
ance states, and I defend the view that philosophers in fact do and also should
appeal to intuitions as evidence in philosophy.
In what follows, I will first remind the reader of some well-known thought
experiments which play a role throughout the chapters of this thesis (section
1.2). I will then give a short summary of each of the chapters. Chapter 2 is
dedicated to the ontology of intuitions (section 1.3). In Chapters 3 to 5, I argue
that intuitions play a role as evidence from thought experiments (section 1.4).
Chapter 6 discusses the method of reflective equilibrium (section 1.5).
1.2 Thought Experiments
I will now present some thought experiments that have been used as coun-
terexamples to philosophical theories. These thought experiments will play an
important role and I present them here to refer back to them throughout the
thesis. The reader familiar with the original Gettier Cases, Jackson’s Mary
2For work on ethnic variations, see Machery, Olivola & de Blanc [82]; for work on gender
diﬀerences, see, e.g., Buckwalter & Stich [11]; for work on the influence of the socioeconomic
status, see, e.g., Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich [135].
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Case, Kripke’s Go¨del Case, and Judith Thomson’s ‘Fat Man’ Trolley Case
might want to skip to the end of the section.
Edmund Gettier’s [41] cases against the theory of knowledge as justified
true belief are certainly amongst the most discussed thought experiments in
philosophy. Here are both Gettier Cases as originally presented:
Gettier Case 1:
Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And
suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunc-
tive proposition:
(d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has
ten coins in his pocket.
Smith’s evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company
assured him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he,
Smith, had counted the coins in Jones’s pocket ten minutes ago.
Proposition (d) entails:
(e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his
pocket.
Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and
accepts (e) on the gounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence.
In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true.
But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones,
will get the job. And, also unknown to Smith, he himself has ten
coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition
(d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false. In our example, then,
all of the following are true: (i) (e) is true, (ii) Smith believes that
(e) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true.
But it is equally clear that Smith does not know that (e) is true;
for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith’s pocket,
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while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith’s pocket,
and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones’s pocket,
whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job. [41,
p. 14]
Gettier Case 2:
Let us suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following
proposition:
(f) Jones owns a Ford.
Smith’s evidence might be that Jones has at all times within Smith’s
memory owned a car, and always a Ford, an that Jones has just
oﬀered Smith a ride while driving a Ford. Let us imagine, now,
that Smith has another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is
totally ignorant. Smith selects three place-names quite at random,
and constructs the following three propositions:
(g) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Boston.
(h) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.
(i) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.
Each of these propositions is entailed by (f). Imagine that Smith
realizes the entailment of each of these propositions he has con-
structed by (f), and proceeds to accept (g), (h), and (i) on the
basis of (f). Smith has correctly inferred (g), (h), and (i) from a
proposition for which he has strong evidence. Smith is therefore
completely justified in believing each of these three propositions.
Smith, of course, has no idea where Brown is.
But imagine now that two further conditions hold. First, Jones does
not own a Ford, but is at present driving a rented car. And second,
by the sheerest coincidence, and entirely unknown to Smith, the
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place mentioned in proposition (h) happens really to be the place
where Brown is. If these two conditions hold then Smith does not
know that (h) is true, even though (i) (h) is true, (ii) Smith does
believe that (h) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that
(h) is true. [41, pp. 14-15]
Another thought experiment which has provoked an extensive debate in
philosophy is Frank Jackson’s [54] case against physicalism. In broad terms,
physicalism is the thesis that everything, including the mental, is physical.
Here is how Jackson presented the Mary Case:
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to
investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and
white television monitor. She specialises in the neurophysiology
of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information
there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes,
or the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on. She discov-
ers, for example, just which wave-length combinations from the sky
stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central
nervous system the contraction of the vocal chords and expulsion of
air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence ‘The
sky is blue’. (It can hardly be denied that it is in principle possible
to obtain all this physical information from black and white televi-
sion, otherwise the Open University would of necessity need to use
colour television.)
What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white
room or is given a colour television monitor? Will she learn any-
thing or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn something
about the world and our visual experience of it. But then it is
inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she
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had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than
that, and Physicalism is false. [54, p. 182]
Saul Kripke [66] famously argues against the descriptive theory of the mean-
ing of names, according to which the meaning of a name is identical to the
description associated with it. Kripke gives the following case, the Go¨del Case:
Imagine the following blatantly fictional situation [. . . ] Suppose
that Go¨del was not in fact author of [the incompleteness] theorem.
A man named ‘Schmidt’, whose body was found in Vienna under
mysterious circumstances many years ago, actually did the work
in question. His friend Go¨del somehow got hold of the manuscript
and it was thereafter attributed to Go¨del. On the view in ques-
tion, then, when our ordinary man uses the name ‘Go¨del’, he really
means to refer to Schmidt, because Schmidt is the unique person
satisfying the description, ‘the man who discovered the incomplete-
ness of arithmetic’. Of course you might try changing it to ‘the
man who published the discovery of the incompleteness of arith-
metic’. By changing the story a little further one can make even
this formulation false. Anyway, most people might not even know
whether the thing was published or got around by word of mouth.
Let’s stick to ‘the man who discovered the incompleteness of arith-
metic’. So, since the man who discovered the incompleteness of
arithmetic is in fact Schmidt, we, when we talk about ‘Go¨del’, are
in fact always referring to Schmidt. But it seems to me that we are
not. We simply are not. [66, pp. 83-84]
Judith Thomson [120], [121] presented a case which has been discussed in
many diﬀerent versions in moral philosophy and was originally introduced by
Philippa Foot [37]. Here is the version I will refer to as the Trolley Case:
Consider a case—which I shall call Fat Man—in which you are
standing on a footbridge over the trolley track. You can see a
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trolley hurtling down the track, out of control. You turn around
to see where the trolley is headed, and there are five workmen on
the track where it exits from under the footbridge. What to do?
Being an expert on trolleys, you know of one certain way to stop
an out-of-control trolley: Drop a really heavy weight in its path.
But where to find one? It just so happens that standing next to
you on the footbridge is a fat man, a really fat man. He is leaning
over the railing, watching the trolley; all you have to do is to give
him a little shove, and over the railing he will go, onto the track in
the path of the trolley. Would it be permissible for you to do this?
Everybody to whom I have put this case says it would not be. [121,
p. 1409]
Even though philosophers disagree about the nature of the judgments we make
when confronted with thought experiment scenarios and whether these judg-
ments are substantially diﬀerent from other judgments or beliefs, I will call
them ‘intuitions’. While Chapter 2 gives an account of what intuitions are,
Chapters 3 to 6 do not rest on that account. What I argue in Chapters 3 to 6
applies to any view of what intuitions are.
1.3 Intuitions
Chapter 2, In Defence of an Inflationist Account of Intuitions, is concerned
with the ontology of intuitions. Drawing a simplified picture of the current
debate over the ontology of intuitions as propositional attitudes, there are two
main camps, inflationists and deflationists. Inflationists hold that intuitions
are a distinctive or sui generis class of mental states. Most inflationists make
the further claim that the intuitions we are concerned with in philosophy pro-
vide a basic source of a priori knowledge (e.g., Bealer [7], Sosa [114]). I will
call the latter ‘rationalist inflationists’. Deflationists think that intuitions can
be reduced to judgments, beliefs, or inclinations to believe (e.g., Williamson
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[138], [140]). Some deflationists argue that intuitions should not play an impor-
tant epistemic role (e.g., Williamson [140], Deutsch [28]) or that they in fact
do not play an epistemic role at all (Earlenbaugh & Molyneux [31]). Other
deflationists think that in thought experiments (and possibly other cases), in-
tuitions provide a priori knowledge (Ichikawa & Jarvis [53]). I motivate a
non-rationalist inflationist account of intuitions according to which intuitions
are appearance states that do not necessarily provide a source of a priori knowl-
edge, because their ontology does not entail any epistemic view.
The chapter consists of three main parts. In the first part, I present some
cases which display the key phenomena an ontology of intuitions should ac-
commodate and explain. Based on these phenomena, I argue that an ontology
of intuitions should:
D1 allow for cases in which we have an intuition that P but no belief that P ;
D2 (the Rationality Challenge) explain why there seems to be no failure of
rationality in having inconsistent intuitions or in having an intuition that
P and a belief that not-P (where we know of the inconsistency) whereas
there would be such a failure in the case of beliefs;
D3 explain why an intuition is often resistant to a conflicting belief.
I take it that a theory which can account for more or all desiderata should be
favoured over a theory that can account for less of these desiderata. Moreover,
a theory which can in some sense account better for these desiderata should be
favoured over a theory which cannot account equally well for them. However,
I do not take D1 to D3 to provide jointly suﬃcient constraints on a correct
account of intuitions.
In the second part, I first look at a simple deflationist view according to
which intuitions are beliefs or judgments. Understanding why the Rationality
Challenge poses a problem to the simple deflationist will help us to evaluate
Timothy Williamson’s [138], [140] elaborate deflationist account according to
which intuitions are either beliefs or inclinations to believe. I show that a
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disambiguation of the term ‘inclination to believe’ allows for two diﬀerent ac-
counts of inclinations to believe: doxastic inclinations to believe and merely
psychological inclinations to believe. The first account fits in naturally with a
deflationist view according to which intuitions reduce to beliefs or belief-like
states, but fails to meet D2 for similar reasons as simple deflationism. The
second account meets D2, however, both the first and the second account fail
to meet D3. I then argue that rationalist inflationist accounts of intuitions
(e.g., Bealer [7], Sosa [115]) cannot cover all relevant cases.
In the third part, I present what I call a non-rationalist inflationist account
of intuitions as appearance states, based on William Tolhurst’s [122] account
of seemings. I show that an account of intuitions as appearance states meets
D1 to D3 better than deflationist and rationalist inflationist accounts.
Let me make a couple of additional remarks concerning Chapter 2. It seems
that philosophers who disagree about the ontology of intuitions disagree deeply
about meta-philosophical and methodological matters. Their respective view
on what intuitions are is tightly related to what they think the nature of philos-
ophy is and to how they answer key methodological questions. Bealer [7] thinks
that philosophy is autonomous in that central questions in philosophy can in
principle be answered without relying substantively on the sciences. What
characterizes the questions philosophers are concerned with is their universal-
ity, generality, and necessity. Intuitions play a fundamental role in philosophy
in that they provide a justificatory procedure for the answers to these kinds of
questions. Sosa’s [115] view on intuitions is an integral part of his general virtue
epistemology, according to which our intuitions and perceptions are manifes-
tations of our epistemic competence. For Williamson [140], the ontology of
intuitions follows from his thesis that philosophy is not in principle diﬀerent
from the sciences or from ordinary thinking. Philosophy therefore does not
need a particular justificatory procedure such as intuitions.
What ultimately decides on which account of intuitions we endorse may
thus depend on many other views we have and on our general approach to
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philosophy. I can obviously not do justice to arguments which derive from
such other views or general approaches. I therefore focus on the question of
how several accounts of intuitions can accommodate and explain certain key
phenomena with respect to intuitions. Hence, I take it that, other things being
equal, a theory which can accommodate and explain more or all phenomena or
which can in some sense account better for these phenomena should be favoured
over a theory that can accommodate and explain less of these phenomena or
which cannot account equally well for them.
1.4 Intuitions as Evidence in Philosophy
Chapters 3 to 5 address the role of intuitions as evidence and are a reply
to Williamson’s [138], [140] view on evidence from thought experiments as
counterexamples to philosophical theories. For the purpose of these chapters,
I will presuppose the following aspects of Williamson’s epistemology. First, all
evidence is propositional.3 Second, all evidence is knowledge and hence factive:
although we might treat false propositions as evidence sometimes, only true
propositions actually are evidence.4
The claim that intuitions play a role as evidence is ambiguous. It can either
mean that the content of the intuition or that the fact that we have an intuition
is evidence. While Williamson thinks that the content of the intuition should
be appealed to, I argue that we ought to use the psychological fact that we
have an intuition as evidence. In what follows, I will sometimes simply use ‘an
intuition’ for ‘the fact that we have an intuition’.
The three chapters approach the topic in three steps. In Chapter 3, I defend
the claim that intuitions play a role as evidence against critics who think that
they do not play such a role. I argue in Chapter 4 that our practice shows that
intuitions play a role as evidence and I address some worries Williamson [138],
[140] raises with respect to this practice. In Chapter 5, I argue that we ought
3See Williamson [137, pp. 194-200].
4See Williamson [137, pp. 200-207].
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to appeal to the fact that we have an intuition for methodological reasons.
I will now give a short overview of each of Chapters 3 to 5.
In Chapter 3, The Role of Intuitions in Philosophy, I am concerned with the
role of intuitions as evidence from thought experiments. Advocates of the
recent movement of experimental philosophy such as Weinberg, Nichols, &
Stich [135] or Machery, Mallon, Nichols, & Stich [81] think that philosophers
rely on intuitions as evidence, and they argue that for a variety of empirical
reasons, this is not a good practice. According to Williamson [140], appealing to
the fact that we have an intuition (rather than to the content of the intuition)
as evidence from counterexamples is an unnecessary practice, and he agrees
with the experimental philosophers that we ought not pursue it.
Max Deutsch [28], [29] and Joshua Earlenbaugh & Bernard Molyneux [31]
go one step further and aim to undermine the experimental philosophers’ ar-
guments. Deutsch argues that in relevant and frequently discussed cases, we
do not treat the fact that we have an intuition as evidence. Earlenbaugh &
Molyneux defend the view that intuitions do not play any evidential role at
all. If they were right, the experimental philosophers’ arguments would be
pointless. However, I argue that Deutsch and Earlenbaugh & Molyneux fail to
undermine the experimental philosophers’ challenge.
I first address Earlenbaugh & Molyneux’s view. They think that whereas
we trust other people’s sensory states, memories, introspections, etc., we only
trust our own intuitions. They give two arguments, one against the claim that
we use the fact that we have an intuition as evidence and one against the claim
that we use the content of the intuition as evidence. I argue that both are
wrong.
I then argue against Deutsch that he uses the wrong criterion to decide
whether we treat the fact that we have an intuition as evidence in philosophy.
We have to distinguish between using the word ‘intuition’ and referring or
appealing to intuitions. Even if we do not use the word ‘intuition’, we might
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still appeal to the fact that we have an intuition as evidence. I finally show that
even if we do not appeal to the fact that we have an intuition as evidence, we
might still implicitly rely on it. I conclude that whether intuitions play a role
as evidence can neither be read oﬀ the premises of our arguments nor decided
on the basis of what we explicitly appeal to.
If the experimental philosophers’ challenge cannot be undermined, we have
to face it. In the last part of the chapter, I present reasons brought forward
by Williamson [141] and others to think that empirical findings about the un-
reliability of intuitions are not relevant to philosophers’ intuitions and that
scepticism about the reliability of intuitions in philosophy is not warranted. I
argue that since our intuitions are nevertheless fallible, psychology and exper-
imental philosophy can sometimes help us to answer philosophical questions.
In Chapter 4, Thought Experiments and Evidence, I argue that appealing to
the fact that we have an intuition as evidence from thought experiments is not
a bad practice if this evidence is used as initial evidence against the target
theory only.
I look at diﬀerent views concerning the evidence we gain from thought ex-
periments as counterexamples to philosophical theories. In the current debate
over the methodology of thought experiments, the following three questions
have not always been distinguished carefully.
(1) What kind of facts can undermine a philosophical theory?
(2) What kind of evidence do we gain from a thought experiment?
(3) What kind of evidence from a thought experiment ought we to appeal to?
Concerning each of these three questions, two diﬀerent answers are possible.
(a) facts about the subject matter the theory is about
(b) facts about our psychological states with contents about the
subject matter the theory is about
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Concerning (1), the standard answer is (a). There is more disagreement with
respect to the answers to questions (2) and (3). I present two views that have
been discussed in the current debate: a view according to which the answer to
both questions is (b) (a view commonly ascribed to experimental philosophers),
and an inclusive view according to which the answer to (2) is both (a) and (b)
and the answer to (3) is (a) (Williamson [138], [140]). I introduce a third view,
according to which the answer to (2) is both (a) and (b) and the answer to (3)
is (b), i.e., according to which we ought to appeal only to the fact that we have
an intuition as initial evidence against the target theory.
To show that this view corresponds with our practice, I provide examples
of how we discuss intuitive counterexamples to philosophical theories some of
which presuppose that we appeal to the fact that we have an intuition. For
instance, we deny the relevance of certain intuitions due to some psychological
disposition of the person having the intuitions, we sometimes give pragmatic or
psychological explanations as to why we have an intuition, we explain why our
intuitions are irrelevant with respect to the subject matter under investigation,
we show that the content of our intuition is in fact not inconsistent with the
target theory, and we give independent arguments in favour of the theory we
aim to defend.
I then argue that two worries Williamson [138], [140] raises do not apply to
this view: appealing to the fact that we have an intuition as initial evidence
does not lead to a regress of giving evidence for evidence and hence does not
provoke scepticism, and it does not presuppose or lead to a view according to
which philosophy is diﬀerent in principle from the sciences.
In chapter 5, Knowledge and Evidence in Philosophy, I argue that a method-
ological constraint on evidence in philosophy can explain why we appeal to the
fact that we have an intuition as evidence from thought experiments.
I first present two cases, Sally the Teacher and Sam the Psychologist, which
suggest that there are methodological constraints on evidence in the sciences.
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In these cases, Sally and Sam know a proposition that P but are not in a
good enough epistemic position to assert that P in a scientific context. The
reason seems to be that they have only non-scientific evidence, i.e., evidence
not generated through recognized scientific methods. In other words, Sally and
Sam do not have the right kind of evidence.
I then argue that philosophy is similar to the sciences with respect to some
relevant aspects, which suggests that there are methodological constraints on
evidence in philosophy as well, and I discuss what these constraints could be.
Williamson [138], [140] suggests two ways to explain why contemporary
philosophers appeal to intuitions on the basis of certain properties of this ev-
idence. In The Philosophy of Philosophy [140], he argues that many sceptical
contemporary philosophers appeal to the fact that they have an intuition as
evidence because they falsely believe in Evidence Neutrality, which is the idea
that a community of philosophers can always in principle achieve common
knowledge as to whether any given proposition constitutes evidence or not. In
‘Philosophical ‘Intuitions’ and Scepticism About Judgement’ [138], Williamson
mentions why even some non-sceptical philosophers might want to appeal to
the fact that we have an intuition instead of to the content of the intuition:
they believe evidence has to meet an operational standard, and they think that
the fact that someone has an intuition can meet this standard. I reject both
Evidence Neutrality and an operational standard as methodological norms.
I then suggest a norm for evidence in philosophy according to which we
ought to appeal to the part of our total evidence for a certain claim which is
relatively easy to access. This norm can explain why we appeal to the fact that
we have an intuition as evidence from a thought experiment even if we are not
sceptical about knowledge from thought experiments.
Chapters 3 to 5 are a reply to Williamson’s view on evidence from thought
experiments in the following sense. According to Williamson, referring to in-
tuitions as evidence is a practice we should not pursue, because it opens a gap
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between facts about our psychological states and the truth of the contents of
these states, which provokes scepticism. Since, as I argue, we appeal to the
fact that we have an intuition for methodological reasons only, it follows that
we have to close the gap for methodological reasons only. This does not aﬀect
our knowledge, and hence does not constitute a sceptical threat. While we
have knowledge of a proposition which undermines the target theory, we might
nevertheless not have succeeded in refuting the theory. However, the history of
philosophy shows that it is indeed very hard to refute a philosophical theory.
1.5 Reflective Equilibrium
Reflective equilibrium has been considered a paradigm philosophical method
involving intuitions. It has been extensively discussed in normative ethics and
political philosophy. The key idea of reflective equilibrium as introduced by
John Rawls [99], [100] for moral and political philosophy is that we test our
moral judgments (or intuitions) and moral principles (or theories) against each
other and revise and refine both when they are inconsistent. In the literature,
‘reflective equilibrium’ ambiguously stands for the method of reflective equilib-
rium and for the state in which all our beliefs are in equilibrium, i.e., coherent.
I am concerned with the method of reflective equilibrium.
Without specifying what exactly they mean by it, philosophers in all areas
of research frequently use the term ‘reflective equilibrium’ when they mention
the methods and aims of their inquiry. It has been suggested that ‘reflective
equilibrium’ is nothing more than a metaphor for the rational performance
of philosophy: for taking into account all relevant information available and
for working out the most plausible, coherent, and comprehensive theory of the
subject matter under investigation. Michael DePaul [25] and Peter Singer [104]
suggest that it could even be compatible with the kind of scepticism about the
reliability of intuitions advocated by some experimental philosophers, i.e., with
a view according to which we ought not take any intuitions into account at all.
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I am interested in the question whether reflective equilibrium is as trivial
as some philosophers think or whether it could give us useful methodological
advice. If it gives us methodological advice, having followed reflective equi-
librium could provide us with some evidence as to the truth of the resultant
theory which is relatively easy to access and hence is evidence we ought to
appeal to (as I argue in Chapter 5).
The chapter consists of two main parts. In the first part, I present reflective
equilibrium as it has been discussed in moral and political philosophy and apply
it to epistemology, more precisely to a fictional philosopher Sophie who thinks
about the Gettier Cases. I then specify what philosophers mean when they say
that reflective equilibrium is trivial.
In the second part, I look at diﬀerent views philosophers hold in the current
debate concerning the role of intuitions in philosophy. I argue that the sceptical
view according to which intuitions ought not play any role in philosophy is not
compatible with reflective equilibrium. I moreover argue that the view I defend
in Chapters 3 to 5, according to which we ought to appeal to the fact that we
have an intuition as initial evidence from thought experiments, is compatible
with reflective equilibrium.
I conclude that MRE is not as trivial as some philosophers think, but more
specific methodological claims have to be made in order for it to serve as a
methodological guide.
Chapter 2
In Defence of an Inflationist
Account of Intuitions
Abstract
This chapter is concerned with the ontology of intuitions. I first de-
velop desiderata for an ontology of intuitions on the basis of paradigm
cases. I then discuss whether some popular accounts of intuitions meet
these desiderata: the view that intuitions are simply beliefs, Timothy
Williamson’s [138], [140] account according to which intuitions are ei-
ther beliefs or inclinations to believe, and George Bealer’s [7] and Ernest
Sosa’s [115] rationalist accounts of intuitions. I finally present a the-
ory of intuitions as appearance states, based on William Tolhurst’s [122]
account of seemings, which I argue meets the suggested desiderata best.
2.1 What are Intuitions?
In reflecting on their methodology, philosophers use the terms ‘intuition’ and
‘seeming’ in various ways. Some use them to refer to a source of knowledge
in general, some use them for a source of a priori knowledge only. Others
use the terms to refer to a kind of propositional attitude, some of which use
them for common sense judgments. Psychologists sometimes speak of intuition
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when they theorize about an unconscious, gut-guided decision process (e.g.,
Gigerenzer [42]). There are even more ways of using ‘it is intuitive’ and ‘it
seems’ in ordinary language, some of which occur in philosophy papers, such
as the use as a hedge or a cautious way of presenting evidence.1
In this chapter, I am not concerned with diﬀerent uses or meanings of ‘in-
tuition’, ‘intuitive’, ‘seeming’, ‘seems’, or similar terms. I am interested in the
kind of propositional attitude we are dealing with in some specific contexts,
such as thought experiments as counterexamples to philosophical theories. We
say we have the intuition that a person in a Gettier Case against the theory of
knowledge as justified true belief (the JTB theory) has the justified true belief
that p but no knowledge that p.2 In Frank Jackson’s Mary Case against physi-
calism, we say we have the intuition that colour scientist Mary learns something
when she leaves her black and white room and sees something coloured for the
first time in her life.3 Other paradigm cases in which we use the term ‘intuition’
in philosophy are the lottery paradoxes, the sorites paradoxes, or the paradox
of emotional response to fiction4, or other paradox cases. We say we have an
intuition towards each proposition of the inconsistent set of propositions that
constitutes a paradox. I will restrict my considerations to the use of ‘intuition’
or related terms in thought experiments and paradoxes, and I will use ‘S has
an intuition that P ’ and ‘P is intuitive to S ’ interchangeably for these cases.
Drawing a simplified picture of the current debate over the ontology of in-
tuitions as propositional attitudes, there are two main camps, inflationists and
deflationists. Inflationists hold that intuitions are a distinctive or sui generis
class of mental states. Most inflationists make the further claim that the intu-
itions we are concerned with in philosophy provide a basic source of a priori
knowledge (e.g., Bealer [7], Sosa [114]). I will call the latter ‘rationalist in-
flationists’. Deflationists think that intuitions can be reduced to judgments,
1See Cappelen [12, pp. 25-93].
2Gettier [41].
3Jackson [54]. Most philosophers think that the Mary Case is not a genuine counterex-
ample to physicalism, including Jackson [56].
4I will return to these paradoxes below.
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beliefs, or inclinations to believe (e.g., Williamson [138], [140]5). Some defla-
tionists argue that intuitions should not play an important epistemic role (e.g.,
Williamson [140], Deutsch [28]) or that they in fact do not play an epistemic role
at all (Earlenbaugh & Molyneux [31]). (I address these arguments and discuss
the role of intuitions as evidence in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.) Other deflationists
think that in thought experiments (and possibly other cases), intuitions pro-
vide a priori knowledge (Ichikawa & Jarvis [53]). I motivate a non-rationalist
inflationist account of intuitions according to which intuitions are appearance
states that do not necessarily provide a source of a priori knowledge. Their on-
tology does not entail any epistemic view. This option has been widely ignored
in the current debate over the ontology and epistemic role of intuitions.
The chapter consists of three main parts. In the first part (section 2.2),
I present 6 cases which show some key phenomena an ontology of intuitions
should accommodate and explain. A special focus lies on cases that have been
subject to extensive first-order philosophical debate but have received little
attention in the current debate over the ontology of intuitions. In the second
part (sections 2.3-2.5), I discuss a simple deflationist view according to which
intuitions are just beliefs or judgments (section 2.3), Timothy Williamson’s
[138], [140] more elaborate deflationist view according to which intuitions are
either beliefs or inclinations to believe (section 2.4), and George Bealer’s [7] and
Ernest Sosa’s [115] rationalist inflationist accounts of intuitions (section 2.5). In
the third part of the chapter (section 2.6), I present a non-rationalist inflationist
account of intuitions as appearance states which I show can accommodate and
explain the relevant phenomena presented in the first part best.
2.2 Desiderata for an Ontology of Intuitions
Let me give some examples of paradigm cases in which philosophers use the
term ‘intuition’. Any presentation of these cases will be disputable to some
extent. In order to avoid begging the question against deviant descriptions, let
5Williamson attributes a similar view to Lewis [74] and van Inwagen [126].
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me introduce a hypothetical philosopher Helen. Helen’s apprehension of the
cases might not be shared by everyone. However, philosophers in the current
debate about intuitions have described themselves as being in similar situations
with respect to these cases or with respect to similar cases. In this sense, Helen
is a representative contemporary philosopher.
At first sight, some of the cases look similar because they are ones in which
Helen has an intuition whose content she does not believe. However, there are
diﬀerences which will play a role in my arguments below, and it will become
clear in the course of the chapter why we need all these cases.
Here are three well-known thought experiments and Helen’s reaction to
them.
Case 1: Gettier Case
Smith has applied for a job. He has a justified belief that someone
else, Jones, will get the job, and he also has a justified belief that
Jones has 10 coins in his pocket. Smith therefore justifiably believes
that the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket. In fact,
Jones does not get the job and Smith himself does. As it happens,
Smith unknowingly also has 10 coins in his pocket. His belief that
the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket therefore
is justified and true. Does Smith also know that the man who will
get the job has 10 coins in his pocket?6
Helen has the intuition that Smith does not know that the man
who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket. It is also true that
she believes that Smith does not know that the man who will get
the job has 10 coins in his pocket.
Case 2: Trolley Case
A trolley is hurtling down a track towards five people. You are on
a bridge under which it will pass, and you can stop it by dropping
6Gettier [41].
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a heavy weight from the bridge. There is a very fat man standing
next to you on the bridge, and the only way to stop the trolley is to
push him over the bridge and onto the track, killing him in order
to save the five people on the track. Should you push the fat man
over the bridge?7
Helen has the intuition that, was she in the situation described, she
should not push the fat man over the bridge. However, she knows
that the numerous Trolley Cases are subject to extensive debates
in moral philosophy, and not knowing these cases and debates in
much detail, she feels like she cannot decide what to believe. She
therefore refrains from judging. Helen has the intuition but she does
not believe that she should not push the fat man over the bridge.
Case 3: Mary Case
Mary is a scientist who is forced to investigate the world from a
black and white room via a black and white television monitor.
She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and has all the
physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when
we see colours. Will Mary learn anything new when she is released
from her black and white room and sees colours for the first time?8
Helen has the intuition that Mary will learn something new when re-
leased from her black and white room. However, she firmly believes
that physicalism is true, and she believes that it is inconsistent with
the truth of physicalism that Mary will learn something new.
Let us now look at three paradox cases.
Case 4: Lottery Paradox
p S knows that S will not have enough money to go on a safari
this year.
7Thomson [120], [121].
8Jackson [54].
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q If S knows that S will not have enough money to go on a safari
this year, then S is in a position to know that S will not win
a major prize in a lottery this year.
r S is not in a position to know that S will not win a major prize
in a lottery this year.9
All three propositions of the Lottery Paradox considered individ-
ually are intuitive to Helen, but she notices that they are jointly
inconsistent. She cannot decide what to believe and refrains from
judging, just as in Case 2.
Case 5: Paradox of the Heap
p A pile of suﬃciently many grains is a heap.
q One single grain cannot make a diﬀerence to whether something
is a heap or not.
r A single grain is not a heap.
All three propositions of the Paradox of the Heap considered indi-
vidually are intuitive to Helen, but she notices that they are jointly
inconsistent. Now, suppose Helen thinks she has a solution to the
Paradox of the Heap, which leads her to believe that q is false, i.e.,
she believes that it is false that one single grain cannot make a dif-
ference to whether something is a heap or not.10 It is still intuitive
to Helen that one single grain cannot make a diﬀerence to whether
something is a heap or not.
Case 6: Paradox of Emotional Response to Fiction
p We can feel genuine pity for the fictional character Anna Karen-
ina.
9Hawthorne [51, p. 2].
10See, e.g., Williamson [136].
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q We cannot feel pity for someone we believe does not exist.
r We believe (even when engaged with fiction) that the relevant
fictional characters do not exist.
All three propositions of the Paradox of Emotional Response to Fic-
tion considered individually are intuitive to Helen, but she notices
that they are jointly inconsistent. Suppose that Helen endorses a
theory of quasi-emotion (similar to Walton’s [129]) and rejects p on
the basis of it: we cannot feel genuine pity for Anna Karenina. It
is, however, still intuitive to Helen that p, i.e., it is still intuitive to
her that we can feel genuine pity for Anna Karenina.11
Let me now point to some phenomena with respect to Cases 1 to 6. In Case
1, Helen has the intuition that Smith in the Gettier Case does not have knowl-
edge, but it is also true that she believes that Smith does not have knowledge
(most contemporary epistemologists share this belief with Helen). This might
lead one to the view that her intuition ought to be identified with her belief.
In the contemporary debate over the ontology and epistemic role of intuitions,
Gettier Cases have been referred to as paradigm cases of intuition driven phi-
losophy.12 Taking them to be paradigmatic might incline one to think that
intuitions in general are just beliefs or belief-like states. However, there are
some more phenomena that can be observed with respect to our cases.
11See, e.g., Radford [97], Gendler & Kovakovich [38]. It is pretty much common sense
that r should not be rejected. It does not seem plausible to assume that when we read a
novel such as Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina, we temporarily cease to believe that Anna Karenina
does not exist. Radford, e.g., rejects this sort of solution to the paradox. With respect to
Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, he says: ‘Of course we don’t ever forget that Mercutio is only
a character in a play, but we “suspend our disbelief” in his reality. The theatre management
and the producer connive at this. They dim the lights and try to find good actors. They,
and we, frown on other members of the audience who draw attention to themselves and
distract us by coughing, and if, during a scene, say a stage hand steals on [sic.], picks up a
chair that should have been removed and sheepishly departs, our response is destroyed. The
“illusion” is shattered. All this is true but the paradox remains. When we watch a play we
do not direct our thoughts to it’s only being a play. We don’t continually remind ourselves
of this—unless we are trying to reduce the eﬀect of the work on us. Nonetheless [. . . ] we are
never unaware that we are watching a play, and one about fictional characters even at the
most exciting and moving moments. So the paradox is not solved by invoking “suspension
of disbelief”, though it occurs and is connived at.’ [97, pp. 71-72].
12See, e.g., Williamson [140].
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First, Cases 2 to 6 show that we do not necessarily believe what is intuitive
to us. Second, they show that it does not seem irrational for Helen to have an
intuition that P without believing that P.
With respect to this second phenomenon, the cases are slightly diﬀerent
from each other. In Case 2, Helen has an intuition and suspends belief. In
Case 4, in which Helen has not solved the paradox, believing p, q, and r alto-
gether would seem irrational, because p, q, and r form a contradictory set of
propositions. However, finding each of the propositions intuitive seems not ir-
rational. In Cases 3, 5, and 6, in which Helen has a firm belief that contradicts
her intuition, having a belief that P and a belief that not-P at the same time
would seem clearly irrational. However, finding P intuitive and at the same
time believing not-P seems not irrational.
An ontology of intuitions should explain why it seems that Helen is not ir-
rational in these cases. I will call the challenge to explain this phenomenon the
Rationality Challenge to an ontology of intuitions. The Rationality Challenge
has not received much attention in the current debate, for diﬀerent reasons.
The reason deflationists have not paid much attention to it is most likely be-
cause the Gettier Cases have been the main focus.13 Rationalist inflationists,
in contrast, have focused on the following third phenomenon. In Cases 3, 5,
and 6, Helen’s intuitions are resistant to conflicting beliefs—or at least more
persistent than beliefs in philosophy usually are.14 In paradoxes such as Cases
5 and 6, we usually begin finding each of a set of contradictory propositions
intuitive and then search for a theory which will preserve as many of our intu-
itions as possible. Even if one or more of our intuitions are inconsistent with
the theory we come to be convinced of, we often keep finding each proposition
of the set intuitive. A similar persistence can be observed in Case 3, the Mary
Case. Even though Helen is convinced that physicalism is true, she still has
13See Williamson [140, chapter 7].
14See, e.g., Bealer: ‘[N]early any proposition about which you have beliefs, authority,
cajoling, intimidation, and so forth can, fairly readily, insinuate at least some doubt and
thereby diminish to some extent, perhaps only briefly, the strength of your belief. But
seldom, if ever, do these things so readily diminish the strength of your intuitions.’ [7, p.
208].
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the intuition that Mary learns something new when she considers the case.
An ontology of intuitions should account for all and not just some of these
paradigm cases. Based on the distinctive features Cases 1 to 6 show, I will
now suggest desiderata for an ontology of intuitions. An ontology of intuitions
should:
D1 allow for cases in which we have an intuition that P but no belief that P ;
D2 (the Rationality Challenge) explain why there seems to be no failure of
rationality in having inconsistent intuitions or in having an intuition that
P and a belief that not-P (where we know of the inconsistency) whereas
there would be such a failure in the case of beliefs;
D3 explain why an intuition is often resistant to a conflicting belief.
These desiderata will provide a useful guide for the evaluation of diﬀerent
accounts of intuitions. I take it that, other things being equal, a theory which
can account for more or all desiderata should be favoured over a theory that
can account for less of these desiderata. Moreover, a theory which can in some
sense account better for these desiderata should be favoured over a theory
which cannot account equally well for them. However, I do not take D1 to D3
to provide jointly suﬃcient constraints on a correct account of intuitions.
In what follows, I argue that deflationist and rationalist inflationist accounts
of intuitions do not meet D1 to D3 as well as a non-rationalist inflationist
account of intuitions which I present in section 2.6.
2.3 Simple Deflationism and the Rationality Challenge
According to simple deflationism, intuitions are just judgments or beliefs. Sim-
ple deflationism is not popular in the current debate over intuitions in philos-
ophy, and it is easy to see why deflationists hold more elaborate views. I will
address D1 and D3 only briefly and then focus on D2, the Rationality Chal-
lenge. Understanding why the Rationality Challenge poses a problem to the
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simple deflationist will help us to evaluate an elaborate deflationist account in
section 2.4.
It is obvious that simple deflationism cannot meet D1, the desideratum
that an account of intuitions allow for cases in which we have an intuition
that P but no belief that P. In fact, D1 begs the question against the simple
deflationist, because she disagrees with our description of the cases in section
2.2. The simple deflationist would have to say that while it might seem that in
the Trolley Case (Case 2), Helen suspends belief, she actually does believe that
we should not push the fat man, and in Cases 3 to 6 (the Mary Case and the
paradox cases), Helen simply has conflicting beliefs. However, I take it that
the description I gave of the above cases is prima facie plausible. At the very
least, the burden of proof rests on the simple deflationist to explain why Cases
2 to 6 are ones where we believe that P while it clearly seems that we have no
belief that P.
But even if we grant the simple deflationist a description of the cases in
terms of beliefs only, she owes us an explanation of why intuitions are often
resistant to conflicting beliefs (D3) and why there seems to be no failure of
rationality in Cases 3 to 6 (D2). With respect to D3, she could argue that
resistance to conflicting beliefs is not special to the beliefs we call ‘intuitions’,
but is a common psychological phenomenon with respect to belief in general.
Ideally, the simple deflationist could give an explanation of why our beliefs
are sometimes resistant to conflicting beliefs and sometimes not. Other things
being equal, a theory which can provide such an explanation is to be favoured
over a theory which cannot. (As we will see in sections 2.4 and 2.5, inflationist
accounts can give such an explanation.)
I will now focus on the Rationality Challenge (D2), which says that there
seems to be no failure of rationality in Cases 3, 5, and 6. I will show that two
obvious strategies to deal with this phenomenon within a simple deflationist
view of intuitions are problematic. First, the simple deflationist could identify
Helen’s intuitions with degrees of belief: in Cases 2 to 6, Helen does not fully
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believe the propositions, she rather believes them to a certain degree only, and
a certain distribution of credences makes her beliefs rational.15
However, there are good reasons to reject an account of intuitions in terms
of degrees of belief. According to an account of degrees of belief, a subject S
is not rational if the degrees of her contradictory beliefs P and not-P do not
add up to 1 on a scale from 0 to 1. Prima facie, such an account of intuitions
cannot accommodate Cases 3, 5, and 6. The reason is that in these cases,
our philosopher Helen is fully convinced of some proposition not-P while she
also has an intuition that P. Given that Helen is fully convinced that not-P,
her credence in not-P is close to 1. If she is rational, then her credence in
P will be close to 0, which cannot explain that she has an intuition that P.
Phenomenologically, an intuition is just not like a belief with very low credence.
If, however, Helen’s credence in P is not close to 0, then she does not assign a
coherent distribution of credences to her beliefs, in which case she is irrational,
thus failing to meet the Rationality Challenge.
Second, in order to meet the Rationality Challenge, the simple deflationist
could reject the Conjunction Principle, which says that if we are rational,
then if we believe a set of propositions, we also believe the conjunction of
them. Rejecting this principle, the simple deflationist could hold that whereas
believing a conjunction of inconsistent propositions is irrational, believing each
proposition individually is not irrational. Here is the principle:
Conjunction Principle: If S is rational, then if S believes P and S
believes Q, then S believes (P and Q).
If intuitions are beliefs, the Conjunction Principle implies that belief in
some contradictions is rational—paradoxes being paradigm cases. Consider
Helen. She is rational in cases 3, 5, and 6, but by the conjunction principle, she
believes in a contradiction. However, it is widely accepted that any theory of
rational belief is in need of a principle that prohibits belief in a contradiction16:
15This view derives from what Sturgeon [118] calls the Fine View of rational belief.
16Evnine [33, p. 202].
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No Contradiction Principle: If S is rational, then S does not believe
(P and not-P).
Obviously, the No Contradiction Principle is in conflict with the Conjunc-
tion Principle, so we have to abandon one of them. Rejecting the No Contra-
diction Principle is a possible way to go, but it is certainly the least popular
way to go.17 In the literature on rational belief, some philosophers discard
the Conjunction Principle.18 This strategy allows us to rationally believe all
propositions of a paradox individually without believing the conjunction of
them. The simple deflationist could make use of this strategy in order to ex-
plain why we do not seem irrational in Cases 3 to 6.
Rejecting the Conjunction Principle commits one to the claim that there
is a diﬀerence between being in a state of having contradictory beliefs and
being in a state of believing a contradiction, so that one could individually
believe P and Q without thereby believing the conjunction (P and Q). Simon
Evnine [33] argues that there is evidence to think that believing (P and Q)
and believing P and believing Q amounts to being in the same state. Evnine
observes that it is presupposed by our practice of attributing conjunctive beliefs
that there is only one state. For instance, when we summarize a person’s view,
we do this by attributing a conjunctive belief. We do not require evidence that
some psychological process has occurred in which all the individual beliefs were
conjoined to one single belief. According to Evnine, this suggests that it is not
possible to believe the conjuncts without believing the conjunction.19 If it is
not even possible to believe the conjuncts without believing the conjunction,
then the rejection of the Conjunction Principle fails.20
It seems, however, plausible that a subject S can, without being irrational,
hold beliefs that are implicitly contradictory, i.e., beliefs that imply P and not-
17For a rejection of the No Contradiction Principle, see Priest [93].
18Kyburg [68], Cherniak [15], Kornblith [63], Foley [36], and more recently Christensen
[16] and Sturgeon [118].
19Evnine takes it to be a conceptual truth that believing the conjunctions and believing
the conjunction is one and the same state, see Evnine [33, p. 215].
20Evnine [33, pp. 214-219].
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P without S knowing or being aware of it. We often hold several beliefs which
are jointly inconsistent either for a lack of knowledge or a lack of reflection, and
it is at least controversial whether we are irrational in these cases. The cases
under consideration, in contrast, are cases of conscious belief in which we are
aware of the inconsistency in our set of beliefs. That we are perfectly aware
of our intuitions towards all three propositions of the paradox cases and the
fact that they are inconsistent is obvious from the fact that we consider Cases
4, 5, and 6 as paradoxical. The same is true for Case 3, the Mary Case: the
intuition, the belief, and the fact that they are inconsistent are conscious to
our philosopher Helen. All we need for our cases is a principle that prohibits
conscious belief in a conscious contradiction (P and not-P). Hence, even if
general arguments against it fail, the Conjunction Principle should still apply
to cases of a small number of conscious beliefs where we are also aware of the
inferential relations between these beliefs—cases such as paradoxes and thought
experiments.
I have argued that two prima facie plausible strategies to defend simple
deflationism against the Rationality Challenge (D2) are problematic. Neither
of the strategies provide a satisfying explanation of why we are not irrational in
cases where we have contradictory or conflicting intuitions. The deflationists in
the current debate over the ontology of intuitions seem to acknowledge that a
more elaborate view is required. In the following section, I present and discuss
Williamson’s account, according to which an intuition is either a belief or an
inclination to believe. I consider that a disambiguation of the term ‘inclination
to believe’ allows for two diﬀerent accounts. The account that fits in naturally
with a deflationist view fails to meet D2 for reasons similar to the ones discussed
with respect to simple deflationism. Whereas the second account meets D2,
inflationist accounts (which I discuss in sections 2.5 and 2.6) have an advantage
over it: they provide an explanation of why intuitions sometimes are resistant
to conflicting beliefs, i.e., they meet D3.
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2.4 Elaborate Deflationism and Persistent Intuitions
According to Williamson [138], [140], to have the intuition that P is either to
believe that P or to be merely consciously inclined to judge or believe that
P. I will call this view an ‘elaborate deflationist’ view of intuitions. Elaborate
deflationism applies to our cases as follows. In Case 1, the Gettier Case, Helen
believes that Smith does not know that the man who will get the job has 10
coins in his pocket; in Cases 2 to 6, she is merely consciously inclined to believe
the respective propositions.
Unlike simple deflationism, Williamson’s elaborate deflationism allows for
cases in which we have an intuition but no belief, i.e., it meets D1. At first
sight, it also provides an explanation of why we are not irrational in Cases
3 to 6, i.e., it seems to meet the Rationality Challenge (D2). According to
Williamson, if S believes that P, S is committed to the truth of P, but if S is
merely consciously inclined to believe that P, S is not committed to the truth
of P :
In the way in which I am committed to the propositions that I
believe, I am not committed to the propositions that I am merely
inclined to believe; I am merely inclined to commit myself to them
in that way. [138, p. 128]
Because there is no commitment to the truth involved in inclinations to
believe, they do not obey any No Contradiction Principle. In Case 4, the
Lottery Paradox, we have conscious inclinations to believe all three propositions
of the inconsistent set. Since we are not committed to the truth of these
propositions, the inconsistency does not pose a problem. In Cases 3, 5, and
6, we have a conscious inclination to believe that P and a belief that not-P.
The explanation of why we are not irrational in these cases is again that we
are not committed to the truth of the content of our conscious inclinations to
believe that P. In what follows, I will first argue that elaborate deflationism
cannot meet the Rationality Challenge because it cannot account for the fact
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that we are equally rational in both kinds of cases (Cases 3, 5, and 6 on the
one hand, and Case 4 on the other hand). Second, I will argue that elaborate
deflationism does not meet D3.
To argue that elaborate deflationism cannot meet the Rationality Challenge,
let us see if a conscious inclination to believe is necessary and suﬃcient for an
intuition. There are not many arguments to be found in the literature as to
whether our intuitions necessarily involve conscious inclinations to believe or
not. Williamson makes the following introspective claim about intuitions:
I can feel such an inclination even if it is quite stably overridden,
and I am not in the least danger of giving way to temptation (just
as one can feel the inclination to kick someone without being in the
least danger of giving way). [140, p. 217]
Unlike Williamson, some authors think that we sometimes have an intu-
ition that P without a conscious inclination to believe that P. Earlenbaugh &
Molyneux [31] defend an account of intuitions as inclinations to believe, but
they think that it seems plausible that there are cases of intuitions without
inclinations to believe:
There at least appear to be cases where one has an intuition without
an accompanying inclination to believe. It seems coherent, that is,
to claim that we can have an intuition that p without being inclined
to believe p. [31, p. 106]
As an example of such a case, they mention the Naive Comprehension Axiom
(i.e., for any property, there is a set of things having that property) which is
intuitive to us even though we have a firm belief that it is not true. This case
is parallel to our Cases 3, 5, and 6, where Helen has a firm belief that not-P
and an intuition that P. I share Earlenbaugh & Molyneux’s view that there
appear to be cases where one has an intuition that P and no inclination to
believe that P, and I think that there in fact are such cases.
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The reason why philosophers disagree about whether there are intuitions
without inclinations to believe could be due to an ambiguity of the term ‘incli-
nation to believe’. Let me introduce a distinction between ‘doxastic inclinations
to believe’ and ‘merely psychological inclinations to believe’. Doxastic inclina-
tions to believe work in certain respects like guesses. If S guesses that Q, S
is not committed to the truth of Q. However, if S firmly believes not-Q and
S is rational, she does not guess that Q. Her guess that Q commits her to
stop guessing that Q as soon as she firmly believes not-Q. Similarly, if S firmly
believes not-Q and S is rational, she is not doxastically inclined to believe that
Q.21 Doxastic inclinations to believe are derivatives of belief in the sense that
they involve some kind of rational commitment, i.e., they inherit some rational-
ity principles from belief. They certainly do not inherit the No Contradiction
Principle, since the fact that we do not violate this principle when we have
contradictory conscious inclinations to believe is exactly the work inclinations
to believe do as opposed to beliefs. However, doxastic inclinations to believe
are likely to inherit Closure under Consciously Known Entailment. For belief,
the principle is formulated thus:
Closure under Consciously Known Entailment (for conscious be-
lief): If S is rational, then if S consciously believes that P and
knows that Q is entailed by P, and considers whether Q, then S
consciously believes that Q.
Closure under Consciously Known Entailment is not aﬀected by the work
inclinations to believe do as opposed to beliefs. Suppose that conscious belief is
closed under consciously known entailment. For instance, suppose that Helen
consciously believes that if the cat is in the kitchen, it is not in the garden.
If Helen also consciously believes that the cat is in the kitchen, then if she is
rational, Helen consciously believes that it is not in the garden. For a doxastic
inclination to believe, the principle is formulated thus:
21There are, of course, diﬀerences between doxastic inclinations to believe and guesses.
Whereas we can have contradictory doxastic inclinations to believe, we cannot guess that P
and guess that not-P.
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Closure under Consciously Known Entailment (for conscious dox-
astic inclination to believe): If S is rational, then if S is consciously
doxastically inclined to believe that P and consciously knows that
Q is entailed by P, and considers whether Q, then S is consciously
doxastically inclined to believe that Q.
Suppose that Helen wonders where the cat is and for some reason comes
to be consciously inclined to believe that the cat is in the kitchen, but she
does not believe it (say, because her evidence is rather poor). Suppose further
that Helen now considers whether the cat is in the garden. Then if she is
rational, she will be consciously inclined to believe that the cat is not in the
garden. This case makes it at least plausible that Closure under Consciously
Known Entailment holds not only for conscious beliefs but also for conscious
doxastic inclinations to believe. Merely psychological inclinations to believe, in
contrast, do not involve any kind of rational commitment: they are not subject
to rational evaluation, i.e., we might want to call them arational.
We could resolve the disagreement between Williamson and Earlenbaugh
& Molyneux as follows. What Williamson claims is that he can feel a merely
psychological inclination to believe that P when he has an intuition that P and
a belief that not-P. Earlenbaugh & Molyneux’s, however, have the intuition
that we do not necessarily have a doxastic inclination to believe that P when
we have an intuition that P and a belief that not-P.
I will now show that a doxastic inclination to believe that P is neither
suﬃcient nor necessary for an intuition that P in the relevant cases where an
intuition is not a belief. To begin with, there is at least a prima facie diﬀerence
between cases where we have an intuition that P and a firm belief that not-P
on the one hand (Cases 3, 5, and 6) and cases where we have an intuition that
P without a firm belief that not-P on the other hand (Case 4). If we think
that intuitions are doxastic inclinations to believe, we should expect it to seem
at least more irrational to be consciously inclined to believe P in the case in
which we have the firm belief that not-P than in the case in which we only
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have a contradicting conscious inclination to believe not-P. After all, we are
committed to the truth of our firm belief in Cases 3, 5, and 6, whereas we
are not committed to the truth of our inconsistent conscious inclinations in
Case 4. However, all cases are similar with respect to rationality: we seem not
irrational in Cases 3, 5, and 6 to the same extent as in Case 4.
To show that a doxastic inclination to believe is not suﬃcient for an in-
tuition, let us now have a look at Case 4 again. Suppose we are doxastically
inclined to believe the contents of our intuitions in the Lottery Paradox. Here
are the propositions again:
p: S knows that S will not have enough money to go on a safari
this year.
q : If S knows that S will not have enough money to go on a safari
this year, then S is in a position to know that S will not win a
major prize in a lottery this year.
r : S is in not in a position to know that S will not win a major
prize in a lottery this year.
Helen has intuitions towards p, q, and r. Suppose intuitions are doxastic
inclinations to believe. Then Helen has doxastic inclinations to believe p, q,
and r. It is also plausible to suppose that Helen, who is a rational subject
and knows what a paradox is, consciously knows that, for instance, (p and
r) entails not-q. Hence, Helen has a doxastic inclination to believe q and a
doxastic inclination to believe not-q, but clearly she has no intuition that not-
q, which shows that a doxastic inclination to believe is not suﬃcient for an
intuition.
In order to show that a doxastic inclination to believe is not necessary for
an intuition either, let us have a look at cases in which Helen has an intuition
that P and a firm belief that not-P (Cases 3, 5, and 6). In these cases, Helen
does not believe the content of her intuition that P. If she had a doxastic
inclination to believe that P, she would moreover have a doxastic inclination to
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believe what she knows to be entailed by P. However, Helen is not doxastically
inclined to believe what is entailed by the content of her intuition that P. Take
Case 3 as an example. Helen has the firm belief that physicalism is true and
the intuition that Mary will learn something new. However, Helen clearly does
not have the intuition that physicalism is false, and she does not even have
the doxastic inclination to believe that physicalism is false. After all, Helen
has a firm belief that physicalism is true. But doxastic inclinations to believe,
I argued above, obey Closure under Consciously Known Entailment. So, if
Helen has a doxastic inclination to believe that Mary learns something new,
and she knows that this entails that physicalism is false, then Helen should
have the doxastic inclination to believe that physicalism is false. Hence, since
the state we are talking about does not obey Closure under Consciously Known
Entailment, it does not seem to involve a doxastic inclination to believe. Helen
only has an intuition that Mary will learn something new, and this intuition
does not obey Closure under Consciously Known Entailment.
If what I argued is correct, it supports Earlenbaugh & Molyneux’s intuition:
there are cases where we have an intuition that P and no inclination to believe
that P, at least no doxastic inclination to believe. One might, however, want
to argue that elaborate deflationism does not involve doxastic inclinations to
believe but only merely psychological inclinations to believe. The fact that
these inclinations to believe are arational explains why we are not irrational in
the relevant cases.
In order to defend this version of the elaborate deflationist account of in-
tuitions, one would have to say more about two things. First, one would have
to explain in what sense such an account of intuitions as beliefs or merely psy-
chological inclinations to believe would be a deflationist account, given that
merely psychological inclinations to believe do not seem to share many of be-
lief’s characteristic properties. Second, one would have to say something about
what exactly merely psychological inclinations to believe are, given that they
do not share much with belief.
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Now let us come back to the Rationality Challenge. An account of intuitions
as beliefs or doxastic inclinations to believe simply does not cover all our cases.
In Cases 3, 5, and 6, we do not have a doxastic inclination to believe, and this
explains why we are not irrational. However, a version of elaborate deflationism
according to which intuitions are beliefs or merely psychological inclinations to
believe would meet the Rationality Challenge. It would explain why we are
equally rational in Cases 3, 5, and 6 on the one hand and Case 4 on the other
hand.
But even if the elaborate deflationist can establish that intuitions are either
beliefs or merely psychological inclinations to believe, it seems that she can-
not provide an explanation of why intuitions are often resistant to conflicting
beliefs. This would mean that elaborate deflationism cannot meet D3.
Here is, however, one explanation a deflationist might oﬀer. There might
be a simple psychological explanation for merely psychological inclinations to
believe: sometimes we are psychologically inclined to believe a proposition P
even if we are convinced that P is false. For instance, a mother is inclined
to believe that her son is innocent of killing the neighbour’s cat even if she
firmly believes that he is guilty, maybe even if she saw him killing the cat.
This merely psychological inclination to believe is probably caused by how
much she loves her son and by her wish that he had not killed the cat. Since
her love and her wish persist, her inclination is persistent as well. Maybe
a similar explanation could work for some of our intuitions in philosophy?
This seems rather implausible. First, we usually do not have philosophical
intuitions towards personal subject matters we are emotionally involved in
(except maybe in moral philosophy). Second, we share many intuitions with
other philosophers, and intuitions such as the ones we have in paradox cases
are equally persistent to many philosophers. It is very implausible to assume
that we would find a psychological explanation for all philosophers with regard
to these cases. Moreover, and as we will see in section 2.5, the inflationist has
a better explanation.
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Note that the phenomenon of persistent intuitions concerns both thought
experiments (as in Case 3) and paradoxes (as in Cases 5 and 6). It does not
occur randomly, it rather appears systematically with paradigm cases of our use
of the term ‘intuition’ in philosophy. The fact that intuitions are resistant to
conflicting beliefs has been one of the main arguments for inflationist accounts
of intuitions. In the next two sections, I present and address two inflationist
accounts.
2.5 Rationalist Inflationism and Paradigm Cases
George Bealer’s (e.g., [6], [7]) and Ernest Sosa’s (e.g., [115]) inflationist accounts
of intuitions tie in with the rationalist tradition after Descartes according to
which intuition is understood as a source of a priori knowledge.22 Whereas
traditional rationalism understands this source as infallible, contemporary ra-
tionalists like Bealer and Sosa think that our intuitions sometimes lead us awry.
They can thus account for the fact that we have an intuition towards each of
the propositions that form a paradox, but at least one intuition is misguided.
According to Bealer, intuitions constitute a ‘sui generis, irreducible, natural
[. . . ] propositional attitude that occurs episodically’.23 When we have an
intuition that P, it intellectually seems to us that it must be that P and could
not be otherwise. This phenomenology cannot be analyzed further, which Alvin
Plantinga expresses as follows:
[Intuitions come with] that peculiar form of phenomenology with
which we are all well acquainted, but which I can’t describe in any
way other than as the phenomenology that goes with seeing that
such a proposition is true. [92, pp. 105-106]
At first sight, Bealer’s rationalist inflationist account meets desiderata D1 to
D3. In fact, the phenomena behind D1, D2, and D3 have motivated rationalist
22See also Plantinga [92].
23Bealer [7, p. 207].
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inflationist views that intuitions are an extra kind of propositional attitude.24
If intuitions are a sui generis propositional attitude, this explains that there
are cases in which we have an intuition that P but no belief that P (D1),
that we are not irrational in the case of a set of inconsistent intuitions or an
intuition that P and a belief that not-P (D2), and that intuitions are more
persistent than beliefs (D3). Bealer points to the fact that similar phenomena
can be observed with respect to sensory seemings in optical illusions such as
the Mu¨ller-Lyer illusion. In the Mu¨ller-Lyer illusion, it seems to us that one
line is longer, but we do not believe it. We are not irrational when it seems to
us that one line is longer, and the illusion is persistent.25
However, looking at our cases, it seems that in philosophy, we are not only
concerned with what would qualify as an intellectual seeming. Compare Cases
5 and 6, the Paradox of the Heap and the Paradox of Emotional Response to
Fiction. Whereas the rationalist inflationist would take it that the intuitions
in Case 5 are a source of a priori knowledge, she would certainly agree that the
propositions in Case 6 are contingent and that they cannot be known a priori,
and hence that we cannot have rational intuitions towards them.
Bealer, however, distinguishes two kinds of intuitions, intellectual or ratio-
nal a priori seemings and non-rational a posteriori seemings. He calls non-
rational seemings ‘physical’ because they stem from the experience we have of
the contingent physical world. Their content is not presented as necessary, and
in philosophy, we are not concerned with them:
When we speak here of intuition, we mean “rational intuition.”
This is distinguished from what physicists call “physical intuition.”
We have a physical intuition that, when a house is undermined, it
will fall. This does not count as a rational intuition, for it does
not present itself as necessary: it does not seem that a house un-
dermined must fall; plainly it is possible for a house undermined to
24Bealer [7, p. 208], [6, p. 6], Sosa [112, p. 258f], Pust [96, p. 32f].
25See, e.g., Bealer [7, pp. 207-214].
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remain in its original position or, indeed, to rise up.’ [7, p. 207]
Other cases where we have non-rational intuitions are scientific thought
experiments. Bealer mentions the following case:
A classic example is Newton’s thought experiment about a rotat-
ing bucket in an otherwise empty space. Would water creep up
the side of the bucket (assuming that the physical laws remained
unchanged)? Rational intuition is silent about this sort of ques-
tion. Rational intuitions concern such matters as whether a case is
possible (logically or metaphysically), and about whether a concept
applies to such cases. [7, p. 207]
Another example is Schroedinger’s case of the cat which is directed against
the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Schroedinger asks us to
imagine a cat, placed in a sealed box together with some poison, a radioactive
source and a Geiger counter. If the Geiger counter detects radiation, the poison
gets released. The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics implies
that after a while, the cat is simultaneously dead and alive. However, we have
the intuition that when we look into the box, the cat is either dead or alive,
but it cannot be both. Our intuition in this case has contingent content we get
to know a posteriori.26
Bealer thinks that intuitions we are dealing with in philosophy are diﬀerent
from intuitions in the sciences: they are rational seemings.27 However, while
our intuitions in the Paradox of Emotional Response to Fiction would not
be considered rational seemings, this case is certainly relevant to philosophy.
Since its introduction by Colin Radford [97], it has played a central role in the
philosophy of fiction and the philosophy of emotions. Some philosophers argue
that q, the claim that we cannot feel pity for someone we do not believe exists, is
false (e.g., Carroll [13], Feagin [34]). Other philosophers deny p, the claim that
we can feel pity for Anna Karenina. Some of them think that we cannot have
26See Sorensen [110] for more thought experiments in the sciences.
27Bealer [7, p. 207].
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a genuine emotional response to fictional situations or fictional characters, and
that what we experience is a quasi-emotion (e.g., Walton [130]). Others think
that the emotions we experience when we engage with fiction are really directed
towards relevantly similar actual characters and situations (e.g., Charlton [14]).
Obviously, the Paradox of Emotional Response to Fiction poses a problem we
are discussing in philosophy.28 It seems that non-rational intuitions not only
play a role in scientific thought experiments, they also play a role in philosophy.
In order to justify an ontological diﬀerence between our intuitions in Case
5 and our intuitions in Case 6, Bealer could argue that the phenomenology of
our intuitions in Case 5 is diﬀerent from the phenomenology of our intuitions
in Case 6. On introspection, I cannot find any diﬀerence between my intuition
that a single grain cannot make a diﬀerence to whether something is a heap or
not on the one hand and my intuition that we can feel genuine pity for Anna
Karenina on the other hand. Even philosophers who share Bealer’s epistemic
view disagree about the supposed phenomenological aspect of rational intu-
itions. Joel Pust [96], who endorses a rationalist inflationist view very similar
to Bealer’s, thinks that the content of a rational intuition only seems necessary
to us on reflection.29 However, even on reflection, I do not experience such a
diﬀerence.
Sosa’s [115] account of rational intuitions does not presuppose a particular
phenomenology. Sosa is mainly interested in the question of how our intuitions
in paradigm cases of a priori knowledge—such as in arithmetic, geometry, or
in philosophical thought experiments and paradoxes—justify our beliefs, and
how we can best account for these intuitions. According to Sosa, intuitions
are intellectual seemings that, unlike perceptual seemings, are not passively
received and hence are epistemically evaluable.30 A visual experience as if
28A similar case where we have intuitions with contingent, a posteriori content is the
Paradox of Painful Art which consists of the following three propositions: 1. People do not
seek out situations that arouse painful emotions. 2. People have painful emotions in response
to some art. 3. People seek out art that they know will arouse painful emotions. See Smuts
[108, p. 60].
29Pust [96, pp. 31-39].
30Sosa [115, pp. 46, 49].
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there is a fire, for instance,
[. . . ] is thought to yield foundational justification, being itself be-
yond relevant evaluation, beyond justification and unjustification.
The intellectual seeming, by contrast is thus evaluable. A reason
can be assigned the wrong weight, as it attracts one’s assent too
much, or too little. [115, p. 49]
Sosa specifies conditions under which an intellectual seeming is intuitive
and rational.31 These conditions have to be understood in the context of his
broader epistemic view, i.e., his virtue epistemology:
[. . . ] the proposed account [of intuitions] has two parts: first, an
understanding of intuitions as a special sort of intellectual seemings,
intuitive seemings; second, a definition of the sort of intuition that
is distinctively “rational.”
1. An intellectual seeming is intuitive when it is an attraction
to assent triggered simply by considering a proposition con-
sciously with understanding. (Of course, one may so much as
understand the proposition only through a complex and pro-
longed process that includes perception, memory, testimony,
or inference.)
2. S rationally intuits that p if and only if S’s intuitive attraction
to assent to < p > is explained by a competence (an epistemic
ability or virtue) on the part of S to discriminate, among con-
tents that he understands well enough, the true from the false,
in some subfield of the modally strong (the necessarily true or
necessarily false), with no reliance on introspection, percep-
tion, memory, testimony, or inference (nor further reliance,
31Note that I am concerned with Sosa’s characterization of intuitions in his 2007 book A
Virtue Epistemology (Vol. 1) only, see [115, pp. 44-63].
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anyhow, than any required for so much as understanding the
given proposition). [115, pp. 60-61]
One might think that since Sosa characterizes intuitions as attractions to
assent that are epistemically evaluable, his view is similar to an elaborate defla-
tionist account according to which intuitions are beliefs or doxastic inclinations
to believe. In this case, it would not meet D2 and D3 for the reasons given in
section 2.4. If intuitions are epistemically evaluable, it seems that we cannot
explain why someone with a firm belief that not-P and an intuition that P
is rational (D2) and why intuitions are more resistant to contradictory beliefs
than other beliefs (D3). However, it seems that Sosa rather characterizes in-
tuitions primarily as intellectual seemings, and then specifies them as intuitive
seemings that are a certain kind of attraction and that share with beliefs the
property of being rationally evaluable.
Just like Bealer, Sosa is only interested in rational a priori intuitions and
how they justify our beliefs. My question, however, is what could explain the
phenomena behind D1 to D3 best. Assuming that rational intuitions do not
or at least do not necessarily come with a particular phenomenology, we can
say the following. The intuitions we have towards the propositions in Case
6 do not seem diﬀerent from the intuitions we have in Case 5 with respect
to D1 to D3. Independent of whether intuitions provide a source of a priori
or of a posteriori knowledge, whether their content is modally strong or not,
or whether they ought to be explained by a certain competence, the following
holds. First, intuitions do not necessarily involve a belief with the same content
(D1). Second, we are not irrational when we have an intuition that P and a
belief that not-P (D2). Third, intuitions are more persistent than beliefs (D3).
It seems that the ontology of our intuitions in Case 5 should be the same
as the ontology of our intuitions in Case 6. I will now show how an account
of intuitions as appearances can meet D1 to D3 best, because it covers all our
cases. The advantage of this non-rationalist inflationist account is that it does
not commit us to any particular epistemic view.
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2.6 Intuitions as Appearances
In a short paper titled ‘Seemings’, William Tolhurst [122] gives a very dense
presentation of his general account of seemings:
Philosophers have worried much about whether, when, and why we
are justified in believing that things are as they seem. Less attention
has been paid to the general question of what it is for things to
seem to be a certain way. Most work on the nature of seemings
has focussed on perception and, to a lesser extent, memory [. . . ]
Some seemings do not fit into these two categories. For example, a
student in a logic class may consider a proof and find it seems to be
valid. Seemings whose objects are abstract objects are not covered
by accounts of memory and perception. In what follows, I seek to
develop a general account that will cover all these cases. [122, p.
293]
While I cannot discuss every aspect of Tolhurst’s account of seemings, I will
look at how it could apply to Cases 1 to 6 and meet desiderata D1 to D3.
According to Tolhurst, seemings are very much like beliefs in that they are
intentional states with a mind-to-world direction of fit (unlike desires, wishes,
etc.). Their contents either fit or fail to fit how things are, just like belief
contents. Despite their similarity to beliefs, seemings constitute a distinct
kind of mental state. Their relation to beliefs is both causal and epistemic: a
seeming can cause and also evidentially support a belief. The circumstances
under which a seeming both causes and evidentially supports a belief, however,
do not always obtain. Whether or not they obtain, the seeming involves a felt
demand that one believe its content: a felt veridicality, ‘the feel of a state
whose content reveals how things really are.’32 Seemings also carry with them
a disposition to form second order beliefs about them.
Here is Tolhurst’s characterization of seemings:
32Tolhurst [122, pp. 298-299].
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It seems to S that φ is t only if
i) S is in a mental state, m, whose content is that φ is t,
ii) m has a property (felt veridicality) which
a) evokes in S the felt demand that S believe that φ is t,
and
b) would, other things equal, evoke in S the felt demand
that S believe that m is veridical if S were to reflect on
her experience of m. [122, p. 299]
Let us first look at some cases Tolhurst gives to distinguish seemings from be-
liefs and to show how seemings cause and evidentially support beliefs. Instead
of ‘felt demand’, I will use ‘felt inclination’ in what follows (Tolhurst uses both
terms interchangeably. I take a ‘felt inclination’ to be the same as a ‘conscious
inclination’, see my discussion of Williamson’s account in section 2.4).
Case A: Seeming with belief
It seems to Sam that there is a puddle in front of her and Sam also
believes that there is a puddle in front of her. The seeming both
causes and evidentially supports her belief.33
Case B: Seeming with felt inclination to believe
Bert has conflicting seemings. On the one hand, Ernie looks angry.
On the other hand, Ernie assures Bert that he is not angry. It
seems (prima facie) to Bert that Ernie is angry, but it also seems
(prima facie) to him that he is not angry. The first inclines Bert to
believe that Ernie is angry, the second inclines Bert to believe that
Ernie is not angry. Because of his conflicting felt inclinations, Bert
withholds judgment. Both seemings are overridden and generate
no beliefs.34
33Tolhurst [122, p. 294].
34Tolhurst [122, pp. 294-295].
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Case C: No belief, no felt inclination to believe: mere appearance
William, who is fully aware of the situation, is looking at a white
object under red light. It appears to him that the object is red,
but this appearance is overridden by his knowledge to the contrary,
and he is not inclined to believe that the object is red. Whereas the
appearance disposes William to believe that the object is red, there
is no psychological motivation for him to believe that the object is
red.35
Tolhurst distinguishes between all-things-considered seemings which gener-
ate beliefs, as in Case A, and prima facie seemings which only generate felt
inclinations to believe, as in Case B. Case C cannot be explained by Tolhurst’s
characterization of seemings given above because the appearance that the ob-
ject is red does not involve a felt inclination to believe that the object is red.
To cover cases like C, Tolhurst introduces the term ‘appearance’ for states re-
gardless of whether they incline us to believe that things are as they appear.
He then uses the term ‘seeming’ for appearances that cause an inclination to
believe or that generate a belief and the term ‘mere appearance’ for those
that do not cause an inclination to believe and that do not generate a belief.
Tolhurst thinks that ordinary usage does not provide an answer to whether
states that incline us to believe the content and such that do not should be
classed together or not. However, it seems obvious that he in fact does class
them together. Tolhurst gives the following characterization of appearances in
general.36
All appearances dispose the subject to believe the content [. . . ] This
is not to say that they all provide occurrent motivation, e.g., a felt
35Tolhurst [122, pp. 295-297].
36One reason why Tolhurst does not introduce seemings as kinds of appearance states
from the beginning might be that his main interest are prima facie seemings which carry
with them a felt inclination to believe. Prima facie seemings are more interesting than mere
appearances and more salient than seemings all-things-considered. Mere appearances are
less interesting because they are overriden and hence of no epistemic relevance. Seemings
all-things-considered are less salient because they are accompanied by a belief and there is
less reason to address the seeming if there is a belief with the same content.
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inclination, to believe; but that they create conditions favourable
for believing. This disposition, like other dispositions, is only ac-
tivated under appropriate circumstances. Things that are brittle
have a disposition to crack and shatter: under some circumstances
they crack, under more extreme conditions they shatter, but often
neither happens because these conditions do not obtain. Likewise,
under appropriate circumstances appearances generate beliefs and
felt inclinations to believe. When an appearance is decisively de-
feated or passes unnoticed, the conditions appropriate for the ac-
tivation of the disposition do not obtain and it may not provide
actual psychological support for believing. [122, p. 296]37
The analogy to brittle things that sometimes crack and sometimes shatter
suggests that under some circumstances, an appearance generates a felt incli-
nation to believe, in which case it is a prima facie seeming, and under some
other circumstances, it generates a belief, in which case it is a seeming all-
things-considered. Under some circumstances, however, it does not generate
either an inclination to believe or a belief, in which case we call it a ‘mere
appearance’.
In line with Tolhurst’s characterization of a seeming, we can give the fol-
lowing more general characterization of an appearance state.
It appears to S that p only if
i) S is in a mental state, m, whose content is that p,
ii) m has a property (felt veridicality) which
37Gregory [49] gives a similar account of the relation between sensory appearances and
beliefs: ‘There are especially intimate links between sensory appearances and many of our
beliefs about the outside world. Indeed, the links are so intimate that some philosophers
have identified sensory appearances with beliefs, or with the acquisition of beliefs. That
identification is too strong – the appearances persist when weve not got any inclination to
trust them – but there is something right about it: part of what it is for sensory appearances
to be ‘appearances’ is that they can be accurate or inaccurate in just the way that beliefs
can be.’ Gregory [49, p. 321]. Gregory then takes sensory and memory appearances as a
starting point to argue that possibility appearances are distinctive states as well.
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a) would, absent a contradicting belief that not-p, evoke
in S the felt inclination that S believe that p, and
b) would, absent a contradicting felt inclination to believe
(and hence absent a belief38) that not-p, evoke in S the
belief that p, and
c) would, other things equal, evoke in S the felt demand
that S believe that m is veridical if S were to reflect on
her experience of m.
Tolhurst also distinguishes ‘peripheral appearances’, which are mere ap-
pearances that pass unnoticed by the subject but may be registered in memory
at later times. Note that peripheral appearances do not satisfy the charac-
terization I have given above, because they are not occurrent or felt states. I
am not sure that peripheral appearances should be classed together with felt
appearances, because it is not clear what it means that something appears to a
subject to be a certain way without the subject actually noticing that it seems
to her in a certain way.
Note again that Tolhurst’s seemings can have all kinds of contents, and
so can appearances in general. However, all appearances have propositional
content, they involve a felt veridicality, and they dispose us to have a felt
inclination to believe and to have a belief with the same content. These con-
ditions are necessary, but they might not be suﬃcient to specify all kinds of
appearances. Sensory appearances, for instance, might come with a special
phenomenology. More work has to be done to distinguish diﬀerent kinds of
appearances, but this would go beyond the scope of the present chapter.
Having presented and slightly adapted Tolhurst’s account of appearances,
let us now see whether, as an account of intuitions, it can meet D1 to D3. Note
that we are not interested in the justificatory relation our beliefs might have to
38It is widely held and I take it to be the case that whenever a subject S has a belief that
P she also has an inclination to believe that P.
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the appearance states. We are merely interested in the causal relation which
might explain the phenomena observed with respect to Cases 1 to 6.
Case 1, the Gettier Case, is parallel to Case A. It appears to Helen that
Smith does not know that the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his
pocket. This seeming causes her belief that the man who will get the job has
10 coins in his pocket. The circumstances are such that nothing blocks Helen’s
belief.
Case 4, the Lottery Paradox, is not directly parallel to any of the cases,
but it is closest to Case B. Helen has appearances towards a set of inconsis-
tent propositions, not just towards two contradictory propositions as in Case
B. Since the propositions are inconsistent and she realizes that they cannot
possibly all be true, Helen refrains from judging. However, nothing prevents
her from being inclined to believe each proposition. Having an inconsistent set
of appearances could have the same eﬀect as having two contradictory appear-
ances: it blocks belief, but not inclination to believe.
Case 2, the Trolley Case, is not directly covered by any of Tolhurst’s cases
either. It is again most similar to Case B. It appears to Helen that if she was
in the situation described in the case, she should not push the fat man. We
could describe the case such that Helen is inclined to believe that she should
not push the fat man, or we could describe the case such that Helen is not even
inclined to believe that she should not push the fat man. What blocks Helen’s
belief or even her inclination to believe is that she finds the question diﬃcult to
answer, and she thinks that in order to form a belief, she would have to think
a lot more about moral theory. Hence, a lack of confidence in our judgment in
a certain area or the knowledge that we have not fully understood a complex
matter might block our belief that P or even our inclination to believe that P.
Cases 3, 5, and 6 are parallel to Case C. The Mary Case, the Paradox of
the Heap, and the Paradox of Emotional Response to Fiction are such that
Helen does not have either a felt inclination or a belief with the content of
her respective intuition. In Case 3, it appears to Helen that Mary will learn
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something new when released from her black and while room. However, this
appearance does not cause a belief or an inclination to believe. The reason is
that it is blocked by her firm belief that physicalism is true and her belief that
physicalism is inconsistent with the proposition that Mary learns something
new.
In Case 5, it appears to Helen that one single grain cannot make a diﬀerence
to whether something is a heap or not. However, this appearance does not cause
a belief or an inclination to believe. The reason is that it is blocked by Helen’s
firm belief that she has solved the paradox because it is false that one single
grain cannot make such a diﬀerence.
In Case 6, it appears to Helen that we can feel genuine pity for Anna
Karenina. However, this appearance does not cause a belief or an inclination
to believe because it is blocked by Helen’s firm belief that we can only have
quasi-emotions towards Anna Karenina. In all three cases, Helen has a belief
which contradicts the content of her appearance, and hence a belief or a felt
inclination to believe with the content of the appearance does not occur.
Let us come back to desiderata D1 to D3 for an account of intuitions.
We have seen that an account of intuitions as appearances allows for cases in
which we have an intuition that P but no belief that P (Tolhurst’s cases B and
C and Cases 2 to 6), which means that it meets D1. However, appearances
share some features with beliefs: they are intentional states with a mind-to-
word direction of fit, the latter of which distinguishes them from states like
wondering, assuming, supposing, and imagining. Due to the felt veridicality
they involve, appearances dispose us to form a belief or a felt inclination to
believe towards their content. Note that the ‘inclination to believe’ could either
be a merely psychological inclination to believe or a doxastic inclination to
believe which involves some rational commitment (as distinguished in section
2.4). It could be the latter because in cases where we have an intuition that P
and a firm belief that not-P, we have no inclination to believe that P, we merely
have an appearance as to P. Appearances do not involve any kind of rational or
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doxastic commitment to their content. This explains why it is not irrational to
have an intuition that P and a belief that not-P at the same time. Hence, an
account of intuitions as appearances can meet the Rationality Challenge (D2).
D3 can be met as well, since the resistance of intuitions to conflicting beliefs
could just be a feature of appearances in general. We are familiar with this
phenomenon from the resistance of appearances in the case of optical illusions.
Even though we know that the stick in the water is not bent, it appears to us
that it is bent whenever we look at it.
2.7 Conclusion
I have presented and discussed several accounts of intuitions which are popular
in the current debate over the ontology of intuitions, and I have argued that
we have reasons to endorse an account that has not received much attention in
the current debate, namely an account of intuitions as appearance states.
After having presented some key phenomena that, other things being equal,
an ontology of intuitions should accommodate and explain, I discussed a simple
deflationist view according to which intuitions are just beliefs or judgments, a
more elaborate deflationist view according to which intuitions are either beliefs
or inclinations to believe, and two rationalist inflationist accounts of intuitions.
I argued that each of these accounts has some problems accommodating and
explaining these key phenomena.
I showed in section 2.3 that the main problem the simple deflationist ac-
count has is that it cannot meet the Rationality Challenge (D2), which is the
desideratum that an account of intuitions explain why it is not irrational to
have an inconsistent set of intuitions or an intuition that P and a belief that
not-P at the same time.
In section 2.4, I showed that an elaborate deflationist view can be under-
stood in two ways. First, intuitions are either beliefs or doxastic inclinations
to believe. Second, intuitions are either beliefs or merely psychological inclina-
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tions to believe. I argued that the first version of elaborate deflationism still
cannot meet the Rationality Challenge. Moreover, both versions of elaborate
deflationism cannot meet D3, the desideratum that an account of intuitions
explain that our intuitions are more resistant to conflicting beliefs than beliefs
in philosophy usually are.
I argued in section 2.5 that Bealer’s and Sosa’s rationalist inflationist ac-
counts of intuitions cannot account for all relevant cases, and I presented a
non-rationalist inflationist view in section 2.6. This account of intuitions as
appearances covers all relevant cases and hence meets desiderata D1 to D3
better than rationalist inflationist accounts.
One might want to object to this account of intuitions for other reasons.
For instance, if one thinks that intuitions come with no phenomenology at all,
one might be unsatisfied with the fact that appearances are supposed to come
with an unanalyzable phenomenology. Tolhurst says the following:
The notion of felt veridicality resists analysis. But we are ac-
quainted with it; reflection on suitable examples should be suﬃcient
to call it to mind. [122, p. 299]
One might deny that intuitions come with something like felt veridicality. Many
philosophers in the recent debate claim not to be acquainted with any phe-
nomenology of intuitions. Herman Cappelen [12], for instance, reports the
following:
[. . . ] I cannot, even with the best of will, discern a special feeling
that accompanies my contemplation of the naive comprehension
axiom, Gettier cases and other alleged paradigms of the intuitive.
[12, p. 117]
Similarly, Williamson [140] denies that there is any kind of phenomenology
that comes along with intuitions:
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For myself, I am aware of no intellectual seeming beyond my con-
scious inclination to believe the Gettier proposition. Similarly, I am
aware of no intellectual seeming beyond my conscious inclination to
believe Naive Comprehension, which I resist because I know better.
[140, p. 217]
Williamson’s comment is directed against intellectual seemings, but he would
probably say the same with respect to appearances. To be consistent, how-
ever, one ought to deny that one is aware of appearances in general, not just
appearances relevant in philosophy, because appearances in philosophy are not
supposed to be diﬀerent from any other appearances.
There is not much one can say in reply to these introspective reports, since
there is no way to convince anyone that they are familiar to the notion of felt
veridicality. However, all I intended to do in this chapter was to show that
an account of intuitions as appearances can meet our desiderata D1 to D3.
These desiderata rely on phenomena which seem to be widely shared amongst
philosophers.
A further advantage of the account of intuitions I have defended over ratio-
nalist inflationist accounts is that it allows for one single state in all our cases,
independent of epistemic aspects. Just as there is one belief state for beliefs
with all kinds of contents, there is one state for appearances with all kinds
of contents. Rationalist inflationist accounts of intuitions are only available if
there is a clear-cut a priori–a posteriori distinction. It is, however, controver-
sial whether there is a clear-cut a priori–a posteriori distinction. Moreover, it
is controversial whether intuitions from thought experiments provide a priori
knowledge even if there is such a distinction. For instance, as a consequence
of Williamson’s account of thought experiments, our intuitions in thought ex-
periments have contingent contents that can only be known a posteriori.39
39See Williamson [140]. Ichikawa and Jarvis [53] take this consequence as a reason to
reject Williamson’s analysis of thought experiments, because the standard view has it that
intuitions like the Gettier intuition are known a priori. However, Williamson rejects the
idea that there is a clear-cut a priori–a posteriori distinction on independent grounds, so
an argument that presupposes a priori knowledge begs the question against his analysis of
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The deflationist account I have defended can explain our talk of ‘intuitive
judgments’ or ‘intuitive beliefs’. These judgments or beliefs are based (causally
or epistemically) on intuitions as appearance states. When we speak about
‘intuitions’, this might either involve a belief (or even knowledge) as in Case 1,
or an inclination to believe as in Cases 2 and 4, or no inclination to believe at
all, as in Cases 3, 5, and 6.
thought experiments.
Chapter 3
The Role of Intuitions in
Philosophy
Abstract
The practice of appealing to intuitions as evidence has recently been
criticised by experimental philosophers. While some traditional philoso-
phers defend intuitions as a trustworthy source of evidence, others try to
undermine the challenge. They argue that in frequently discussed cases
intuitions do not play a role as evidence (Deutsch [28], [29]), or that
intuitions do not play any role as evidence in philosophy (Earlenbaugh
& Molyneux [31]). I argue that these attempts to undermine the exper-
imentalists’ challenge fail. If what I argue is correct, philosophers have
to face the experimental philosophers’ challenge.
3.1 Introduction
Some philosophers think that intuitions are treated as evidence in contempo-
rary analytic philosophy as well as in the history of philosophy, going back to
Plato. In the recent debate about philosophical methodology, George Bealer
[7], Alvin Goldman & Joel Pust [46], and Ernest Sosa [115], among others, pro-
vide several arguments for the claim that intuitions are justifiably treated so,
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since they in fact are evidence in philosophy. Advocates of the current move-
ment of experimental philosophy such as Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich [135] or
Machery, Mallon, Nichols, & Stich [81], to mention only two well-known papers,
agree that we rely on intuitions, but they consider it a practice which is not
conducive to the aims of traditional philosophy. Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich’s
empirical studies on Gettier Cases show that there are significant variations
in people’s intuitive responses to these cases, depending on their culture and
socioeconomical status. Based on this empirical result, the authors argue that
traditional epistemologists do not succeed in establishing genuine epistemic
norms because what they really explore are norms local to their own cultural
and socioeconomic group only. Machery, Mallon, Nichols & Stich’s empirical
studies on Kripke’s Go¨del Case reveal significant variations in people’s intu-
itions about the reference of names. Raising similar concerns as Weinberg,
Nichols, & Stich, the authors draw the following conclusion:
[. . . ] our data indicate that philosophers must radically revise their
methodology. Since the intuitions philosophers pronounce from
their armchairs are likely to be a product of their own culture and
their academic training, in order to determine the implicit theories
that underlie the use of names across cultures, philosophers need
to get out of their armchairs. [81, B9]
In this chapter, I do not discuss the experimentalists’ studies or their ar-
guments against the use of intuitions as evidence in philosophy, and I do not
go into much details about possible ways to defend the claim that intuitions
are evidence. Rather, I discuss some traditional philosophers’ reactions to the
experimentalists’ challenge that take, more or less, the same line of argument.
Instead of defending intuitions as a source of evidence, they aim to undermine
the challenge by denying that intuitions play the assigned role. Max Deutsch
[28], [29] argues that in relevant and frequently discussed cases, intuitions do
not play the evidential role that has been assigned to them. Joshua Earlen-
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baugh & Bernard Molyneux [31] defend the view that contrary to what some
traditional philosophers as well as experimental philosophers claim, intuitions
have not been treated as evidence in philosophy at all. Before presenting their
arguments and responding to them in detail, I will make some helpful distinc-
tions.
Philosophers who think that intuitions play a role as evidence usually also
think that thought experiments as counterexamples or potential counterexam-
ples to philosophical theories are paradigm cases of the use of intuitions as
evidence. In Frank Jackson’s Mary Case against physicalism, some of us have
the intuition that colour scientist Mary learns something new when she leaves
her black and white room and sees something coloured for the first time in her
life (Jackson [54]). In Kripke’s counterexample to a descriptivist theory of the
meaning of names, the Go¨del Case, most of us have the intuition that ‘Go¨del’
refers to Go¨del and not to Schmidt (Kripke [66]). In the Gettier Cases against
the theory of knowledge as justified true belief (the JTB theory), we have the
intuition that a person in a particular situation lacks knowledge that P despite
having a justified true belief that P (Gettier [41]). The defendants of the claim
that intuitions play a role as evidence take intuitions to be evidence against a
philosophical theory in these and similar cases.
The claim that intuitions are evidence is ambiguous, as has been stated
in the literature (e.g., Lycan [79], Earlenbaugh & Molyneux [31]). It can ei-
ther mean that the content of the intuition (also called ‘the intuited’), or that
the psychological state (also called ‘the intuiting’) is evidence. Philosophers
who think that evidence is factive (e.g., Williamson [140]) refer to the first
by speaking about a fact about the world as evidence, and to the second by
speaking about the fact that we have an intuition as evidence. In this chapter,
my main concern is the question whether we actually treat the fact that we
have an intuition (or the intuiting) as evidence in philosophy. For simplicity, I
will sometimes use ‘an intuition’ for ‘the fact that we have an intuition’.
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Some philosophers are reluctant to use the word ‘intuition’, since they do
not think that intuitions are epistemically or ontologically diﬀerent from other
kinds of judgments or beliefs.1 Although in the last chapter I defended what
I called a ‘non-rationalist inflationist’ account of intuitions according to which
intuitions are appearance states, nothing in this chapter presupposes my view.
For our purposes, it does not matter how we label the respective attitude, and
I will mostly stick to the word ‘intuition’—thereby talking about the intuition,
judgment, inclination to judge, belief, or whatever else philosophers think intu-
itions are. The question whether we rely on the fact that we have an intuition
as evidence is independent of the question of what intuitions are.
Why should we assume that the fact that we have an intuition (or the
intuiting) can or should be used as evidence in philosophy at all? Here are
some preliminary reasons. First, Weatherson [132] argues that experts in other
areas (e.g., in business) sometimes use the fact that they have an intuition as
evidence. Surely we should not take just any intuitions into account, we should
rather carefully choose the ones we have reason to think are reliable. But
there is no reason to think that philosophy is in any important way diﬀerent
from other disciplines where we rely on experts’ intuitions. It is, however,
controversial whether philosophers are experts in a sense that would make
them better intuiters than lay people. I present arguments in favour of the
claim that philosophers are expert intuiters in section 3.6.
Second, many contemporary philosophers engage in practices which suggest
that they take the fact that we have an intuition as evidence. For instance,
many philosophers aim to give pragmatic or psychological explanations for the
fact that we have a certain intuition that P if this intuition is not treated as
true by their theory. I discuss examples of this practice in Chapter 4. Assuming
that our practice in philosophy is more or less adequate, this suggests that we
can use the fact that we have an intuition as evidence.
1E.g., Deutsch [28], Earlenbaugh & Molyneux [31]. Williamson [138, p. 152] pleads for
the elimination of the term ‘intuition’.
CHAPTER 3. THE ROLE OF INTUITIONS IN PHILOSOPHY 58
Third, some philosophers think that the fact that we have a sensory seeming
is evidence, and ways of defending this view can equally be applied to intu-
itions. Jessica Brown [10] considers three ways to do so within an internalist
epistemology: dogmatism (e.g., Pryor [95]), a priori entitlement (e.g., Wright
[142]), and explanationism (e.g., Vogel [128]). Brown also discusses an exter-
nalist approach she favours, according to which our beliefs about the world
are justified if they are reliably formed on the basis of the relevant facts about
our psychological states. Assuming that forming the belief that P on the basis
of the fact that we have an intuition that P is reliable, this belief is thereby
justified.2 I discuss this argument in Chapter 5.
In what follows, I will argue that two ways of undermining the experimental
philosophers’ challenge to our use of intuitions in philosophy fail.
3.2 Undermining the Experimentalists’ Challenge?
I will first give a more detailed outline of the two above-mentioned attempts to
undermine the experimentalists’ challenge, which I will then address individu-
ally in the succeeding sections. Deutsch [28], [29] and Earlenbaugh & Molyneux
[31] defend the idea that we do not appeal to intuitions as evidence in philos-
ophy. If this were true, it would be hard to see how experimental philosophy
would pose a challenge to philosophical methodology.
Both attempts to undermine the experimentalists’ challenge can be under-
stood in the spirit of Timothy Williamson [140], who argues that appealing to
psychological states such as intuitions as evidence is an unnecessary practice
we should not pursue. Williamson claims that philosophers who appeal to in-
tuitions as evidence do so as a consequence of the misguided idea of Evidence
Neutrality.3 Evidence Neutrality is the thesis that
[. . . ] whether a proposition constitutes evidence is in principle un-
2Brown [10, pp. 506-515].
3Williamson [140, pp. 208-215]. Williamson [138] gives an alternative explanation as to
why some philosophers appeal to intuitions, which I discuss in Chapter 5.
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contentiously decidable, in the sense that a community of inquirers
can always in principle achieve common knowledge as to whether
any given proposition constitutes evidence for the inquiry. [140, p.
210]
In cases where philosophers disagree with their peers on whether a proposition
about the world is evidence, they draw on a fact about which mutual agreement
is easier to achieve, which is the fact that someone has an intuition.4 The fact
that someone has an intuition then is supposed to count as common evidence.
Williamson uses the Gettier Cases as an example:
Arguing from the Gettier proposition that the subject in a Gettier
case lacks knowledge, I conclude that knowledge is not equivalent
to justified true belief. Now I meet someone who thinks the Gettier
proposition [is] a mere cultural prejudice, not itself evidence. In
this context, it is not in principle uncontentiously decidable that
the Gettier proposition is evidence. Thus the only way to satisfy
Evidence Neutrality is by ruling that the Gettier proposition does
not constitute evidence. To argue that knowledge is not equivalent
to justified true belief, I must go back a step to less contentious
premises. What can they be? My opponent allows that I believe the
Gettier proposition, and may even admit to feeling an inclination
to believe it too (I am not merely idiosyncratic), while overriding
it on theoretical grounds. [140, p. 211]
However, Williamson thinks that appealing to psychological states as evidence
is a practice we should not pursue.5 The reason is that there is a gap between
psychological states with certain contents and the truth of these contents which
is ‘not easily bridged’ and which provokes scepticism. Attempts to psychologise
4According to Williamson [138], intuitions are just beliefs or inclinations to believe, on
which see Chapter 2.
5Williamson does not say that facts about psychological states can never be used as
evidence in philosophy. However, he thinks that they should not be used as evidence in the
case of thought experiments as counterexamples to philosophical theories, see [140, chapter
7].
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the matter of philosophy (e.g., by holding that we are concerned with our
concepts only) do not solve the problem, since ultimately, we are interested
in facts about the world and not in facts about our psychological states. We
should therefore give up Evidence Neutrality and appeal directly to facts about
the world as evidence. I discuss Williamson’s arguments to the eﬀect that we
ought not appeal to intuitions as evidence at length in Chapters 4 and 5.
In very much the same spirit, Deutsch argues that we usually or at least
in frequently discussed cases do not treat intuitions as evidence. Contrary to
the common perception and to what Machery, Mallon, Nichols, & Stich [81]
claim, Deutsch thinks that Kripke does not appeal to intuitions as evidence in
the Go¨del Case, but to facts about the world and to arguments instead.6 Here
is how Deutsch describes the case:
Kripke oﬀers direct arguments against [. . . ] [the] descriptivist the-
ory of meaning, but he also objects to it indirectly by criticizing the
theory of reference it entails. D encapsulates the theory of reference
that is a consequence of the descriptivist theory of meaning:
D : An ordinary proper name, n, as used by a given speaker,
S, refers to the object that is the denotation of some/most/all
of the definite descriptions S associates with n.
To show that D is false, Kripke simply describes counterexamples–
cases in which a name, as used by a given speaker, does not refer to
the denotation of the definite description(s) the speaker associates
with the name. Here is one such case, one of Kripke’s own (Kripke,
1972/1980, pp. 83-84): Imagine that Go¨del did not prove the in-
completeness of arithmetic but that some other man, Schmidt, did.
Go¨del stole the proof from Schmidt and published it under his own
name. But now imagine a speaker who uses ‘Go¨del’, but associates
6Deutsch [29] also discusses Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich’s [135] criticism of the claim that
intuitions from the Gettier Cases play a role as evidence.
CHAPTER 3. THE ROLE OF INTUITIONS IN PHILOSOPHY 61
just a single description with it, namely ‘the prover of incomplete-
ness.’ To whom does this speaker’s uses of ‘Go¨del’ refer, Go¨del
or Schmidt? The answer, Kripke says, is Go¨del, not Schmidt. If
Kripke is right, D is false. [28, p. 446]
According to Deutsch, ‘nothing in Kripke’s famous argument against the
descriptivist theory of reference for proper names hinges on assuming anything
about peoples’ intuitions’.7 Deutsch concludes that whether a counterexample
is intuitive might be psychologically interesting; what matters philosophically
is whether it is genuine and hence refutes the respective philosophical theory.
Even more radically, Earlenbaugh & Molyneux argue that there simply is no
such practice of treating intuitions as evidence in philosophy and that intuitions
only play a rhetorical role in that they function persuasively and give rise to
beliefs. Earlenbaugh & Molyneux contrast what they call the ‘evidential-role
view’, which is the view that intuitions are used as evidence in philosophy, with
what they call the ‘evidential view’, which is the thesis that intuitions in fact
are evidence in philosophy.8 Whereas experimental philosophers claim that
intuitions play an evidential-role but deny the evidential view, Earlenbaugh &
Molyneux hold that intuitions do not, from the beginning, play an evidential-
role at all. They introduce their project as follows:
We argue that intuitions do not play an evidential-role in philoso-
phy. Hence, we show that any evidential view of intuitions that is
motivated by the way intuitions are actually used in philosophy is
wrongheaded. This sets us aside, we think, from the traditional de-
bate, in which one side argues that they play an evidential-role and
so they should, because they are genuine forms of evidence, whereas
the other argues that they do, but they should not, because they
are not. We argue that they do not, whether or not they should.
[31, p. 92]
7Deutsch [28, p. 445].
8Earlenbaugh & Molyneux [31, p. 92].
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In what follows, I first show that Earlenbaugh & Molyneux’s arguments
against the evidential-role view of intuitions fail. The authors do not succeed
in showing that we do not use intuitions as evidence in philosophy (section 3.3).
I argue against Deutsch that he uses the wrong criterion to decide whether
Kripke appeals to an intuition in his argument (section 3.4). I then show that
we may sometimes rely on intuitions as evidence even if we do not appeal to
intuitions (section 3.5).
Having shown that the authors fail to establish that intuitions do not play
a role as evidence in philosophy, we have to face the experimentalists’ challenge
that intuitions are not reliable. In the last part of the chapter I present some
arguments to the eﬀect that scepticism about the reliability of intuitions is not
warranted (section 3.6).
3.3 Treating Intuitions as Evidence
In order to establish that we do not treat intuitions as evidence, Earlenbaugh
& Molyneux give two arguments, one against the claim that intuitings (the
propositional attitudes) play an evidential-role and one against the claim that
intuiteds (the contents of the propositional attitudes) play such a role. To
show that intuitings do not play an evidential-role, Earlenbaugh & Molyneux
introduce the following test:
One can check whether a community treats a mental state ψ as a
basic evidential state by determining whether the members of that
group are willing to accept, prima facie, inferences of the following
sort:
S ψ ’s that P
Therefore P.
[31, p. 98]
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‘Basic evidential states’ are states such that a subject S ’s being in such a state
is prima facie evidence for the truth of its content. Examples are sensory
seemings, memory states, and introspections.9 According to Earlenbaugh &
Molyneux, it is easy to see that basic evidential states pass the above test:
One is usually willing to infer P from the fact that S seems to
see that P, prima facie, provided that one believes that S has a
normal, functioning visual system, that conditions are normal, and
that nothing else is amiss (e.g., one does not believe S to be a liar).
[31, p. 98]
The same is true for any ψ that is a basic evidential state, no matter who
has it. In contrast, we are not willing to infer P from the fact that someone
diﬀerent from ourselves has an intuition that P. Intuitings therefore do not pass
the test and hence are not treated as basic evidential states, as Earlenbaugh &
Molyneux claim:
We clearly hold nothing like GI:
GI: In general, intuitions (intuitings) are reliable indica-
tors of the truth of their contents.
For if we did hold something like GI, then inferences like the fol-
lowing:
Jones has the intuition that P.
Therefore P.
would seem as solid, prima facie, as the corresponding inference
from one’s own intuitions. But they do not. This shows that we,
in practice, are not committed to anything like GI. In fact, we are
hardly aﬀected by the intuitions of others, no matter how strongly
9See also Goldman & Pust [46, p. 180].
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they are professed and no matter how many others have the intu-
ition. Thus we are not treating intuitions as basic evidential states.
[31, p. 99]
To reach their conclusion, the authors make two diﬀerent assumptions.
First, they take it to be obvious that whereas we treat basic evidential states as
evidence no matter which honest person with a normal, functioning perceptual
system has them, we only treat our own intuitions as evidence. Second, they
assume that a kind of state is only treated as a basic evidential state if all
tokens (where the subject is honest and otherwise normal) of this kind of state
are treated as evidence. I think that both assumptions are false.
As to the first assumption, it is not true that we only trust our own intu-
itions. We certainly trust some other people’s intuitions. There is no reason
to think that students, when they learn philosophy, merely trust philosopher’s
arguments and do not trust any of the intuitions their teachers communicate.
Moreover, I think we would misdescribe what we do in philosophy if we thought
that professional philosophers only trusted their own intuitions. We often adopt
a philosopher’s theory without going through every single step ourselves if we
know that this other philosopher is an expert in the respective area and has
examined more theories and has more knowledge than we ourselves have. How-
ever, it seems true that we trust our own intuitions as evidence if we ourselves
are experts in a certain area and someone else, who is an expert in the same
area, has a contrary intuition. But the fact that in some cases we prefer to
trust our own intuitions as prima facie evidence does not imply that we do not
sometimes trust other people’s intuitions. Intuitions are not subject sensitive
in the way Earlenbaugh & Molyneux suggest.
As to the second assumption, Earlenbaugh & Molyneux claim that because
we do not trust just anyone’s intuitions, we do not in general trust intuitions.
However, it seems that we do not trust just anyone’s sense of hearing, taste,
or vision either. In numerous cases we only trust experts’ sensory seemings.
For instance, if I want to know which bird is tweeting in my garden, I ask an
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ornithologist rather than a friend who has read a beginners book on birds and
how they tweet. Only what the expert seems to hear is relevant in this case.
Nevertheless, we would not want to say that my friend’s sense of hearing is
not normal. Think of a geologist who is able to distinguish between two very
similar kinds of minerals, or think of a wine taster. We would certainly trust
the geologist or the wine taster on certain matters rather than anyone else, but
we would not want to say that everyone else’s senses are not normal. As in the
case of intuitions, experts probably only trust themselves in some cases. If two
expert ornithologists do not both seem to hear the same mockingbird tweet
(for instance, one of them seems to hear a Chilean Mockingbird, the other a
Bahamas Mockingbird), they will probably each trust themselves and not the
other expert. It seems that whose sense of hearing, taste, or vision we trust
does not depend on the general reliability of their faculty but on other, more
specific skills which makes some of us experts. There is no categorical diﬀerence
between how we treat intuitions and how we treat basic evidential states. If
we assume that a kind of state is only treated as a basic evidential state and
hence as evidence if all tokens (where the subject is honest and her senses are
normal) of this kind of state are treated as evidence, there are probably no
states that we treat as basic evidential states.
Even though in this chapter I am mainly concerned with intuitings as ev-
idence, I will briefly look at Earlenbaugh & Molyneux’ second argument, the
argument against the evidential-role of intuiteds. The authors claim that in-
tuiteds do not play what they call a ‘psycho-evidential role’, and this is why
we do not treat them as evidence. Propositions play a psycho-evidential role
if they play a role as evidence in virtue of being the target of a psychological
state.10 According to Earlenbaugh & Molyneux, intuiteds in general do not
play a psycho-evidential-role because we do not necessarily place credence in
our intuiteds:
Believed propositions play a psycho-evidential-role because the be-
10Earlenbaugh & Molyneux [31, p. 100].
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lief guarantees that the subject invests credence in them. But S’s
intuiting P is not suﬃcient for S investing credence in it. Thus,
if an inference legitimately proceeds from an intuited proposition,
it must be because the subject stands in some other, credence-
entailing, attitude towards it. [31, p. 102]
Obviously, we do not place any credence in the contents of intuitings we
do not trust (e.g., folk intuitions). Moreover, even if we usually trust our own
intuitions, we do not necessarily place any credence in their content. In cases
where we firmly believe that not-P, we do not place credence in the content of
our intuition that P. Take Jackson’s Mary Case. Suppose that S holds that
physicalism is true. S then thinks about the Mary Case for a long time, and
eventually comes to the conclusion that she was right and physicalism is indeed
true. Now suppose furthermore that whenever S goes through the Mary case,
she nevertheless has the intuition that Mary learns something new when she
leaves her black-and-white room. S firmly believes that physicalism is true,
and she knows that her intuition about Mary is incompatible with the claim
that physicalism is true. In this case, it is obvious that S does not place any
credence in the content of her intuition. The evidence that S gets from the
fact that she has an intuition is defeated by the overwhelming evidence she has
for the truth of physicalism.
As Bealer (e.g., [7]) and others have discussed in their work, this phe-
nomenon is well-known from cases of optical illusions.11 Since we know that a
straight stick in water is not bent, we do not place any credence in the content
of our perceptual seeming that it is bent. Similarly, because we know that
the two lines in the Mu¨ller-Lyer illusion are of equal length, we do not place
any credence in the content of our perceptual seeming that they are not of
equal length. However, that in some cases we do not place any credence in
their contents does not mean that we think sensory seemings do not play a
psycho-evidential role. The same should obviously hold for intuitions.
11See also Pust [96].
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Let me make a last general remark on Earlenbaugh &Molyneux’s arguments
against the idea that we treat intuitions (intuitings or intuiteds) as evidence.
The authors admit that it seems as if we treat intuitions as evidence, which
they explain by claiming that intuitions cause and motivate beliefs. According
to their use of the phrase ‘treat as evidence’, a subject S can appeal to an
intuiting or intuited as evidence and believe that it is evidence without thereby
treating it as evidence. Whether we treat a particular intuiting as evidence
depends on whether we treat all (relevant) intuitings as evidence, and whether
we treat a particular intuited as evidence depends on whether we place credence
in all (relevant) intuiteds. This is a counterintuitive use of the word ‘treat’.
We would like to say that S treats an intuition as evidence when S intends to
use the intuiting or intuited as evidence and behaves as if it was evidence. In
what follows, this is how the word ‘treat’ will be used in this chapter.
3.4 Referring to Intuitions
In order to show that Kripke appeals to facts about the world as evidence in
the Go¨del Case, Deutsch points out that Kripke does not say it is intuitive
that we are not talking about Schmidt. Instead, Kripke says ‘straight out, and
emphatically, that we are not talking about Schmidt’.12 According to Deutsch,
this indicates that Kripke does not treat intuitions as evidence. Here is the
relevant passage in Deutsch which he uses to defend the claim that Kripke’s
argument does not appeal to intuitions:
In his own discussion of the case, Kripke, after spinning the tale of
Go¨del and Schmidt, and using ‘we’ to refer to those of us who, in
the story, associate just ‘the man who discovered the incomplete-
ness of arithmetic’ with ‘Go¨del,’ says that, on descriptivism, since
the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic is in fact
Schmidt, we, when we talk about ‘Go¨del’, are in fact always refer-
12Deutsch [28, p. 451].
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ring to Schmidt’ (Kripke, 1980, p. 83). Immediately following this
comment, Kripke says, ‘But it seems to me that we are not. We
simply are not’ (Kripke, 1980, p. 84). He does not say that it is
intuitive that we are not talking about Schmidt; he says straight
out, and emphatically, that we are not talking about Schmidt. [28,
p. 451]
Deutsch gives two reasons for thinking that his view is correct. First, he
shows that Kripke argues for his view and does not simply rely on his intuition
that ‘Go¨del’ does not refer to Schmidt. Second, Deutsch claims that there is a
better reconstruction of Kripke’s argument without reference to an intuition,
which corresponds with what Kripke literally says. Here is the form of the
argument Deutsch thinks is not correct:
(0) It is intuitive that there is an F that is not a G.
(1) So, there is an F that is not a G.
(2) Hence, not all F s are Gs.
Instead, the best reconstruction of the argument is this:
(1) There is an F that is not a G.
(2) Hence, not all F s are Gs.13
I think that both ways of arguing do not show what Deutsch wants to es-
tablish. First, that Kripke gives additional arguments for his view does not
imply that he does not use his intuition as evidence. Second, the best recon-
struction of an argument is not necessarily the correct reconstruction of an
author’s reasoning. Surely, once we have all the evidence for the claim that
‘Go¨del’ does not refer to Smith from Kripke’s arguments, we do not need to
use the initial evidence in our reconstruction anymore. However, this does not
mean that Kripke did not appeal to an intuition as initial evidence when he
first came up with his counterexample to the descriptive theory of meaning.
13Deutsch [29, p. 452].
CHAPTER 3. THE ROLE OF INTUITIONS IN PHILOSOPHY 69
While I think it is very plausible that Kripke appeals to an intuition in his
argument, my aim is not to establish this interpretation. I will merely argue
that Deutsch does not succeed in showing the contrary, because the evidence
he gives does not favour the claim that Kripke does not appeal to an intuition
over the claim that he does.
To see this, consider the following. If we want to find out whether we appeal
to intuitions in philosophy, at first sight, the obvious question to ask seems to
be the following.
(a.) Do we use the term ‘intuition’ in the premises of our argu-
ments?
(a.) can easily be answered by counting the word ‘intuition’ in philosophy
papers. The result will be that in contemporary analytic philosophy, the word is
used quite frequently, but possibly not so in the history of philosophy. However,
it does not follow from the fact that we use the word ‘intuition’ more frequently
in contemporary philosophy that we necessarily appeal to intuitions as evidence
more frequently. Maybe we sometimes use the word as a hedging term or as
an expression of modesty, etc. Maybe there is no psychological state that
corresponds to our use of the term, which could mean that we never actually
use ‘intuition’ to refer to evidence.14
Deutsch points to the fact that Kripke does not use ‘intuition’ as evidence
for the claim that Kripke’s argument does not involve intuitions. However, as
we cannot infer simply from the fact that we use the word ‘intuition’ that we
actually refer to a psychological state, we cannot infer from the fact that we
do not use the word ‘intuition’ that we do not refer to an intuition. It could
be that we refer to a psychological state with some expressions other than
the term ‘intuition’. The point is that (a.) is not the adequate criterion to
decide whether someone appeals to an intuition as evidence or not. Whether
14See, e.g., Cappelen [12].
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we use the term ‘intuition’ does not show anything. We have to ask two further
questions:
(b.) Do we, in the premises of our arguments, use the term ‘intu-
ition’ to refer to a psychological state that serves as evidence for
our beliefs?
(c.) Do we, in the premises of our arguments, refer with some other
expressions to a psychological state that serves as evidence for our
beliefs?
(b.) and (c.) are probably the most discussed questions concerning intu-
itions in philosophy. As to (b.), Deutsch thinks that when we say that p is
intuitive, this means something like ‘we know p directly, without inference’, ‘p
is true’, ‘p is pretty obviously true’, or ‘p should be accepted as true unless
compelling reasons can be given for rejecting it’.15 Williamson [138] [140], and
others argue that what we call ‘intuitions’ can be reduced to beliefs or belief-
like states. They think that the content of the intuition can be evidence, but
that there is no special psychological state such that the fact that we have it
could or should be used as evidence. Others, like Bealer [7], Pust [96], Sosa
[115], and Weatherson [132] argue that the fact that we have an intuition can
be evidence in philosophy. I agree with the latter that we refer to a psycholog-
ical state when we use the word ‘intuition’ in philosophy (at least in paradigm
cases such as thought experiments), and I also think that we can appeal to the
fact that we have an intuition as evidence, as I mentioned in section 3.1 (and
as I defend in Chapters 4 and 5). However, each of these answers to (b.) need
to be defended, and merely looking at our use of the word ’intuition’ does not
do the work.
Complementarily, we have to ask whether there are cases where we ap-
peal to intuitions as evidence without using the word ‘intuition’ (c.). Some
philosophers (traditional philosophers as well as experimental philosophers)
15Deutsch [28], [29, p. 458].
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have understood the Go¨del Case and similar cases such that intuitions play an
evidential role, even though their authors do not use the term ‘intuition’. ‘It
seems to me that we are not’ in Kripke’s argument might, after all, refer to an
intuition. This terminology has been used by defendants of rationalist accounts
of intuitions such as Bealer [7], who takes intuitions to be intellectual seemings
in contrast to sensory seemings.16 Whether Kripke refers to an intuition with
the phrase ‘It seems to me’ cannot be decided simply by looking at what Kripke
literally says. The words we use might be some evidence as to what we refer
to, but it is clearly not enough evidence in a philosophical debate like the one
over intuitions. We can decide on this matter only on a theoretical level.
3.5 Intuitions as Implicit Evidence
Let us, for a moment, go back to Earlenbaugh & Molyneux [31]. They argue
that intuitings do not play any role as evidence in philosophy because we do
not treat them as basic evidential states. We do not treat intuitings as basic
evidential states because we do not treat all (relevant) intuiting tokens as ev-
idence, which the authors think is necessary for a kind of state to be treated
as a basic evidential state. They draw the following conclusion concerning the
role of intuitions as evidence:
[. . . ] if intuitions were merely evidence but [. . . ] were not treated as
such then they would play little role in argumentation and theory
construction. They would be inert – indicative of the truth but not
in a way to which we have access. Hence, intuitions can explain the
behaviors of the philosophical community only if they are treated
as evidence; simply being evidence is not enough. [31, p. 92]
Earlenbaugh & Molyneux claim that as far as they know, there is no moti-
vation for a view according to which intuitions are not treated as evidence but
16See Chapter 2.
CHAPTER 3. THE ROLE OF INTUITIONS IN PHILOSOPHY 72
still play a role as evidence.17 Given what they mean by ‘treated as evidence’
(see section 3.3), this might be plausible. However, there is motivation for
such a view if we take ‘treating intuitions as evidence’ to mean ‘appealing to
intuitions as evidence’. I will now argue that in order for the fact that we have
an intuition to be our evidence, we do not necessarily have to appeal to it.
Brian Weatherson [132] has argued that a view according to which the
fact that we have an intuition that P is evidence in cases where P is false
can give us an explanatory advantage. Take, for instance, Frank Jackson on
his Mary Case against physicalism. Suppose, for the sake of the argument,
that with his sentence ‘It seems just obvious that she will learn something
about the world and our visual experience of it’18, Jackson did not refer to the
fact that he had an intuition but rather to the putative fact that a person in
Mary’s situation learns something new. Suppose that he also did not believe
that the fact that he had an intuition was his evidence. Maybe he thought
that only the contents of our intuitions can possibly be evidence in philosophy.
Suppose furthermore that Jackson wrongly thought that a person in Mary’s
situation learns something new. In fact, Mary does not learn anything new
and physicalism is true.19
According to a Williamsonian view of evidence, the putative fact that a per-
son in Mary’s situation learns something new could not have been Jackson’s
evidence. In his book Knowledge and its Limits, Williamson [137] famously
defends his view that all and only knowledge is evidence. As a consequence,
evidence is factive and propositional, and even though we might treat false
propositions as evidence sometimes, only true propositions actually are evi-
dence.20 According to such a view, we might want to say that Jackson did not
have any evidence from the thought experiment which counts against physi-
calism. In this case, we might want to call his belief that physicalism is false
17Earlenbaugh & Molyneux [31, pp. 92-93, footnote 8].
18Jackson [54, p. 182].
19Most philosophers think that the Mary Case is not a genuine counterexample to physi-
calism, including Jackson [55].
20See Williamson [137, p. 201].
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in some sense irrational (supposing that the thought experiment was his only
source of evidence against physicalism).21
However, we might as well say that Jackson relied on some genuine evidence
for his belief, namely the fact that he had the intuition that Mary learns some-
thing new, even though he did not appeal to this fact as evidence. According
to Williamson [137], we do not always know what our evidence is, and there
are two ways in which a belief can be based on evidence:
Call one’s belief in p explicitly evidence-based if it is influenced by
prior beliefs about the evidence for p [. . . ] Call one’s belief in p
implicitly evidence-based if it is appropriately causally sensitive to
the evidence for p [. . . ] the causal sensitivity of the belief in p to
the evidence for p need not be mediated by further beliefs about
the evidence for p. [137, pp. 191-192]
Jackson’s belief that physicalism is false could have been appropriately
causally sensitive to the implicit evidence consisting in the fact that Jackson
had an intuition that Mary learns something new.
This explanation as to how Jackson’s belief was based on evidence does
not work if we endorse what Goldman & Pust [46] have suggested, which is a
‘two-step evidential route’ for evidence from thought experiments:
An adequate reconstruction of philosophical methodology [. . . ] re-
quires a two-step evidential route. In the first step, the occurrence
of an intuition that p, either an intuition of one’s own or that of an
informant, is taken as (prima facie) evidence for the truth of p (or
the truth of a closely related proposition). In the second step, the
truth of p is used as positive or negative evidence for the truth of
a general theory. [46, p. 182]
21Weatherson [132] argues that philosophers sometimes have false intuitions, but we would
not want to call them irrational for this reason. If we want to call them rational and if being
rational requires respecting the evidence, we have to say that they have genuine evidence.
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According to Goldman & Pust, the fact that we have an intuition that P is
evidence for the fact that P, which is then evidence against Q. Applied to the
Gettier Cases, the fact that we have the intuition that a subject in a Gettier
situation does not have knowledge is first taken as prima facie evidence for
the claim that a subject in such a situation would not have knowledge. In
a second step, that such a subject lacks knowledge is then taken as evidence
against the JTB theory of knowledge, i.e., for the claim that the JTB theory
is false. Applied to the Mary Case, the fact that Jackson had the intuition
that Mary learns something new is prima facie evidence for the claim that a
person in Mary’s situation learns something new. Since, however, a person
in Mary’s situation does not learn anything new, we have no evidence against
physicalism.
However, a diﬀerent understanding of the evidential route according to
which there is only one step seems to be more widely held. When S has the
intuition that P, S has evidence for P and at the same time evidence against
Q. This is plausible since P is supposed to imply not-Q. Applied to the Mary
Case, the fact that Jackson had an intuition that Mary learns something new
was evidence not only for the claim that a person in such a situation would
learn something new, it was also evidence against physicalism, since the first
implies the second. Such a view is especially held by philosophers who think
that the only evidence we gain from thought experiments against the target
theory is the fact that we have an intuition. I will discuss the question of what
exactly the evidence is we gain from thought experiments in Chapter 4.
I have argued that not only can we refer to an intuition without using the
word ‘intuition’, we can also rely on an intuition as evidence without explicitly
appealing to it. The role intuitions play as evidence can neither be simply read
oﬀ our words nor oﬀ the premises of our arguments. I therefore take it that
the experimental philosophers’ challenge cannot easily be undermined and has
not been undermined by Deutsch’s or Earlenbaugh & Molyneux’s arguments.
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3.6 The Expertise Defence
If the experimental philosophers’ challenge cannot be undermined, we have to
face it. In what follows, I will present reasons to think that empirical findings
about the unreliability of intuitions are not relevant to philosophers’ intuitions
and scepticism about the reliability of intuitions in philosophy is not warranted.
This line of argument has been brought forward, amongst others, byWilliamson
[141]. Even though Williamson himself argues that we ought not appeal to the
fact that we have an intuition, his argument for the irrelevance of experimental
philosophers’ findings applies to both the content of the intuition and the fact
that we have an intuition.
Experimental philosophers have tested laypeople’s intuitions on philosoph-
ical questions.22 Their concern is that philosophers might be prone to the
same kinds of eﬀects and psychological features they have discovered laypeople
to be. Some experimental philosophers draw a radical conclusion from their
studies: using intuitions as evidence for or against philosophical theories is an
unreliable method which should not be pursued (e.g., Alexander & Weinberg
[2], Weinberg [133]).
However, one might wonder what exactly the conclusions are we should
draw for philosophy from the results of testing laypeople’s intuitions. Some
philosophers, e.g., Devitt [30] and Goldman & Pust [46], are interested in
laypeople’s intuitions because they think that only laypeople’s intuitions are
uncontaminated by philosophical theory. Goldman & Pust say the following:
If the person experiencing the intuition is a philosophical analyst
who holds an explicit theory about the nature of F, this theory
might warp her intuitions about specific cases [. . . ] For this rea-
son, philosophers rightly prefer informants who can provide pre-
theoretical intuitions about the targets of philosophical analysis,
rather than informants who have a theoretical ‘stake’ or ‘axe to
22These laypeople are mostly undergraduate students in the United States.
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grind’. [46, p. 83]
Other philosophers such as Hilary Kornblith [65], Kirk Ludwig [78], and
Williamson [140] think that experimental philosophers’ studies are irrelevant
because we are interested in expert intuitions only rather than in laypeople’s
intuitions. These philosophers take it that philosophers’ intuitions in thought
experiments are more reliable than laypeople’s intuitions because like experts
in other disciplines, philosophers have specific skills and specific philosophi-
cal knowledge and experience which makes them better intuiters.23 Kornblith
claims that like in the sciences, where ‘accurate theory is allowed to play a role
in guiding and shaping observation’, we should not prefer ‘the intuitions of the
ignorant and the naive over those of responsible and well-informed investiga-
tors’24. Williamson [140] expresses it thus:
We should not regard philosophical training as an illegitimate con-
tamination of the data, any more than training natural scientists
how to perform experiments properly is a contamination of their
data. Although the philosophically innocent may be free of various
forms of theoretical bias, just as the scientifically innocent are, that
is not enough to confer special authority on innocent judgment,
given its characteristic sloppiness. [140, p. 191]
Weinberg, Gonnerman, Buckner & Alexander [134] have criticized the so-
called expertise defence and argued that whether philosophers are experts in
the relevant sense is an empirical question. They claim that the burden of proof
is on the traditional philosophers to show that their intuitions are in fact more
reliable. They moreover argue that there is little evidence that philosophical
training is of any relevance to a reliable performance in thought experiments.
Philosophers should therefore not rely on intuitions from thought experiments
before having conducted the relevant empirical investigations.
23Ludwig [78] compares philosophers to mathematicians, Williamson [139], [140] to
lawyers, and Weatherson [132] to business people.
24Kornblith [65, pp. 33-34].
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In reply, Williamson [141] argues that the burden of proof is rather on the
experimental philosophers’ side to show empirically that philosophical training
is not conducive to a reliable performance in thought experiments. He argues
that philosophers’ training fulfills all relevant criteria mentioned in the liter-
ature on expertise: (a) repetitive practice with fast, accurate feedback, (b)
decomposition of the task into sub-tasks, and (c) use of external decision aids.
Philosophers often get immediate feedback on thought experiments (a), run-
ning a thought experiment involves several steps and diﬀerent skills (b), and
formal methods can help us to evaluate our judgments in thought experiments
(c). Williamson concludes that Weinberg, Gonnerman, Buckner & Alexander
[. . . ] provide no significant evidence that thought experimentation
is worse oﬀ in the relevant respects than the cognitive skills they
acknowledge to be enhanced by training in philosophy, such as in-
formal argumentation and the close analysis of texts. Consequently,
they provide no reason to rely less on trained philosophers’ skill at
thought experimentation than on their skill at those other cognitive
tasks. [141, p. 226]
For the sake of my arguments throughout this thesis, I will assume that Williamson
and others are right: in general, philosophers’ intuitions on philosophical mat-
ters are reliable.
This, however, does not imply that philosophers’ intuitions are infallible,
and it leaves room for empirical or other explanations as to why we have a
particular intuition. Philosophers might sometimes be prone to unwanted psy-
chological eﬀects, cultural biases and pragmatic phenomena. For this reason, it
is important to take empirical research into account in order to decide whether
we can trust a particular intuition on a particular subject matter.
In some experimental philosophers’ work, a more constructive claim has
been made, namely that empirical findings can supplement and improve our
methods in philosophy (e.g, Knobe [61], Knobe & Nichols [62], Swain, Alexan-
CHAPTER 3. THE ROLE OF INTUITIONS IN PHILOSOPHY 78
der, & Weinberg [119], Nadelhoﬀer & Nahimas [85]). James Beebe gives the
following characterization of empirically informed philosophy:
Experimental epistemology is the use of the experimental methods
of the cognitive sciences to shed light on debates within epistemol-
ogy, the philosophical study of knowledge and rationally justified
belief. Some skeptics contend that ‘experimental epistemology’ (or
‘experimental philosophy’ more generally) is an oxymoron. If you
are doing experiments, they say, you are not doing philosophy. You
are doing psychology or some other scientific activity. It is true
that the part of experimental philosophy that is devoted to carry-
ing out experiments and performing statistical analyses on the data
obtained is primarily a scientific rather than a philosophical activ-
ity. However, because the experiments are designed to shed light on
debates within philosophy, the experiments themselves grow out of
mainstream philosophical debate and their results are injected back
into the debate, with an eye to moving the debate forward. This
part of experimental philosophy is indeed philosophy—not philoso-
phy as usual perhaps, but philosophy nonetheless. [8, p. 1]
Such a positive view of experimental philosophy and the relevance of empir-
ical experiments to philosophical questions has been practiced, amongst others,
by Jennifer Nagel [86], [87] and Tamar Gendler [40], [39].
In the above quote, Beebe suggests that some parts of experimental philos-
ophy is philosophy, while engaging in experiments is science. But we might as
well take the empirical work to be part of philosophy, and we can then define
philosophy via the central questions philosophers have been trying to answer
rather than via the methods philosophers use to answer these questions. This
is the view I will hold in what follows. While I take it that scepticism about the
reliability of intuitions in philosophy is not warranted, I think that psychology
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and experimental philosophy can sometimes help us to answer philosophical
questions.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I argued that two attempts to undermine the challenge ex-
perimental philosophy poses to the role of intuitions in philosophy are not
successful. I first argued that Earlenbaugh & Molyneux’s arguments against
the evidential-role of intuitions fail and that Deutsch does not use the correct
criterion to decide whether Kripke or anyone else refers to intuitions in their
arguments. I then showed that even if we do not appeal to the fact that we
have an intuition as evidence from thought experiments, this fact can consti-
tute implicit evidence against the target theory. I finally presented reasons
to believe that scepticism about the reliability of intuitions as advocated by
experimental philosophers is not warranted, and I mentioned a more positive
picture according to which experimental philosophy and psychology can help
us to answer philosophical questions.
Whereas Kripke and others do not use the word ‘intuition’, it seems that
using it and also appealing to intuitions as evidence has become fashionable in
recent years. In the following Chapter 4, I argue that the practice of appealing
to the fact that we have an intuition is wide-spread, and I criticize Williamson’s
view that it is a practice we ought not pursue. In Chapter 5, I oﬀer an expla-
nation as to why we appeal to intuitions as evidence from thought experiments
according to which this is a good practice.
Chapter 4
Thought Experiments and
Evidence
Abstract
In this chapter, I am concerned with the kind of evidence from thought
experiments we ought to appeal to. I defend the view that we ought to
appeal only to the fact that we have an intuition, and that this evidence is
initial evidence only. I first show that this corresponds with our practice.
I then argue that Timothy Williamson’s [138] worry that appealing to
the fact that we have an intuition as evidence from a thought experiment
leads to a regress of giving evidence for evidence does not apply to this
view. Appealing to the fact that we have an intuition as initial evidence
allows us to stop the regress and is just one way of pursuing a practice
that is commonly performed in the sciences as well.
4.1 Introduction
Timothy Williamson [140, chapter 6] gives the following account of thought
experiments. Take any Gettier Case as a counterexample to the theory of
knowledge as justified true belief (the JTB theory) as an example. Let x be a
person in the Gettier Case and p the relevant justified true proposition. GC is
the Gettier relation which holds between x and p.
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1. ♦∃x∃pGC(x, p)
2. ∃x∃pGC(x, p)￿→ ∀x∀p[GC(x, p) ⊃ JTB(x, p) ∧ ¬K(x, p)]
3. ♦∃x∃p(JTB(x, p) ∧ ¬K(x, p))
In words, this means that (1) it is possible for some x to stand to some p in a
Gettier relation, (2) if some x were to stand to some p in a Gettier relation, she
would have a justified true belief which is not knowledge, and (3) it is possible
to have a justified true belief which is not knowledge. The antecedent of (2)
gives us the judgment we make when confronted with the thought experiment
scenario.
(3) creates an inconsistency with the target theory, the JTB theory of knowl-
edge, according to which justified true belief of a proposition p is necessary and
suﬃcient for knowledge of p. By creating this inconsistency, the Gettier Case
undermines the JTB theory of knowledge. Hence, the Gettier Case functions
as a counterexample to the JTB theory of knowledge.
I will sometimes call the content of the judgment we make when confronted
with a scenario in a thought experiment (e.g., that the person in the scenario
described does not have knowledge) the ‘thought experiment proposition’. It
does not matter how we label the respective attitude towards the thought
experiment proposition, but I will mostly stick to the word ‘intuition’—thereby
talking about the intuition, judgment, inclination to judge, belief, or whatever
else philosophers think the relevant judgments are.
For Williamson, the method of thought experiments is an instance of or-
dinary counterfactual reasoning. Since our counterfactual judgments are re-
liable, thought experiments reliably lead to knowledge of the thought experi-
ment proposition. Many philosophers share the view that thought experiments
can provide knowledge of the thought experiment proposition, but their ex-
planations as to how this knowledge is gained vary. George Bealer [7], [6]
and Ernest Sosa [115] think that intuitions can provide a priori knowledge,
and since we have an intuition towards the thought experiment proposition,
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we can gain a priori knowledge of the thought experiment proposition. Like
Williamson, Ichikawa & Jarvis [53] think that intuitions are just ordinary be-
liefs, but they provide an account of thought experiments which entails that
thought experiments usually generate a priori knowledge. Despite the diﬀer-
ent views these philosophers take on thought experiments and intuitions, they
agree that thought experiments provide a way of gaining knowledge of the
thought experiment proposition.
However, since philosophers’ intuitions are fallible, it is useful to distinguish
between intuitive counterexamples and genuine counterexamples to philosoph-
ical theories. A thought experiment is an intuitive counterexample if most
philosophers have an intuition that the thought experiment proposition holds.
An intuitive counterexample which undermines the target theory is genuine,
and an intuitive counterexample which does not undermine the target theory is
merely intuitive.1 A counterexample is not necessarily intuitive (for instance,
there could be empirical counterexamples to philosophical theories), but we are
concerned with intuitive counterexamples only.
Note that the Gettier Cases are very convincing counterexamples to the
JTB theory of knowledge. Even though philosophers disagree about the cor-
rect theory to cover our intuitions in the Gettier Cases, very few doubt that
they are genuine counterexamples to the JTB theory and hence that they un-
dermine the JTB theory.2 From looking just at the Gettier Cases, it seems that
philosophical theories get refuted by the appeal to our knowledge of the thought
experiment proposition. When we talk about already established counterex-
amples like the Gettier Cases, we use the fact that the person in the Gettier
Case does not have knowledge in our reconstruction. However, the common
use of the Gettier Cases as examples in methodological debates seem to lead to
1This is in contrast to Weatherson’s definition of a counterexample: ‘Let us say that a
counterexample to the theory that all Fs are Gs is a possible situation such that most people
have an intuition that some particular thing in the story is an F but not a G’, Weatherson
[131, p. 3]. According to my view, this defines an intuitive counterexample, but not a
genuine counterexample.
2Weatherson [131], however, thinks that the JTB theory is still a candidate worth con-
sidering.
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a distorted view of how theories get refuted in philosophy. Most counterexam-
ples to philosophical theories do not undermine the target theory as obviously
as the Gettier Cases undermine the JTB theory.
The issue I address in this chapter concerns our practice of refuting philo-
sophical theories. I defend the view that we ought to appeal only to the fact
that we have an intuition, and that this evidence is initial evidence only. I first
show that this corresponds with our practice. I then argue that Williamson’s
[138] worry that appealing to the fact that we have an intuition as evidence
from a thought experiment leads to a regress of giving evidence for evidence
does not apply to this view. Appealing to the fact that we have an intuition
as initial evidence allows us to stop the regress and is just one way of pursuing
a practice which is commonly performed in the sciences as well.
4.2 Distinguishing Three Questions
In the current debate over the methodology of thought experiments as coun-
terexamples to philosophical theories, the following three questions have not
always been distinguished carefully.
(1) What kind of facts can undermine a philosophical theory?
(2) What kind of evidence do we gain from a thought experiment?
(3) What kind of evidence from a thought experiment ought we to appeal to?3
Two diﬀerent kinds of answers are possible to all three questions: facts about
the subject matter the theory is about, or facts about our psychological states
with contents about the subject matter the theory is about.
(1) is a question about the ontology of the facts that undermine a philo-
sophical theory. A wide range of contemporary philosophers embrace the view
that most philosophical theories are not about our psychological states. Even
though philosophical theories usually concern more abstract matters of fact,
3Provided that we gain any evidence against the target theory.
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they are as much about the world as scientific theories are.4 Accordingly,
philosophical theories can be undermined by the facts about the world rather
than by facts about our psychological states, i.e., by the facts that are the
contents of our intuitions rather than by facts about our intuitions. For in-
stance, our theories of knowledge are about knowledge and not about what we
believe knowledge is or what our concept of knowledge is. Accordingly, the
JTB theory of knowledge is undermined by the fact that a person in a Gettier
Case has justified true belief that p but no knowledge that p rather than by
the fact that we have the intuition that a person in a Gettier Case has justified
true belief that p but no knowledge that p.5 Hence, what ultimately decides
whether a theory is correct are the facts about the world, not facts about our
psychological states. In what follows, I take (1NP) to be the standard view:
(1NP) Philosophical theories can be undermined by the contents of our intu-
itions.
There is more disagreement with respect to the answers to questions (2) and
(3). (2) concerns the evidence we gain from a thought experiment and hence
the epistemic situation we are in with respect to the thought experiment propo-
sition. (3) concerns the methodological advice with respect to the evidence we
gain from a thought experiment and with respect to the target theory. By
‘methodological advice’ I mean an answer to the question of what our practice
of refuting a philosophical theory ought to be, where ‘to refute’ means to show
that the evidence undermines the theory. It seems that especially question (3)
has not always been clearly distinguished from (1) and (2).6
4In the recent debate about thought experiments and intuitions, Goldman & Pust [46]
and Goldman [45] are an exception. They think that philosophy is about our concepts rather
than about the world.
5See, e.g., Kornblith [64, p. 12].
6It is not entirely clear whether Williamson distinguishes between an epistemic question
(2) and a methodological question (3). Williamson’s 2007 book The Philosophy of Philoso-
phy is not supposed to give concrete methodological advice, as the author explicitly claims:
‘I considered using the phrase “philosophical method” in the title, but decided against on
the grounds that it seemed to promise something more like a recipe for doing philosophy
than I believe possible. When asked for advice on some occasion, the Duke of Wellington
is said to have replied “Sir, you are in a devilish awkward predicament, and must get out
of it as best you can.” My advice would be scarcely more useful. At the crucial point, I
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In the following sections, I first present three possible views resulting from
diﬀerent answers to (2) and (3) (section 4.3). According to the view I defend,
the answer to (2) is that both the contents of our intuitions and facts about
our intuitions constitute the evidence we gain from a thought experiment, and
the answer to (3) is that we ought to appeal to the fact that we have an
intuition as evidence against the target theory (section 4.4). To show that this
corresponds with our practice, I provide examples of how we discuss intuitive
counterexamples to philosophical theories (section 4.5). In the remainder of the
chapter, I argue that two worries Williamson raises in his paper ‘Philosophical
“Intuitions” and Scepticism about Judgement’ [138] and in The Philosophy
of Philosophy [140] do not threaten this view. I argue that appealing to the
fact that we have an intuition as evidence does not lead to a regress of giving
evidence for evidence and hence does not provoke scepticism (section 4.6) and
that appealing to the fact that we have an intuition as evidence does not
presuppose or lead to a view according to which philosophy is diﬀerent in
principle from the sciences (section 4.7).
4.3 Evidence from Thought Experiments
In this section, I give two views on what our evidence from thought experi-
ments is, and I present Williamson’s reasons to prefer one of them over the
other. Williamson draws a picture of the debate according to which many con-
can only say “Use your judgment.”’ [140, p. ix] Williamson goes on to claim that as the
primary task of the philosophy of science is to understand science rather than to give scien-
tists advice, it is the primary task of the philosophy of philosophy to understand philosophy,
rather than to give philosophers advice. However, clearly every sub-discipline of science is
also concerned with the methodology that gives applicable advice on how to do research.
If philosophy is no exception, philosophy needs a sub-discipline that gives methodological
advice. Williamson seems to agree at least with the idea that philosophy has methods which
can be studied: ‘Some may wonder whether philosophy has a method to be studied, espe-
cially if it is as methodologically undistinctive as just suggested. Forget the idea of a single
method, employed in all and only philosophical thinking. Still, philosophers use methods
of various kinds: they philosophize in various ways. A philosophical community’s method-
ology is its repertoire of such methods. The word “method” here carries no implication of
a mechanically applicable algorithm, guaranteed to yield a result within a finite time. On
this loose understanding of what a methodology is, it is disingenuous for a philosopher to
claim to have none.’ [140, p. 3]. Moreover, Williamson himself gives advice on certain con-
crete methodological questions. As I will discuss below, he thinks that we should appeal to
the content of the thought experiment proposition rather than to the fact that we have an
intuition as evidence from thought experiments, [140, chapter 6].
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temporary analytic philosophers think that in thought experiments, ‘[. . . ] our
ultimate evidence consists of the psychological truths that we have intuitions
[. . . ], whether true or false.’7 Whether this claim about most contemporary
philosophers is correct or not, the view entails the following answer to (2):
(2P) The evidence we gain consists in the fact that we have an intuition.
From (2P) it follows that the only possible answer to (3) is this:
(3P) We ought to appeal to the fact that we have an intuition.
I will call the view combining (2P) and (3P) the Psychologistic View of evidence
from thought experiments.
As mentioned in section 4.1, most non-experimental philosophers think that
we usually gain knowledge of the thought experiment proposition, because
thought experiments reliably generate knowledge. It is also very plausible
to suppose that most of the time, we know that we have an intuition (or a
belief, etc.) towards the thought experiment proposition. Since according to
Williamson [137], all our knowledge constitutes our total evidence, the fact
that we have an intuition is most of the time part of our evidence as well. For
cases where we know both the content of the intuition and the fact that we
have an intuition, this view of evidence leads to the following answer to (2).
(2I) The evidence we gain consists in the content of our intuition and in the
fact that we have an intuition.
Williamson [138], [140] thinks that as a general strategy, we ought to appeal
to the content of the intuition as evidence, and we should only withdraw this
evidence if it turns out that we were wrong and the content of the intuition is
false. Williamson claims that this is not only the best strategy in philosophy,
it also corresponds with what we do in the sciences:
[. . . ] if we do know that P, would it not be negligent not to use that
knowledge in evaluating an empirical theory to which it is relevant?
7Williamson [138, p. 119].
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It would not advance science to insist that scientists’ evidence can-
not include the fact that 19 out of 20 rats fed the substance died
within 24 hours, but only the fact that the scientist was perceptually
inclined to judge that 19 out of 20 rats fed the substance died [. . . ]
Of course, it may later turn out that a disgruntled lab technician
fed the rats the wrong substance, but the proper response to such
remote possibilities is to backtrack if one of them is found to ob-
tain, not to make a futile attempt in advance to identify evidence
for which backtracking will not be required in even the remotest
eventualities. [138, p. 151]
Hence, the evidence we ought to appeal to against the target theory consists
in the content of our intuition rather than the fact that we have an intuition:
(3NP) We ought to appeal to the content of our intuition.
I will call the view which combines (2I) and (3NP) the Non-Psychologistic
View of evidence from thought experiments, since the evidence consisting of
psychological facts ought to play no role in our practice of refuting a philo-
sophical theory.
Let us have a look at Williamson’s reasons against the Psychologistic View.
The main problem with appealing to the fact that we have an intuition, ac-
cording to Williamson, is that it is not clear how we get from a truth about
our psychology to a truth about the world (which we are ultimately interested
in, as stated in (1NP)), since ‘psychological evidence has no obvious bearing
on many philosophical issues’.8
There are three further theses Williamson thinks are closely related to the
Psychologistic View and more or less explicitly endorsed by a large range of
contemporary philosophers. The first thesis is Evidence Neutrality, which is
the idea that
8Williamson [140, p. 234]. See Brown [10] for arguments to the eﬀect that the gap
between facts about our intuitions and facts about the world can be closed, see also Chapters
3 and 5. I will discuss this worry in more detail in Chapter 5.
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[. . . ] whether a proposition constitutes evidence is in principle un-
contentiously decidable, in the sense that a community of inquirers
can always in principle achieve common knowledge as to whether
any given proposition constitutes evidence for the inquiry. [140, p.
210]
Williamson [140] argues that their false belief in Evidence Neutrality leads
many philosophers to the view that only the fact that we have an intuition can
be evidence from the thought experiment, i.e., to the Psychologistic View. The
Psychologistic View then motivates a second thesis, Judgment Scepticism:
Judgment Scepticism: we cannot trust our practices of applying
concepts in judgment.9
Endorsing Judgment Scepticism threatens to lead to an even more general and
destructive kind of scepticism which questions our judgments in the sciences as
well, such as observational judgments or judgments that rely on folk concepts.
The third thesis Williamson finds to be related to the Psychologistic View
is that there is a fundamental diﬀerence between the sciences and philosophy
insofar as we ought to trust our judgments in the sciences, but we ought not
trust our judgments in thought experiments.10 In the context of the debate
over the methodology of philosophy, philosophical exceptionalism is mainly
associated with the view that intuitions provide or are supposed to provide a
special source of knowledge, which equips philosophers with a special kind of
method that is fundamentally diﬀerent from the methods we apply in ordinary
thinking or in the sciences.11 For the current purpose, the following claim
9Williamson [140, p. 220].
10Williamson [140, p. 220].
11Some passages in Williamson [140] suggest that he thinks of philosophical exception-
alism as concerning the methods of philosophy as opposed to the methods of science: ‘Of
course, philosophy-hating philosophers (a common breed) claim that philosophical thought
experiments are profoundly unlike those in natural science, in ways which make the former
bad and the latter good, but we should be suspicious of such claims of philosophical ex-
ceptionalism’, Williamson [140, p. 179]. Other passages suggest that Williamson thinks of
philosophical exceptionalism as something that distinguishes philosophy from ordinary think-
ing: ‘The main overall aim is to subsume the epistemology of thought experiments under the
epistemology of counterfactual conditionals and metaphysical modality (. . . ) and thereby to
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characterizes philosophical exceptionalism precisely enough:
Philosophical Exceptionalism: the methods in philosophy are fun-
damentally diﬀerent from the methods in the sciences.
The assumption that philosophy has a special kind of method again invites
scepticism concerning philosophy more generally.
To sum up, Williamson argues against the Psychologistic View because he
thinks that it is caused by the false belief in Evidence Neutrality. It motivates
Judgment Scepticim and Philosophical Exceptionalism, but leads to scepticism
about philosophy more generally and threatens to aﬀect the sciences as well.
According to Williamson, the Psychologistic View, Judgment Scepticism, and
Philosophical Exceptionalism are all misguided, and we can and should avoid
all three by endorsing the Non-Psychologistic View.12
I will argue that even within a Williamsonian picture of knowledge and
evidence, we should neither endorse the Psychologistic View nor the Non-
Psychologistic View. I will suppose that Williamson’s inclusive view concern-
ing the evidence we gain from thought experiments (2I) is correct. In general,
thought experiments generate knowledge. Hence, in most cases, we know the
thought experiment proposition. We also know that we have an intuition to-
wards the thought experiment proposition, and since all knowledge is evidence,
both constitute evidence. I will argue that although thought experiments pro-
vide evidence consisting of the content of the intuition, it does not follow that
we ought to appeal to the content of the intuition when we run thought exper-
iments as counterexamples to philosophical theories. Instead, I think that the
psychologistic answer (3P) is correct. I will defend a version of the following
view:
reveal it as an application of quite ordinary ways of thinking, not as something peculiarly
philosophical.’ Williamson [140, p. 180].
12In ‘Philosophical ‘Intuitions’ and Scepticism About Judgement’ [138], Williamson ex-
plains the relations between Judgment Scepticism and the Psychologistic View slightly dif-
ferently. He argues that it is common amongst naturalists to doubt our judgments in thought
experiments. Being sceptical about judgments in thought experiments, however, is just one
instance of being sceptical about judgments in a more general way and endorsing Judgment
Scepticism. According to Judgment Scepticism, thought experiments only provide knowledge
of the fact that we have an intuition, which then leads to the Psychologistic View.
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(2I) The evidence we gain consists in the content of our intuition and in the
fact that we have an intuition.
(3P) We ought to appeal only to the fact that we have an intuition as evidence.
The version of (3P) I will argue for is meant to be a general methodological
rule. In some cases of thought experiments as counterexamples, however, it
will be appropriate to appeal directly to the thought experiment proposition
as evidence against the target theory. Imagine some undergraduate philoso-
phy student who thinks that knowledge is just belief. In order to convince
this student that knowledge is not just belief, we might give a counterexam-
ple. Knowledge is obviously not just belief and our counterexample is clearly
genuine. In this case, it would not be appropriate to use the fact that we have
an intuition and not the content of the intuition as evidence against the the-
ory of knowledge as belief. However, I will defend a version of (3P) for cases
of evidence from intuitive counterexamples to theories that are not obviously
false. The version of (3P) I will defend is therefore not meant to imply that we
should always appeal to the fact that we have an intuition rather than to the
content of the intuition as evidence from a thought experiment. What I will
argue for is that this strategy is always available and the best option in cases
where we are genuinely interested in testing a philosophical theory.
In the next section, section 4.4, I defend a version of (3P) by considering
Jason Stanley’s [116] use of counterexamples to defend his anti-intellectualist
account of knowledge.
4.4 Intuitions as Initial Evidence
Stanley introduces his book Knowledge and Practical Interests [116] by giving
intuitive counterexamples to what he calls ‘intellectualism’ about knowledge.
Intellectualism about knowledge is the thesis that whether someone knows
something does not depend upon practical facts, but merely on facts which
make the belief more likely to be true, i.e., on truth-conducive facts. According
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to Stanley, his cases show that knowledge varies with respect to a non-truth
conducive factor, which is the importance the action has to the subject of
knowledge.13 This, however, is inconsistent with intellectualist theories such
as epistemic contextualism. Epistemic contextualism is the semantic thesis
that knowledge varies with respect to the context in which it is uttered, where
‘context’ refers to the situation of the subject who is attributing knowledge.
Stanley discusses several variations of two cases originally brought forward
by Keith DeRose [26] as evidence for contextualism.14 Here are Stanley’s ver-
sions of the cases:
Low Stakes. Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a
Friday afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way home
to deposit their paychecks. It is not important that they do so,
as they have no impending bills. But as they drive past the bank,
they notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are
on Friday afternoons. Realizing that it isn’t very important that
their paychecks are deposited right away, Hannah says, ‘I know the
bank will be open tomorrow, since I was there just two weeks ago
on Saturday morning. So we can deposit our paychecks tomorrow
morning.’
High Stakes. Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a
Friday afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to
deposit their paychecks. Since they have an impending bill coming
due, and very little in their account, it is very important that they
deposit their paychecks by Saturday. Hannah notes that she was at
the bank two weeks before on a Saturday morning, and it was open.
But, as Sarah points out, banks do change their hours. Hannah
says, ‘I guess you’re right. I don’t know that the bank will be open
tomorrow.’ [116, pp. 3-4]
13Stanley [116, p. 11].
14DeRose [26, p. 913].
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As DeRose [26] has already pointed out, our intuitions are that Hannah is
right in both cases. Hannah has knowledge in Low Stakes but no knowledge
in High Stakes. While the contextualist can explain these intuitions, Stanley
gives a further case he thinks the contextualist cannot give a straightforward
explanation for:
Low Attributor–High Subject Stakes. Hannah and her wife Sarah
are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They plan to stop at the
bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks. Since they have
an impending bill coming due, and very little in their account, it is
very important that they deposit their paychecks by Saturday. Two
weeks earlier, on a Saturday, Hannah went to the bank, where Jill
saw her. Sarah points out to Hannah that banks do change their
hours. Hannah utters, ‘That’s a good point. I guess I don’t really
know that the bank will be open on Saturday’. Coincidentally, Jill
is thinking of going to the bank on Saturday, just for fun, to see if
she meets Hannah there. Nothing is at stake for Jill, and she knows
nothing of Hannah’s situation. Wondering whether Hannah will be
there, Jill utters to a friend, ‘Well, Hannah was at the bank two
weeks ago on a Saturday. So she knows the bank will be open on
Saturday’. [116, p. 4]
Stanley notes that our intuitive reaction to this case is that Jill is wrong
and that Hannah does not know that the bank will be open on Saturday.
According to the contextualist, what Jill says would have to be true, because
the truth-value of Jill’s knowledge ascription is determined by what is salient to
Jill, which is that Hannah has been to the bank two weeks previously, and not
Hannah’s current situation, of which Jill is ignorant.15 According to Stanley’s
anti-intellectualism, however, the reason why Hannah knows in Low Stakes is
that it is not important for her and Sarah to deposit their paychecks, and
15Stanley [116, p. 24].
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the reason why she does not know in High Stakes and in Low Attributor–High
Subject Stakes is that it is important for her and Sarah that they deposit
their paychecks. The contextualist, however, cannot give a straightforward
explanation of our intuition in Low Attributor–High Subject Stakes.
Suppose that, as mentioned above, thought experiments reliably lead to
knowledge of the thought experiment proposition, and suppose that most of
us have the respective intuitions in Stanley’s cases. Is this all Stanley has to
do to refute intellectualism? If Williamson’s view of evidence from thought
experiments were correct, Stanley would not need to do anything else but give
his counterexamples to intellectualism. However, this does not seem to be all
Stanley has to do to refute intellectualism, and in fact he does much more. After
presenting his cases, Stanley goes on to discuss alternative explanations of our
intuitive reactions to his cases. He rejects the claim that we do not have the
respective intuitive reactions, and he considers and rejects the claim that our
intuitions are not semantically significant but can be explained by pragmatic
aspects of the utterance.16 If Williamson’s view were correct, there would be
no need to give these further arguments. In most of the remainder of his book,
Stanley argues against contextualism and other intellectualist theories and for
the claim that his view, interest-relative invariantism, does not only get the
above cases right but is also the better theory all things considered. It seems
that Stanley uses the fact that we have certain intuitions as initial evidence,
and he then goes on to argue that the truth of the content of these intuitions
provides the best explanation as to why we have the intuitions.
By initial evidence, I first of all mean defeasible evidence. Moreover, initial
evidence is evidence available given the actual and temporary amount of infor-
mation or state of investigation. We call a piece of evidence ‘initial’ evidence if
more information will be available or if there are more ways to argue that we
have not yet considered. Initial evidence might initiate that we refute a theory,
but it is not suﬃcient to refute a theory, and it motivates further investigations.
16Stanley [116, pp. 12-14].
CHAPTER 4. THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS AND EVIDENCE 94
If we generalize from Stanley’s practice to our general practice of debating in-
tuitive counterexamples to philosophical theories, we get the following version
of (3P):
(3P*) We ought to appeal only to the fact that we have an intuition, and we
ought to appeal to this fact as initial evidence only.
To support (3P*), I present some strategies which are used in our practice
of debating intuitive counterexamples in philosophy in the next section.
4.5 Intuitive Counterexamples
I will first present some strategies we use to show that a counterexample is
merely intuitive as opposed to genuine. The strategies are not intended to
be exhaustive, but they provide a useful categorization of our practices. The
examples I use might be controversial, i.e., diﬀerent philosophers might have
diﬀerent views on the correct way of describing a particular case and which
strategy is appropriate for it. However, the fact that we commonly use these
strategies should not be controversial.
The first strategy is to deny the relevance of certain intuitions due to some
psychological disposition of the person having the intuitions. The following
three are strategies of explaining away the significance of a particular intuition.
By ‘explaining away the significance of an intuition’, I mean explaining why we
have the intuition even though the content of the intuition is not true, which
involves showing that the intuition is not significant to the truth or falsity of
its content.17
17See also Ichikawa [52]. Such an explanation can rely on some pragmatic rules of con-
versation, on some properties of our reaction to the presentation of the thought experiment
scenario or other irrelevant psychological features, or on some properties of the theory’s sub-
ject matter. They all presuppose that we use the fact that we have an intuition as evidence.
The fourth strategy involves re-identifying the content of the intuition or the target theory,
which shows that we use the evidence we gain from thought experiments as initial evidence
only.
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(i) Relevance of the intuitions
Experimental philosophers have shown that laypeople’s intuitions in thought
experiments are subject to all kinds of irrelevant factors, and they think it is
likely that philosophers are prone to the same eﬀects, which might influence
and often mislead their intuitions. I mentioned in Chapter 3 that philosophers
such as Kornblith [65], Ludwig [78], and Williamson [140] think that the exper-
imental philosophers’ studies are irrelevant because we are interested in expert
intuitions only rather than in laypeople’s intuitions. They take it that philoso-
phers’ intuitions in thought experiments are more reliable than laypeople’s
intuitions because like experts in other disciplines, philosophers have specific
skills and specific philosophical knowledge and experience which makes them
better intuiters.18 Kornblith claims that like in the sciences, where ‘accurate
theory is allowed to play a role in guiding and shaping observation’, we should
not prefer ‘the intuitions of the ignorant and the naive over those of responsible
and well-informed investigators’.19
Experimental philosophers disagree about which intuitions are relevant. Ac-
cording to Adam Feltz & Chris Zarpentine [35] and Ram Neta & Mark Phe-
lan [88], empirical evidence has cast doubt on the evidence Stanley uses to
defend anti-intellectualism. The authors claim that Stanley’s defence of anti-
intellectualism is based on the empirical assumption that it captures part of
our ordinary practices of knowledge ascription. Feltz & Zarpentine write:
[. . . ] Stanley’s case for anti-intellectualism depends on ‘examples
that suggest’ that ordinary knowledge ascriptions are sensitive to
the practical facts of the subject’s situation (2005, p. 3). But are
our ordinary knowledge ascriptions sensitive to the practical facts
of a subject’s situation? [We] investigate this question empirically
[. . . ] [We] focus on Stanley because his case against intellectual-
18Ludwig [78] compares philosophers to mathematicians, Williamson [139], [140] to
lawyers, and Weatherson [132] to business people.
19Kornblith [65, pp. 33-34].
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ism clearly depends on facts about ordinary knowledge ascriptions.
Thus, we treat Stanley’s claims about ‘the intuitive reactions we
have to these cases’ (2005, p. 5) as predictions about ordinary
knowledge ascriptions. Our results do not support Stanley’s pre-
dictions. If our data generalize, the case for anti-intellectualism can-
not depend on the sensitivity of our ordinary practices of knowledge
ascription to the practical facts of a subject’s situation. Ordinary
knowledge ascriptions do not appear to be sensitive to these facts.
[35, p. 6]
Feltz & Zarpentine’s empirical studies on 152 students in introductory-level
philosophy classes suggest that anti-intellectualism does not generalize to peo-
ple’s ordinary practice of ascribing knowledge in some paradigmatic cases. Peo-
ple’s intuitions in these paradigmatic cases do not show the pattern that would
support anti-intellectualism. Hence, the intuitions Stanley and others might
have in Stanley’s cases are not relevant to the question whether intellectualism
is true.
In line with Kornblith, Ludwig, and Williamson, Stanley could argue that
the fact that these students have certain intuitions is not relevant with respect
to whether his cases support anti-intellectualism, e.g., because they are not
experts (see the discussion of expertise in philosophy in section 3.6 of Chapter
3).
(ii) Explaining away: pragmatic explanations
Explaining away the significance of an intuition to the truth or falsity of the
proposition in question by relying on some pragmatic rules of conversation has
been a very common practice in philosophy of language since H. P. Grice’s
[50] introduction of conversational implicature. It is widely accepted that our
use of language is not only guided by semantic, but also by pragmatic rules.
There is a diﬀerence between the information we usually communicate with a
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sentence and the meaning of the sentence, and what we usually communicate
aﬀects some of our intuitions. When we search for semantic facts, we therefore
have to make sure that we do not confuse them with merely pragmatic ones.
Here are three examples provided by Kent Bach [3]:
1. Jack and Jill went up the hill.
2. Jack and Jill are engaged.
3. Jill got married and became pregnant.
According to Bach, our intuitions about what these sentences mean are likely
to be biased in favour of understandings corresponding what people are likely
to communicate. In uttering sentences (1) - (3), a speaker is likely to mean
something more specific, namely the following:
1*. Jack and Jill went up the hill together.
2*. Jack and Jill are engaged to each other.
3*. Jill got married and then became pregnant.
Since we take (1*) - (3*) to be most typically communicated, we intuitively
take it to be the meaning of the sentences (1) - (3). However, what we are
likely to communicate with these sentences is not necessarily their meaning.
These three examples might be very easy to detect and one might think that
philosophers are not prone to a semantic/pragmatic confusion. However, there
are much more complicated cases where such a confusion is not as easy to
detect. Bach [4] gives a variety of cases, some of which seemed to have been
rather diﬃcult to figure out:
Overlooking the semantic/pragmatic distinction led the so-called
ordinary language philosophers to make some misguided claims
about the meanings of such philosophically interesting terms as
‘tries’, ‘seems’, ‘good’, and ‘true’. They were right to ask what we
would mean in uttering sentences containing such terms, but they
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were wrong to draw pragmatics-laden conclusions about the mean-
ings of these terms. For example, it was thought that trying to
do something entails some eﬀort or diﬃculty in doing it and that
something’s seeming to have a certain property entails doubt if not
denial that it does have that property. These alleged entailments ac-
tually stem from conditions for appropriately and non-misleadingly
using sentences containing ‘try’ or ‘seems’, not from their truth-
conditions.
Bach thinks that it is questionable to what extent our intuitions in general
actually reveal semantic facts, i.e., to which extend they should be explained
by a theory rather than just explained away, hence they ‘should be relied upon
judiciously’.20 Keith DeRose [27], in contrast, warns that pragmatic explana-
tion should not be exaggerated if we want the method of counterexamples to
be a useful practice, and Jason Stanley [116] thinks that pragmatic explana-
tions have to involve general conversational principles such as Gricean maxims
of conversation in order to provide a satisfactory alternative to taking the in-
tuition at face value.21 Whereas there is disagreement about the extent to
which we should apply this practice and what the requirements are, there is
no doubt about the danger of confusing pragmatic facts with semantic facts in
our intuitions.
(iii) Explaining away: psychological explanations
The strategy of empirically testing and explaining why we have a certain in-
tuition on the basis of psychological theories has recently become popular in
philosophy, and the relevance of empirical work to traditional philosophical
questions has been extensively discussed in the recent literature on the method-
ology of philosophy.
20Bach [3], see also [4].
21Stanley [116, pp. 13-15].
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It seems that experimental philosophers have further developed a strategy
which has, until recently, been pursued from the armchair. Philosophers have
always tried to vary some factors of the thought experiment scenario in order
to rule out alternative explanations as to why we have a certain intuition. Here
are two quotes from Stanley [116] on his cases presented above, where he argues
against two alternative psychological explanations of our intuitions:
For example, one might attempt to explain away the force of the
intuitions behind these scenarios, by arguing that, when someone
recognizes that the cost of being wrong are particularly high, his or
her confidence is shaken. [116, p. 6]
Another strategy that proponents of intellectualism commonly ap-
peal to in the face of these examples is to argue that in certain cases
our responses are sensitive not to whether the subject knows, but
to whether the subject knows that she knows. [116, p. 7]
It is obvious that both of these claims are psychological theses. As long as we
have not tested these theses, that our confidence is shaken and that we confuse
knowledge with knowledge of knowledge in the respective cases are not much
more than speculations about how our mind works, and running experiments or
backing them up with psychological evidence of some kind in order to evaluate
them would clearly be an improvement.
(iv) Explaining away: ontological explanations
We can also explain away the relevance of an intuition by relying on a property
of the theory’s subject matter. Brian Weatherson [131] gives four criteria by
which we can judge a philosophical theory. The first criterion is that there
should not be too many intuitive counterexamples to it. According to Weath-
erson, intuitions come in various degrees, and whether a counterexample is a
threat to the theory depends on how strong the intuition is. Also, the more
‘obscure or fantastic’ a counterexample is (involving zombies, etc.), the less
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damaging it is to a theory.22 The second feature a theory should have is that
there should not be too many unacceptable theoretical consequences. Such
unacceptable consequences can, for instance, be caused if we incorporate too
many intuitions into the theory. A theory should moreover pick out significant
properties of the subject matter in question and should also be as simple as
possible. These four criteria can be in conflict with each other and have to be
weighted against each other. As a consequence, a theory can be true if there
are intuitive counterexamples to it.
In order to explain why an intuitive counterexample might cause no harm
to a philosophical theory, Weatherson endorses a Lewisean theory of meaning.
When we assign a property to a predicate, we must make sure that first, this
property satisfy as many as possible of our pre-theoretic beliefs, and secondly,
that it is simple and theoretically important. According to Lewis, for a property
to be simple and theoretically important is to possess a primitive naturalness.
However, our pre-theoretic beliefs sometimes do not cover the naturalness of
the property. According to Weatherson, this might be the case with respect
to the JTB theory of knowledge: there are no reasonably natural properties
in the neighbourhood of our disposition to use ‘knows’. If this is right, then
even some significant changes to our use are not changes in meaning of ‘knows’,
because they do not change which is the closest reasonably natural property
to our usage pattern of ‘knows’. Hence, the JTB theory as the best trade-
oﬀ ‘is still a live possibility, even considering Gettier Cases’.23 Gettier gave an
intuitive counterexample, but the JTB theory does not have many unacceptable
theoretical consequences, it is significant and extremely simple. In other words,
the JTB theory does very well on the three remaining criteria, so that the
Gettier Cases might not cause any harm to it. Hence, a theory as strong as the
JTB theory of knowledge itself provides good evidence against the genuineness
of the intuitive counterexample.
The practice of giving an explanation that relies on a property of the subject
22Weatherson [132, p. 8].
23Weatherson [131, p. 11].
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matter is probably least common. It is quite diﬀerent from the practice of
explaining away the significance of an intuition by appealing to pragmatic
rules or by giving a psychological explanation as to why we have the intuition.
One reason is that it presupposes a controversial theory of meaning. Moreover,
while pragmatic or psychological explanations can predict our intuitions on
the basis of some general conversational rule or some underlying psychological
feature, giving an explanation that relies on a property of the subject matter
only cannot explain or predict our intuitions.
(v) Identifying the content of the intuition
After having given a thought experiment as a counterexample, philosophers
sometimes discover that the thought experiment proposition actually is not
inconsistent with the target theory. I will give two examples.
Vann McGee [84] argues that modus ponens is not an entirely reliable rule
of inference. According to McGee, there are occasions in which one has good
reasons to believe the premises but no reason to believe the conclusion of an
argument. He gives, among others, the following case:
Having learned that gold and silver were both once mined in his
region, Uncle Otto has dug a mine in his backyard. Unfortunately,
it is virtually certain that he will find neither gold nor silver, and
it is entirely certain that he will find nothing else of value. There
is ample reason to believe
If Uncle Otto doesn’t find gold, then if he strikes it rich,
it will be by finding silver.
Uncle Otto won’t find gold.
Since, however, his chances of finding gold, though slim, are no
slimmer than his chances of finding silver, there is no reason to
suppose that
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If Uncle Otto strikes it rich, it will be by finding silver.
[84, p. 463]
McGee takes this case to be a counterexample to the general validity of modus
ponens. However, other philosophers have replied that it merely shows that
modus ponens does not necessarily provide reasons to believe the conclusion,
given that one believes the premisses. It does not show that the inference rule
is not valid. If this is true, it means that McGee’s case is consistent with and
hence not a genuine counterexample to modus ponens.24
Some philosophers have argued that Frank Jackson’s Mary Case against
physicalism does not show that physicalism is false, but that it reveals inter-
esting facts about other kinds of knowledge. Here is Jackson’s case:
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to
investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and
white television monitor. She specialises in the neurophysiology
of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information
there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes,
or the sky, and use terms like ’red’, ’blue’, and so on [. . . ] What
will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room
or is given a colour television monitor? Will she learn anything or
not? [54, p. 130]
Jackson’s original answer was that it seems ‘obvious that she will learn some-
thing about the world and our visual experience of it.’25 He concluded that
Mary’s knowledge about the neurophysiology of vision must have been incom-
plete even though she had all the physical information. Hence, there is more
knowledge to have than knowledge about the physical and physicalism is false.26
24For a critical discussion, see Sinnott-Armstrong, Moor, and Fogelin [105], Lowe [77] and
Nolan [90]. Lycan [80] accepts the case as a genuine counterexample to modus ponens.
25Jackson [54, p. 130].
26Jackson has since changed his view and agrees with his critics that the Mary Case is
not a genuine counterexample to physicalism (e.g., [55]).
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The problem is that it is not obvious what exactly the content of the in-
tuition that Mary learns something is. Here are two alternative suggestions,
according to both of which the case shows something about our knowledge but
is not inconsistent with physicalism. The first has been defended by David
Lewis [74], [75]. According to Lewis, what Mary acquires is knowledge-how as
opposed to knowledge-that. She learns how to recognize, remember or imagine
colours, e.g., how to recognize a red tomato or to remember or imagine the blue
sky. Learning how to do these things does not amount to learning facts, it is
to acquire a bundle of abilities. Therefore, what Mary learns when she leaves
the black and white environment is not incompatible with the completeness
of her factual knowledge of the physical information about vision. According
to Earl Conee [18] and Michael Tye [123], Mary neither acquires knowledge-
that nor knowledge-how. What she acquires is knowledge by acquaintance in
the sense that she becomes familiar with redness in the most direct possible
way. Whereas Mary knows everything about the properties of experiences, she
gets acquainted with them only when she leaves her black and white environ-
ment. Both views just presented have it that Mary knows everything about the
physical facts and hence physicalism is true, but she acquires non-propositional
knowledge when she leaves her black and white environment.
In both cases, the intuitive counterexample turns out not to be genuine,
because the content of the intuition is not in conflict with the original target
theory.
I presented five strategies of showing that an intuitive counterexample to a
philosophical theory is not genuine. Even though the extent to which these
strategies ought to be applied might be controversial, they are commonly used
in contemporary analytic philosophy. They show that we often do more than
just using the thought experiment proposition in order to refute the target
theory.
Strategy i) suggests that we sometimes question the relevance of certain
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intuitions, in particular of intuitions of a certain group of people. Strategies ii),
iii), and iv) suggest that even though our intuitions from thought experiments
are reliable, there are several ways to question the truth tracking properties of a
particular intuition. Strategy v) shows that there are ways to question whether
the thought experiment creates an inconsistency with the target theory. This
strategy suggests that we sometimes need more evidence as to whether the
thought experiment proposition is in fact inconsistent with the target theory.
It seems that all strategies are best explained by our use of the fact that we
have an intuition as initial evidence. Had we used the content of the intuition
as evidence, diﬀerent ways of explaining why we have the intuition would not
play any role.
There is a further strategy which we use when we consider thought exper-
iments as counterexamples to philosophical theories, which is to provide inde-
pendent arguments in support of the content of the intuition. Max Deutsch
[29] thinks that there is no widespread practice of appealing to the fact that we
have an intuition as evidence against a philosophical theory. One of his argu-
ments for this claim is that there is not one single way to reject a philosophical
theory. While I argued in Chapter 3 that he does not succeed in establishing
that intuitions play no role as evidence, I agree that we often use additional ar-
guments to support the content of the thought experiment proposition. This, I
think, supports my claim that we use the evidence we appeal to from a thought
experiment as initial evidence only.
As an example, Deutsch shows that Gettier and others have provided mul-
tiple arguments against the JTB theory of knowledge. Here is a quote from
Deutsch’s paper, where he gives several examples:
(a) [. . . ] S’s justified true belief that p might fail to be knowledge
if there is a disconnection between: (i) what causes S to believe
p, and (ii) what makes S’s belief that p true. In the 10 coins-
case, it is the number of coins in Jones’s pocket that is (partly)
causally responsible for Smith’s belief that the man who will get
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the job has 10 coins in his pocket. But that belief is true ‘in virtue
of’ the number of coins in Smith’s pocket. According to Gettier,
this disconnection between what causes Smith to believe and what
makes Smith’s belief true justifies the judgment that Smith does
not know.
(b) Some epistemologists (e.g. Unger (1968), [. . . ] Pritchard (2005))
argue for the related idea that agents in (at least some) Gettier
Cases are only luckily correct in believing what they do, and that
the presence of this sort of ‘epistemic luck’ explains why such agents
lack knowledge. In the 10-coins case, it is an accident (luck) that
Smith is right in believing that the man who will get the job has 10
coins in his pocket, given that this belief is based partly on a count
of the coins in the pocket of a man who, as it happens, is not the
man who will get the job. This appears to be compelling grounds
for concluding that Smith’s belief does not add up to knowledge.
(c) Other epistemologists (e.g. Lehrer and Paxson (1969)) claim
that S’s justified true belief that p may fail to qualify as knowledge
if there are ‘epistemic defeaters’ to S’s justification. Roughly, q
is defeater to S’s justification for p, if q is compelling evidence
against p about which S is unaware. The presence of defeaters might
explain Smith’s lack of knowledge in the 10 coins-case. If Smith
were apprised of the fact that it was he who would get the job, not
Jones, then Smith would no longer justifiably believe that the man
who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket. Smith’s justification
for his belief is thus defeated and, for this reason, arguably fails to
count as knowledge. Deutsch [29, p. 14]27
To summarize, Deutsch first points to Gettier’s argument that the discon-
nection between what causes Smith to believe and what makes Smith’s belief
27References: Goldman [44, pp. 357-372]; Unger [124, pp. 157-170]; Pritchard [94]; Lehrer
& Paxson [72, pp. 225-237].
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true justifies the judgment that Smith does not know. He then points to the
fact that other epistemologists have argued that the luck involved in the per-
son’s belief and the truth of this belief make the case such that the person
does not have knowledge. Finally, he draws attention to the argument that
unrecognized defeaters prevent the person from having knowledge. All these
arguments have been given independently from the intuition we have in the
Gettier Cases in support of the counterexample.
I have presented several strategies we use to either show that an intuitive
counterexample is merely intuitive or to show that it is genuine. Some of
these strategies presuppose that we use the fact that we have an intuition as
evidence. However, that we use these strategies only shows that (3P*) is a
common practice, rather than that it is a practice we ought to pursue. One
might want to object that while (3NP) should be our standard practice, we step
back and appeal to the fact that we have an intuition only when challenged.
Hence, only upon challenge, our practice ought to be (3P*).
In Chapter 5, I will give a more general defence of (3P*). As a short reply,
let me say the following. First, given that there are diﬀerent ways of explain-
ing the fact that we have an intuition which are commonly used, it would be
inappropriate not to consider them when considering an intuitive counterex-
ample. Second, one might say that in the case of an intuitive counterexample
to an accepted philosophical theory, we are always in a situation where our ev-
idence is challenged, because the target theory is in conflict with the thought
experiment.
In the following two sections, I address two worries Williamson raises with
respect to (3P). I show that (3P*) does not provoke a regress of giving evidence
for evidence (section 4.6) and does not presuppose or lead to Philosophical
Exceptionalism (section 4.7).
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4.6 The Regress Argument
Let us have a closer look at some of Williamson’s arguments against a view
which entails (3P), the claim that we ought to use the fact that we have an
intuition as evidence from thought experiments. As mentioned above, when
we run a thought experiment, we usually do not only gain knowledge of the
thought experiment proposition, we also gain knowledge of the psychological
fact that we have an intuition that the thought experiment proposition holds.
Because all knowledge is evidence, this piece of knowledge could be appealed
to as evidence as well. Williamson [138] considers this option. He says that
someone might respond to his view entailing (3NP) thus:
Granted, when we are consciously inclined to judge that P, we of-
ten but not always know that P. That we are consciously inclined
to judge that P should therefore be treated as good but defeasi-
ble evidence for the claim that P. It is just one more part of the
total body of evidence on which philosophical theories should be
evaluated. [138, p. 200]
However, Williamson thinks that appealing to only this part of our evidence
would not be a good practice, for the following reason:
What [this reply] perversely ignores is the evidential role of the fact
that P itself, as opposed to that of the fact that we are consciously
inclined to judge that P. After all, if we do know that P, would it not
be negligent not to use that knowledge in evaluating a philosophical
theory to which it is relevant? [138, p. 148]
According to Williamson, one might argue that if we do not know whether
we know the thought experiment proposition, we cannot use our knowledge to
evaluate the target theory. What we need is knowledge of knowledge of the
thought experiment proposition. Williamson argues that this view is inade-
quate for two reasons:
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First, it gives no more reason to deny that we know that we know
that P than to deny that we know that P in the relevant cases.
Although we cannot expect to have infinitely many iterations of
knowledge, for more than computational reasons (Williamson 2000,
114-34), that general point merely shows that we must sometimes
simply apply our knowledge, without first checking whether we
know, for otherwise we get stuck in an infinite regress of checks.
That is the second problem for the envisaged defence of [the above
reply]. [138, p. 149]
While I will not argue that we need knowledge of knowledge of the thought
experiment proposition, I think it is correct that we should use the fact that we
have an intuition as evidence from thought experiments as initial evidence and
consider alternative explanations as to why we have the intuition. Williamson’s
worry is that we might end up in an infinite regress of giving evidence for
evidence. He concedes, however, that this is not a practical concern: at a
certain point, we just apply our knowledge. The question is whether there is
an epistemic reason to stop it.
Let us suppose that the fact that we have an intuition in a thought exper-
iment can be used as initial evidence against the target theory, as (3P*) has
it and as our practice suggests. There is a possible regress at two diﬀerent
points. First, we might be worried about evidence for the fact that we have an
intuition that P. Second, we might be worried that we need evidence for the
further evidence we use to show that the counterexample is genuine.
As initial evidence, the fact that we have an intuition is evidence given
the momentary state of information and investigation, and further evidence is
required to show that the counterexample is genuine and actually refutes the
target theory (as I have argued in sections 4.4 and 4.5). Now, if we investigate
further and eventually come to the conclusion that the counterexample is gen-
uine, i.e., does in fact undermine the target theory, it does not matter whether
the counterexample is intuitive or not. Not every counterexample is intuitive,
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and since what counts against the theory is whether the counterexample is
genuine, it does not matter whether we really find it intuitive or it just seems
to us that it is intuitive. If, however, upon further investigation, we come to
the conclusion that our counterexample is not genuine, we do not need to know
whether it is intuitive or not either. Hence, from an epistemic point of view,
it is redundant to investigate whether we actually have an intuition that P or
not, because this is not what we are ultimately interested in. If we more often
than not actually have an intuition that P when it seems to us that we have
an intuition that P in a thought experiment, investigating whether an intuitive
counterexample is genuine is the strategy required. It seems that there are not
just practical reasons to stop the regress; there is, from an epistemic point of
view, a redundancy to giving evidence for the claim that we have discovered
an intuitive counterexample.
The second regress one might fear concerns the question of when we are
allowed to stop further investigations into the truth or falsity of the thought
experiment proposition. How can we determine whether we have shown that
a thought experiment undermines a philosophical theory? Do we have to run
through all possible strategies mentioned in section 4.4? This seems to be a
question that concerns philosophy in general and to which I cannot give an
answer. The sceptic who challenges us here would have to be a sceptic about
arguments and explanations. The sceptic would have to endorse something as
general as the following:
Scepticism about Arguments and Explanations : we cannot trust our
arguments and explanations in philosophy.
It will be very hard to endorse such a general version of scepticism about
philosophy without it aﬀecting the sciences as well.
In this section, I have argued that following (3P*) as a general method-
ological rule is a good practice because our intuitions only serve as motivation
for further investigations into the truth and falsity of the thought experiment
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proposition, and using the fact that we have them as initial evidence does not
lead to a regress of giving evidence for evidence. We have epistemic reasons to
stop the regress. I have argued that the psychological facts are not the only
evidence and that we also use evidence from arguments, etc. Since the psycho-
logical facts are only initial evidence, there is less need to address the problem
of the gap between facts about our psychological states and facts about the
world. The reason why we use the fact that we have an intuition as initial
evidence only does not seem to be that we do not trust our judgments, it is
rather that refuting a philosophical theory involves more than just knowledge
of the thought experiment proposition.
In the next section, I show that scientists proceed similarly when they
discover a potential counterexample to an established scientific theory.
4.7 Philosophical Exceptionalism
Williamson thinks that our evidence in philosophy does not consist in facts with
respect to which we are infallible: we sometimes might not have knowledge in
the case of a thought experiment. However, successful counterexamples such
as the Gettier Cases suggest a general strategy as to what kind of knowledge
we need in order to refute a philosophical theory:
[ordinary] knowledge is enough. We have no general guarantee
against the possibility that we did not know something that we
thought we knew. [138, p. 151]
This, Williamson thinks, is just parallel to what we do in the empirical sciences.
I will suggest that when scientists discover a counterexample to an estab-
lished theory, they do not simply apply their knowledge, even if the methods
they applied to gain that knowledge are reliable. If this observation is correct,
taking the fact that we have an intuition as initial evidence is not in principle
diﬀerent from what scientists do and hence does not presuppose or lead to
Philosophical Exceptionalism.
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Here is a recent example where scientists discovered evidence against an es-
tablished theory. In spring 2009, concern was raised in Canada that prior vac-
cination with the common influenza vaccine was associated with an increased
risk of swine-flu (pH1N1 virus). This concern led to several epidemiologic in-
vestigations in order to assess the putative association. The conclusions of the
studies were that prior vaccination with 2008-09’s seasonal influenza vaccine
was associated with an increased risk of swine-flu during spring and summer
2009 in Canada. Here is a quote from the introduction to the study:
In this paper we report the expected finding that 2008-09 TIV was
associated with a significant [. . . ] reduction in the risk of medically
attended illness due to seasonal influenza. However, we also report
the unexpected finding that TIV receipt was subsequently associ-
ated with a statistically significant [. . . ] increased risk of medically
attended illness due to the novel pH1N1 virus [. . . ]. Because the
latter result is contrary to established knowledge, greater scrutiny is
required to determine whether these associations are more likely on
balance to be real (causal) or due to a methodological flaw (bias).
[106, p. 8]
It is important to note that these results are unexpected. First, they contradict
the established theory. Second, some other studies conducted in other coun-
tries have shown that seasonal vaccination ‘had no influence or may have been
associated with reduced chances of pH1N1 illness’. The scientists have data
that suggest that the seasonal flu vaccine may increase a risk of getting infected
with swine-flu, but further investigations are required in order to confirm these
data and possibly eventually reject the theory that there is no association be-
tween the seasonal vaccination and the risk of getting infected with swine-flu.
The data can certainly be used as initial evidence for the fact that there is such
an association, and hence as initial evidence against the established theory.
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Scientists have diﬀerent strategies to find out whether their data correspond
to the facts in the world. Methods based on observation are susceptible to
random variation, which means that the vaccinated people who took part in
the study might show the discovered feature only by chance. Furthermore,
there could be some bias in the selection of people or in the information that
was provided by the people who took part in the study. It might also be that
the vaccinated and tested people share another unknown characteristic that is
actually responsible for increasing their risk of developing swine-flu.
My suggestion is to view the method of thought experiments as counterex-
amples to philosophical theories as similar to conducting experiments that pro-
duce counter-evidence to established scientific theories. Obviously, there are
diﬀerences between philosophy and the sciences when it comes to the methods.
However, these diﬀerences do not aﬀect our more general practice of dealing
with counter-evidence to established theories. Even if it is likely that the scien-
tists know that there is an association between the seasonal vaccination and the
risk of getting infected with swine-flu because they applied a reliable method,
they need to exclude other explanations of their data in order to refute the es-
tablished theory. A similar claim is true for philosophy. Even if it is very likely
that we know the thought experiment proposition, we need to know whether
the counterexample is genuine as opposed to merely intuitive, which involves
more than knowing the thought experiment proposition.
Williamson says the following about thought experiments as counterexam-
ples to philosophical theories:
Philosophy is hard enough already: why should we make it even
more diﬃcult by forbidding ourselves to bring some of our knowl-
edge to bear? We are not obliged to fight with one arm tied behind
our back. [138, pp. 148-149]
Without question, science is hard as well. However, it is obvious that we would
not want to say something similar in the sciences: ‘Science is hard enough
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already: why should we make it even more diﬃcult by forbidding ourselves
to bring some of our knowledge to bear? We are not obliged to fight with
one arm tied behind our back.’ Because of what is at risk, it is easy to see
that mere knowledge is not enough when it comes to counter-evidence to an
established scientific theory. We need to know whether we know that there is
an association between the seasonal vaccination and the risk of getting infected
with swine-flu. I think that the same holds for philosophy: in order to have
refuted the target theory, we need to know that the thought experiment is a
genuine counterexample that undermines the target theory.
4.8 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to argue that a view of evidence from thought
experiments combining (2I) and (3P*) corresponds with our practice of debat-
ing intuitive counterexamples to philosophical theories. While the evidence we
gain consists in the content of the intuition and in the fact that we have an
intuition (2I), we appeal to the fact that we have an intuition as initial evidence
in order to refute a philosophical theory, which corresponds with (3P*).
I showed in sections 4.4 and 4.5 that there are various strategies we use in
philosophy which presuppose (3P*). I suggested that our practice shows that
we use the fact that we have an intuition in a thought experiment only as initial
evidence against a philosophical theory, and that the main function of our in-
tuitions is to motivate further investigations as to whether the counterexample
is genuine.
I argued in sections 4.6 and 4.7 that Williamson’s regress worries do not
apply if the fact that we have an intuition is used as initial evidence only and
that the practice of appealing to the fact that we have an intuition as initial
evidence does not lead to or presuppose Philosophical Exceptionalism: when it
comes to counter-evidence to an established theory, our practice in philosophy
is not in principle diﬀerent from our practice in the sciences.
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So far, I have not given an explanation as to why appealing to the psycho-
logical fact that we have an intuition as evidence from thought experiments is
a good practice. I address this issue in the next chapter, Chapter 5.
Chapter 5
Knowledge and Evidence in
Philosophy
Abstract
In Chapter 4, I argued that actual philosophical practice standardly in-
volves appeal to our intuitions rather than to the contents of our intu-
itions. In this chapter I oﬀer an explanation of why this is the case. I
first show that there are methodological constraints on evidence in the
sciences, which suggests that there are such constraints in philosophy
as well. I discuss several options of what the constrains on evidence in
philosophy could be. I then defend an account according to which we
ought to appeal to the part of our total evidence which is relatively easy
to access.
5.1 Introduction
Supposing that thought experiments reliably lead to knowledge of the content
of our intuition that P, we can distinguish the following two views concerning
the evidence we usually gain from a thought experiment (where P is true):
115
CHAPTER 5. KNOWLEDGE AND EVIDENCE IN PHILOSOPHY 116
Psychologistic View : the evidence we gain from a thought experi-
ment consists in the fact that we have an intuition that P.
Inclusive View : the evidence we gain from a thought experiment
consists in the fact that we have an intuition that P and in the fact
that P.
In Chapter 4, I distinguished between the evidence we gain from a thought
experiment and the evidence we ought to appeal to when we aim to refute a
philosophical theory. I argued that using the fact that we have an intuition that
P as initial evidence from thought experiments corresponds with our practice
in philosophy. In this chapter, I further motivate the claim that this is a
practice we ought to pursue even if we endorse the Inclusive View.
In the first part (sections 5.2 and 5.3), I present cases which suggest that
there are methodological constraints on evidence in the sciences (section 5.2),
and I defend this view against alternative interpretations of the cases (section
5.3). In the second part (section 5.4), I argue that there are methodological
constraints on evidence in philosophy as well, because philosophy is similar to
the sciences with respect to some relevant aspects, which makes it plausible
that there are such constraints on evidence in philosophy as well. Timothy
Williamson [138], [140] oﬀers two explanations as to why many contempo-
rary philosophers appeal to the fact that they have an intuition that P. In
‘Philosophical ‘Intuitions’ and Scepticism About Judgement’ [138], Williamson
claims that some might believe evidence has to meet an operational standard,
and they think that the fact that someone has an intuition that P meets this
standard, but the content P does not. In The Philosophy of Philosophy [140,
pp. 208-215], he argues that many contemporary philosophers appeal to the
fact that they have an intuition as evidence because they falsely believe in Evi-
dence Neutrality, which is the idea that a community of philosophers can always
in principle achieve common knowledge as to whether any given proposition
constitutes evidence or not. I consider an operational standard and Evidence
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Neutrality as methodological norms as well as Evidence Neutrality as a conver-
sational norm. In the third part (section 5.5), I then suggest a methodological
norm for evidence in philosophy according to which we ought to appeal to the
part of our total evidence for a certain claim which is relatively easy to access.
This norm can explain why we appeal to the fact that we have an intuition
that P as evidence from a thought experiment even if we endorse the Inclusive
View, and I suggest that it explains our use of evidence in many other cases as
well.
5.2 Evidence in the Sciences
Not everything we take to be evidence in ordinary life contexts can be used
as evidence in the sciences. Scientific evidence has to meet standards such as
statistical relevance, objectivity, and reproducibility. Moreover, the methods
by which we acquire scientific evidence have to be made transparent. People
not familiar with scientific practices do not always seem to appreciate this fact,
as the following shows.
In an online article titled ‘Duh! The Most Obvious Scientific Findings of
2010’1, two authors list scientific findings such as ‘Caﬀeine aﬀects kids’ sleep’,
‘Smoking a lot of weed is bad for you’, or ‘Sitting in front of the TV all day can
make a teen fat’. They introduce their article with the line ‘Along with some
truly groundbreaking discoveries, scientists this year told us a few things we
already kind of knew’. Under the headline ‘Bullies pick on unpopular kids’, they
ridicule a study by Rene´ Veenstra et al. [127] published in Child Development.
They write ‘Who’d have guessed? Bullies target kids who are unpopular and
less likely to be defended by their peers, a new study finds.’ Several other
online newspapers and blogs make fun of the study, some of them calling it a
waste of money.
Here is how Veenstra et al. gained their evidence. For their study on bul-
1http://www.livescience.com/11227-duh-obvious-scientific-findings-2010.html. Date: 29
December 2010.
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lying, they tested 26 elementary school classes. The research assistants first
explained to the children what bullying is.2 They then gave examples of bully-
ing and of forms of behaviour that should not count as bullying (e.g., teasing
in a friendly and playful way). The children finally had do fill out question-
naires where they answered questions concerning which peers they accepted or
rejected, and who they were bullying or bullied by.
The results of a study by Britt Hedman Ahlstro¨m [1], titled ‘Major Depres-
sion and Family Life—The family’s way of living with a long-term illness’, was
listed amongst the most obvious findings of 2009. The authors of the online
article comment on it as follows:
This sad truth stands to reason: Life is hard for kids whose parents
are depressed. ‘Children take on an extremely heavy responsibility
by monitoring and keeping an eye on the depressed parent,’ said
study author Britt Hedman Ahlstro¨m of the Sahlgrenska Academy
at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. Hedman Ahlstro¨m found
that a parent’s depression increases a child’s sense of responsibility
and feelings of loneliness. She recommends that health services sup-
port the whole family, and not just the person who is ill [. . . ] Good
advice, and hopefully not news to the mental health community.3
Let us see how Hedman Ahlstro¨m conducted her her study on depression
and family life. Hedman Ahlstro¨m conducted 25 interviews, both group in-
terviews and individual interviews, which were all tape-recorded and tran-
scribed. She used qualitative content analysis and phenomenological hermeneu-
tic method to analyze the data. Qualitative content analysis requires the re-
searcher to divide the interview text into units, sample the units in accordance
with the research question and rewrite it in categories and themes.4 Phe-
nomenological hermeneutics is performed in three steps: the researcher reads
2They used the term ‘bullying’ as defined in the Olweus’ [91] Bully/Victim questionnaire.
3http://www.livescience.com/5965-duh-year-obvious-discoveries.html, emphasis added.
Date: 31 December 2009.
4Hedman Ahlstro¨m [1, p. 20]. Hedman Ahlstro¨m refers to Krippendorﬀ [67], amongst
others.
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the text naively, then structures and analyses it and finally reaches an inter-
pretation on the basis of the first two steps and of independent knowledge.5
The strong reactions to seemingly unnecessary studies quoted above can
be explained by the fact that many people are not familiar with scientific
methods and constraints on scientific evidence. To scientists, however, it should
not come as a surprise that Veenstra et al. and Hedman Ahlstro¨m tested
their hypotheses empirically, using scientifically recognized methods such as
questionnaires and interviews, as well as certain methods to analyze the data
gained through these questionnaires and interviews. On the basis of these two
cases and how they were discussed, we can construct the following fictional
cases.
Sally the Teacher
Sally is a teacher. She has been teaching for a couple of years
and has been observing a lot of bullying in her classroom. Sally
comes to believe that bullies choose victims that are already re-
jected by their classmates, which gives them a rise in status on the
one hand and no loss in aﬀection by other classmates on the other
hand. She speaks to many teachers in her school who have observed
similar situations and confirm Sally’s observations about bullying.
Given her evidence, Sally knows that bullies choose victims that
are already rejected by their classmates, and she acts appropriately
when she takes precautions to protect potential victims from po-
tential bullies. After some more years of teaching, Sally goes back
to university and carries out a study that confirms exactly what
she already knew: bullies want to realize both status and aﬀec-
tion and therefore choose victims that are already disliked by their
classmates.
5Hedman Ahlstro¨m [1, p. 22]. The method of phenomenological hermeneutic was devel-
oped, amongst others, by Lindseth & Norberg [76].
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There seems to be nothing wrong with this case. Before the study, Sally
knows that bullies choose victims that are already disliked by their classmates,
and that they do so to realize both status and aﬀection. The propositions
are true, Sally believes them and she has enough evidence through her own
experience and through testimony. Sally also appropriately takes precautions
to protect potential victims from potential bullies. From a scientific point
of view, however, running a study is necessary. Imagine, for instance, the
psychology department is planning to edit a new textbook on education, and
they ask Sally to write a contribution on bullying. It would be unacceptable for
Sally to publish her knowledge gained in the classroom and through testimony
(e.g., anecdotally) in the textbook. In order to meet scientific standards of
evidence, she clearly needs to run the study.
Here is a second case:
Sam the Psychologist
Sam is a psychologist who works with patients suﬀering from major
depressions. Many of Sam’s patients are parents of children, and
many of them raise concerns with regard to their children’s mental
health. Sam decides to talk to some of the children as well, and over
the years, she realizes that their mental health is either already
heavily aﬀected by their parent’s disease or is threatened to be
aﬀected. Sam decides to change her practice: from now on, she
insists on treating the children as well whenever a parent suﬀers
from a major depression. Given her evidence, she knows that a
major depression of a parent negatively aﬀects the children’s mental
health, and she acts appropriately when she insists on treating them
as well. After a couple of more years, Sam is up for a new challenge.
She decides to run a study on her patients and publish the results.
Her study confirms exactly what she knew already: the children’s
mental health is either already heavily aﬀected by their parent’s
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disease or is threatened to be aﬀected.
There seems to be nothing wrong with this case either. Before the study,
Sam knows that the children’s mental health is aﬀected. The proposition is
true, Sam believes it and she has suﬃcient evidence through her own expe-
rience. Moreover, Sam’s knowledge is also suﬃcient for her to appropriately
treat the children. Even without clinical experience, we can easily see that
a parent’s depression is very likely to negatively aﬀect the children’s mental
health. From a scientific point of view, however, running a study is necessary.
Imagine, again, the psychology department is planning to edit a new textbook,
and they ask Sam to write a contribution on the aﬀects of a major depression
on the patient’s children. It would be unacceptable for Sam to publish her
knowledge acquired while talking to her patients in a textbook. In order to
meet scientific standards of evidence, she clearly needs to run the study.
As I have presented them, the cases seem to be ones in which a subject
knows a proposition that P but is not in a good enough epistemic position to
assert that P in a scientific context. The reason seems to be that the subject
has only non-scientific evidence, i.e., evidence not generated through recognized
scientific methods. The subject does not have the right kind of evidence.
This description of the cases is open to several possible objections. First,
some might deny that the non-scientific evidence the subject has for P is enough
for knowledge that P. Second, even if we accept that Sally the Teacher and
Sam the Psychologist are cases in which a subject knows that P but is not in
a good enough epistemic position to assert that P in a scientific context, there
is a question of what explains why this is so. For instance, our cases constitute
potential counterexamples to the suﬃciency direction of the knowledge norm
of assertion. The knowledge norm of assertion states that one is properly
epistemically positioned to assert P if one knows that P. Further, one might
think that it also undermines the suﬃciency direction of the knowledge norm of
practical reasoning. The knowledge norm of practical reasoning states that one
is properly epistemically positioned to use P in practical reasoning if one knows
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that P.6 Third, contextualists or subject sensitive invariantists may suggest
that the subject has enough evidence for knowledge in ordinary contexts but
not in scientific contexts where the standards are higher. Thus, they may oﬀer
an interpretation of the cases on which in the scientific context when the subject
is not epistemically well enough positioned to assert the relevant proposition,
or act on it, she doesn’t know it. I will deal with each of these objections in
turn.
5.3 Objections and Replies
The following Objections 1 to 5 provide some plausible alternative explanations
of why it seems inappropriate for Sally and Sam not to run a study before
publishing a paper, which I will all reject.
Objection 1
A first response might be to doubt that the cases are described correctly. One
may think that Sally does not know that bullies choose victims that are already
rejected by their classmates before having run the study, and that Sam does not
know that a major depression of a parent negatively aﬀects the children’s men-
tal health before having run the study. According to this objection, Sally may
still be properly epistemically positioned to take precautions in the classroom,
and Sam may still be properly epistemically positioned to treat the patient’s
children, despite having no knowledge. However, one may say, knowledge is
necessary for Sally and Sam to assert their beliefs in a scientific context, i.e.,
to publish a paper.
In reply and to defend the claim that Sally and Sam have knowledge, the
following can be said. First, given their evidence, it it prima facie plausible to
think that Sally and Sam have knowledge. Take the online articles quoted above
again: it is at least understandable why someone unfamiliar with scientific
6The knowledge norm of assertion or of practical reasoning is often used or defended as
a bi-conditional: a subject knows that P if and only if she is properly epistemically position
to assert P and rely on P in her practical reasoning.
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standards might make fun of the studies. It seems that the researchers already
knew what they then confirmed with scientific methods. Similarly, any subject
in a similar situation as Sally and Sam seems to have knowledge of the relevant
proposition before running a scientific study.
Second, we can easily adapt the cases such that the subject is in an even
better epistemic situation which makes it even more plausible that she has
knowledge. Here is a slightly changed version of Sally the Teacher.
Sally the Experienced Teacher
Sally is a teacher. She has been teaching for a couple of years and
has been observing a lot of bullying in her classroom. Sally comes
to believe that bullies choose victims that are already rejected by
their classmates, which gives them a rise in status on the one hand
and no loss in aﬀection by other classmates on the other hand. She
speaks to many teachers in her school that have observed similar
situations and confirm Sally’s observations about bullying. Sally
teaches for 10 more years in diﬀerent schools. Over the years, she
makes the same observations again and again. Because she is very
interested in the topic, she talks to many teachers and students,
and they all confirm her observations. Given her evidence, Sally
knows that bullies choose victims that are already rejected by their
classmates, and she acts appropriately when she takes precautions
to protect potential victims from potential bullies. Sally goes back
to university and carries out a study that confirms exactly what
she already knew: bullies want to realize both status and aﬀec-
tion and therefore choose victims that are already disliked by their
classmates.
Given that Sally is epistemically extremely well positioned, it is very plau-
sible that she has knowledge. Simply judging from the number of samples,
she is in a much better epistemic position before running the study than she
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would be from only running the study, without having any previous experi-
ence. However, while she can publish her evidence gained through the study in
a psychology textbook, she cannot appropriately publish her evidence gained
in the classroom and through talking to teachers and students.
If one does not want to grant Sally knowledge in Sally the Experienced
Teacher, it seems one would have to argue on more general theoretical grounds,
such as that we cannot know any general empirical proposition before having
tested it scientifically. This, however, would be very implausible. For instance, I
know that tulips need water to grow, that most dogs enjoy running and playing
with a stick, that people with friends are usually happier than people without
friends, etc. I know these general empirical propositions without having tested
them scientifically myself and without knowing of a scientific study in which
they were tested, and it is likely that some of them have never been scientifically
tested at all.
Surely, Sally and Sam cannot rule out that they are deceived by all stu-
dents, co-teachers and patients, respectively, but in many cases of knowledge
we are not able to rule out being deceived, even after having tested our beliefs
scientifically. We do not need to assume that in order for a subject to have
knowledge, she can rule out these sceptical possibilities.7
Objection 2
Someone might question my diagnosis that the reason why Sam and Sally
cannot appropriately publish their knowledge is that they do not have the
right kind of evidence. Instead, they may suggest that the problem is not
a certain quality of evidence they lack but the quantity. To take Sally the
Teacher as an example: even though Sally can act on her knowledge when she
protects disliked students, she is not in a good enough epistemic position to
appropriately assert her knowledge in a scientific context because she simply
needs more evidence.
7See, e.g., Williamson [137].
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Take Sally the Experienced Teacher again and change it such that we grant
Sally knowledge from the beginning on: given her evidence, Sally knows that
bullies choose victims that are already rejected by their classmates, and she
acts appropriately when she takes precautions to protect potential victims from
potential bullies. Sally then teaches for 10 more years, makes the same observa-
tions again and again, and talks to many teachers and students who all confirm
her observations. Even though Sally is epistemically extremely well positioned,
far better than is required for knowledge, her evidence is clearly still not suﬃ-
cient to write a paper on bullying. The reason, I take it, is that it is not the
right kind of evidence to be published in the psychology textbook.
Objection 3
My suggestion that the cases of Sally and Sam are ones in which a subject
knows that P but is not in a good enough epistemic position to assert it may
seem to violate the knowledge norm of assertion or practical reasoning. Ac-
cording to the suﬃciency direction of the knowledge norm of assertion, one is
properly epistemically positioned to assert P if one knows that P. According
to the suﬃciency direction of the knowledge norm of practical reasoning, one is
properly epistemically positioned to use P in practical reasoning if one knows
that P. Denying the knowledge norm of assertion or practical reasoning would
be a controversial move since it is widely accepted (e.g., by Williamson [137],
Hawthorne [51], Stanley [116]).
However, evidence against the knowledge norm of practical reasoning has
recently been given by Jessica Brown [9] and Jennifer Lackey [69], [70]. Brown
argues that the knowledge norm cannot serve to settle debates about knowl-
edge, and the cases she gives suggest that knowing that P is not suﬃcient to
appropriately rely on P in practical reasoning. Lackey [70] argues that as-
sertions grounded in a very high degree of justification and even above the
threshold for knowledge can fail to be epistemically appropriate and hence
provide putative counterexamples to the suﬃciency direction of the knowledge
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norm. To show this, Lackey gives several cases in which a subject has what
she calls ‘isolated secondhand knowledge’: the subject knows that P solely on
the basis of testimony that P and knows nothing or very little relevant about
the matter other than that P. In these cases, the subject cannot appropriately
assert her knowledge that P. Lackey claims that the reason is that P is not the
right kind of evidence. This is similar to what I claimed for my cases: before
the study, Sally and Sam lack evidence generated through recognized scientific
methods, which is the kind of evidence they need in order to publish their
knowledge. While nothing depends on it, I take it that publishing a science
paper is an elaborate form of asserting rather than acting.
Let us have a closer look at one of Lackey’s cases:
DOCTOR: Matilda is an oncologist at a teaching hospital who has
been diagnosing and treating various kinds of cancers for the past
fifteen years. One of her patients, Derek, was recently referred to
her oﬃce because he has been experiencing intense abdominal pain
for a couple of weeks. After requesting an ultrasound and MRI, the
results of the tests arrived on Matilda’s day oﬀ; consequently, all
of the relevant data were reviewed by Nancy, a competent medical
student in oncology training at her hospital. Being able to confer
for only a very brief period of time prior to Derek’s appointment
today, Nancy communicated to Matilda simply that her diagnosis
is pancreatic cancer, without oﬀering any of the details of the test
results or the reasons underlying her conclusion. Shortly thereafter,
Matilda had her appointment with Derek, where she truly asserts
to him purely on the basis of Nancy’s reliable testimony, ‘I’m very
sorry to tell you this, but you have pancreatic cancer.’ [70, pp. 3-4]
According to Lackey, Matilda knows that Derek has pancreatic cancer, but
she is not epistemically well enough positioned to assert that Derek has pan-
creatic cancer. Isolated secondhand knowledge is simply not the right kind of
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evidence to be appropriately used in this context, and hence the case violates
the suﬃciency direction of the knowledge norm of assertion. My suggestion
that the cases of Sally and Sam are ones in which a subject knows that P but
is not in a good enough epistemic position to assert P may suggest that they
violate the knowledge norm of assertion in exactly the same way.
Lackey discusses an objection to her view that DOCTOR and similar cases
violate the suﬃciency direction of the knowledge norm according to which
Matilda cannot appropriately assert that Derek has pancreatic cancer because
this would violate an institutional norm. While Matilda cannot be criticized
qua asserter, she can be criticized qua doctor: as a doctor, she is not epis-
temically well enough positioned to assert that Derek has pancreatic cancer.
According to this objection to Lackey’s case, the medical profession requires
that doctors oﬀer diagnoses which are not grounded entirely in isolated sec-
ondhand knowledge, in which case Matilda is criticizable only for institutional
reasons. If this is correct, DOCTOR is consistent with the knowledge norm of
assertion. Lackey argues that this objection is not successful for two reasons.
First, if the medical profession allowed diagnoses grounded in isolated second-
hand knowledge, the institution would no longer serve their epistemic purpose
and patients would no longer trust it, so the reasons why Matilda cannot assert
her knowledge are epistemic. Second, this explanation does not work for cases
which are in relevant aspects similar to DOCTOR but where no institution is
involved.8
Whether or not Lackey has established that DOCTOR and similar cases
violate the suﬃciency direction of the knowledge norm of assertion does not
matter for the current purposes. I do not think that my cases violate it, but
Lackey’s cases can nevertheless be used to serve my purpose whether or not
they are treated as counterexamples to the knowledge norm of assertion. The
reason is that the relevant similarity between Lackey’s cases and our cases is
that the subject does not have the right kind of evidence. Given Lackey’s cases
8For such cases, see Lackey [70, pp. 22-26].
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are very similar to our cases, some of her ways of defending them will work for
our cases as well (see Objections 4 and 5).
The weaker claim, that in DOCTOR and similar cases, a proposition P
cannot be asserted for institutional reasons supports my view. It seems (and
the real cases described above suggest) that in a scientific context, knowledge
can only be appropriately asserted (e.g., published) when it meets standards
such as statistical relevance, objectivity, and reproducibility, and when the
methods by which it is gained are made transparent for reasons dictated by
the scientific community. From an epistemic point of view, however, it might
be perfectly appropriate to assert P in a scientific context. Sally the Teacher
and Sam the Psychologist therefore seem to be consistent with the knowledge
norm of assertion.
Objection 4
One might want to object that the reasons why Sally and Sam cannot appro-
priately publish their knowledge are not institutional, but for instance merely
pragmatic. Sally and Sam, one might want to say, could not possibly write
down all their experience in an appropriate way that would convince others
and this is why they have to run a study. While this might be true as well,
the sciences are clearly an institutionalized group enterprise. Scientists work
on projects together and use evidence produced by other scientists in their re-
search. Since they have to be able to rely on each other’s evidence, the methods
by which the evidence is gained have to be made transparent. In the examples
given above, Veenstra et al. give a detailed description of how they reached
their conclusion about bullying, and Hedman Ahlstro¨m makes the two recog-
nized methods she uses transparent (see section 5.2). Surely, some aspects of
it may be pragmatic. For instance, scientists would not be able to reproduce
evidence if the methods were not transparent. Other aspects may be epistemic.
For instance, scientists want to minimize the chances of making mistakes, and
this is why they only use methods that have been proven to be reliable. More-
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over, it is important to note that one of the sciences’ main aims is the mere
acquisition of knowledge. Given that knowledge is one of the main aims, we
should expect there to be special constraints on how to produce knowledge.
Since the relevant evidence has to be produced by scientifically recognized
methods, I will speak of methodological standards of evidence.
Objection 5
A further possible response comes from a contextualist or subject sensitive in-
variantist view. According to contextualism about knowledge, the truth condi-
tions of knowledge ascriptions depend on the context in which they are uttered,
where ‘context’ refers to features of the knowledge attributor or her situation.
According to subject sensitive invariantism, the strength of epistemic posi-
tion required for knowledge varies depending on the stakes of the subject of
knowledge attribution. According to these views, a knowledge ascription could
change from being true to being false as a result of an increase in the stakes.
Second and more importantly, contextualism holds that the truth conditions
of knowledge ascription can be altered not merely by the stakes, but by other
factors including salience of error and perhaps institutional standards.
Both could try to explain why it would be inappropriate in Sally the Teacher
and Sam the Psychologist not to conduct the studies by claiming that Sally and
Sam have knowledge in the classroom or in the psychological practice, but that
they do not have knowledge in the high-stakes context the sciences provide. In
reply, I will first argue that the stakes are not necessarily high in the science
context (both for the subject and a possible knowledge ascriber), and I will then
use one of Lackey’s replies to the contextualist or subject sensitive invariantist
objection to her cases.
It seems that Sally the Teacher is not a case in which the stakes shift from
low to high. Two diﬀerent aspects could raise the stakes in a scientific con-
text. First, the stakes could raise because Sally’s knowledge would be available
to many people who would act on this knowledge, for which Sally would be
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responsible. In the classroom context, the stakes are clearly low. All Sally
does is protect potential victims who are anyway disliked by their classmates.
Now, it seems that protecting disliked children is good no matter how many
people do it—it does not get bad if more people do it. The stakes are therefore
not higher, neither for Sally personally nor for Sally as part of the scientific
community.
Second, the stakes could raise because Sally would make her knowledge
available to the scientific community. One may think that the practical stakes
are high because the researcher would risk to ruin her reputation in the scientific
community if she published a false claim. However, it happens frequently that
scientists publish papers with false claims. In fact, some of the most respected
researchers have defended theories that were later proven wrong. To stay in
psychology, most of the theories developmental psychologist Jean Piaget has
defended have been proven wrong. Nevertheless, Piaget remains one of the
most admired psychologists in history, and even though many of his claims
were false, these very claims have inspired the discipline and led to extensive
studies and improved knowledge of the subject matter. It seems that publishing
false claims is not a problem in itself, and the reason is that scientists make
the methods they use to gain their evidence transparent in their publications.
It would be inappropriate to draw conclusions from the evidence which clearly
cannot be drawn, or to publish knowledge based on just observing children in
the classroom and talking to fellow teachers. Hence, if the stakes are high for
the scientist, they seem to be high because of the way scientific evidence is
gained or used and not because the claims made might be false.
Even if what I have just argued is not correct and scientific contexts do, for
some reason, necessarily provide high stakes contexts, salience of error, or per-
haps institutional standards, it seems that this would not make a contextualist
or subject sensitive invariantist explanation true. Here one of Lackey’s replies
to the contextualist and subject sensitive variantist with respect to DOCTOR
and similar cases is helpful. Lackey argues that her cases do not involve high
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stakes, but even if they could be construed as involving high stakes, the con-
textualist’s and the subject sensitive variantist’s response would be to require
simply more evidence for knowledge in these cases. However, Lackey argues
that a certain kind of evidence is required.9 The same would be true in our
cases. I have argued in reply to Objection 2 that simply more evidence is not
suﬃcient; we need a special kind of evidence, namely evidence approved by the
scientific community.
I have argued that there are methodological constraints on evidence in the
sciences: not any kind of knowledge can be used as evidence in a scientific
context. Since I am ultimately interested in evidence in a philosophical con-
text, I will not discuss what exactly these constraints are and instead move on
to discuss evidence in philosophy. The main reason why I nevertheless chose
examples from the sciences is that I am interested in constraints on evidence in
academic philosophy rather than in ordinary life situations. However, when we
assert or act on knowledge gained in philosophy, we are typically in a philosoph-
ical context, which makes it diﬃcult to isolate methodological constraints from
epistemic aspects which would apply in ordinary life situations. For instance,
it is not clear how one’s knowledge that knowledge is not justified true belief
or one’s knowledge that intuitions cannot be reduced to beliefs would influence
how one acts in ordinary life situations. In ordinary life situations, we might
be interested in whether some particular cases are cases of knowledge and what
intuitions people have, but it is hard to see how a particular definition of either
would make a diﬀerence as to how we act.10 We are, however, often not in
a scientific context when we assert or act on knowledge which can be tested
in the sciences (such as Sally’s or Sam’s knowledge), which made it easier to
isolate methodological constraints from epistemic aspects.
In the next two sections, sections 5.4 and 5.5, I argue that there are method-
9Lackey [70, p. 27].
10Surely, we may act on some knowledge gained through philosophical inquiry. For in-
stance, one might come to know that God exists through philosophical research, which might
influence how one acts in ordinary life significantly.
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ological constraints on evidence in philosophy and I discuss what they could
be.
5.4 Evidence in Philosophy
Even though the methods in the sciences and in philosophy diﬀer, it seems
that there are analogous constraints on evidence. As mentioned above, one
of the reasons why our evidence in the sciences has to meet certain standards
is that the sciences are an institutionalized group enterprise. The same holds
for academic philosophy as well: academic philosophy is an institutionalized
group enterprise. Just like scientists, philosophers highly rely on each others
work, and they often work on projects together. Or they work independently on
similar projects, and before publishing a paper, they take the evidence that has
already been produced on the relevant topics into consideration. Philosophers
therefore aim to make their evidence available to each other. They also often
make the methods by which they gain their evidence available. For instance,
philosophers do not simply publish the knowledge they gain from a thought
experiment, they also present and discuss the thought experiment and explain
why they take certain facts to be their evidence.
Moreover, I said that one of the sciences’ main aim is the mere acquisition of
knowledge. Similarly, one of the main aims of philosophy certainly is the mere
acquisition of knowledge. It even seems to be the aim of philosophy. While
evidence in ordinary life situations often serves mainly practical purposes such
as to act on it in ordinary situations, knowledge we use as evidence in academic
philosophy is rarely used to act on in ordinary life contexts (as explained above).
We assumed that in thought experiments, we usually gain knowledge of the
content of the intuition and knowledge of the fact that we have an intuition.
I called this the Inclusive View of evidence from thought experiments which
Williamson endorses (see section 5.1). Williamson claims that we ought to
appeal to the content of the intuition as evidence from thought experiments.
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However, I argued in Chapter 4 that appealing to the fact that we have an in-
tuition as initial evidence from thought experiments is a practice we commonly
pursue. A constraint on evidence in philosophy could explain why we ought to
do so.
In what follows, I discuss what such a constraint could be. I first con-
sider three possible ways Williamson suggests to explain why some misguided
philosophers appeal to the fact that they have an intuition and thereby psychol-
ogize their evidence: an operational standard of evidence, Evidence Neutrality,
and Evidence Neutrality as a conversational norm. I reject these explanations
(this section) and then give my own explanation according to which appealing
to the fact that we have an intuition is a practice we ought to pursue (section
5.5).
Rejecting an Operational Standard
In ‘Philosophical ‘Intuitions’ and Scepticism About Judgement’ [138], Williamson
claims that one reason why some philosophers psychologize their evidence may
be that they think one must always be in a position to know what rationality
requires of one. Since it is rational to form one’s beliefs on the basis of one’s ev-
idence, these philosophers will also think that one must always be in a position
to know what one’s evidence is. Hence, they endorse an operational standard
of evidence. An operational standard of evidence implies that a proposition
P constitutes evidence only if we know or are in a position to know that P
is part of our evidence.11 According to Williamson, the endorsement of such
an operational standard could explain why some philosophers appeal to the
fact that they have an intuition rather than to the content of the intuition as
evidence from thought experiments:
On any standard of evidence on which our evidence includes the
11To be in a position to know that p entails the following, according to Williamson: ‘[. . . ]
it is neither necessary to know p nor suﬃcient to be physically and psychologically capable
of knowing p. No obstacle must block one’s path to knowing p. If one is in a position to
know p, and one has done what one is in a position to do to decide whether p is true, then
one does know p.’ [137, p. 95]
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fact that the subject in a Gettier case lacks knowledge, we are not
always in the relevant sense in a position to know what our evidence
is. Contrapositively, we are always in a position to know what our
evidence is only if our evidence does not include the fact that the
subject in a Gettier case lacks knowledge. Thus, for both percep-
tion and philosophical judgement, the demand for an operational
standard of evidence drives even many non-sceptics to adopt the
psychologized standard of evidence to which the sceptics appeal.
By that standard, one’s evidence is only the fact that it percep-
tually or intellectually appears to one that P, not the fact that P
itself. [138, p. 119]
However, in Knowledge and its Limits [137], Williamson famously argues
that no operational standard of evidence can be established: there is no general
domain of evidence to which we have privileged access (the anti-luminosity the-
sis).12 Hence, Williamson claims in the above-mentioned paper, mere knowl-
edge is suﬃcient to qualify as evidence, in philosophy and in the sciences. He
says:
In philosophy as in empirical science, our evidence does not consist
of facts with respect to which we are infallible. Ordinary knowledge
is enough. We have no general guarantee against the possibility
that we did not know something that we thought we knew. [138,
p. 151, my emphasis]
While it is certainly true that our evidence does not consist in facts with respect
to which we are infallible, it does not follow that any kind of evidence is good
enough. I argued that there are constraints on evidence to be used in the
sciences (sections 5.2 and 5.3), and that evidence in philosophy is likely to be
constrained as well (this section). We might, therefore, consider an operational
standard as a constraint on evidence in philosophy only. Just like a proposition
12For Williamson’s anti-luminosity thesis, see [137, pp. 93-113; 147-183].
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cannot be used as evidence in the sciences if it does not meet the standards of
scientific evidence, a proposition might not be usable as evidence in philosophy
if it does not meet an operational standard.
This could explain why we do not appeal to the content of our intuition but
rather to the fact that we have an intuition as evidence from thought experi-
ments. Even though intuitions do not meet the general operational standard,
Williamson grants that we are often in a position to know what intuitions we
have:
[It is not the case] that we are not often or typically in a position to
know what intuitions we have. The point is just that not even facts
about intuition meet the fully operational standard of evidence that
was used to exclude other facts. [138, p. 121]
We can say the following:
Operational Evidence. Some of our evidence E is such that we know (or
are in a position to know) that we have it whereas other evidence E* is
such that we do not know (or are not in a position to know) that we have
it.
Operational Evidence could be read in two diﬀerent ways. First, it could
mean that some kinds of evidence E are typically such that we know (or are
in a position to know) that we have it, whereas other kinds of evidence E* are
typically not such that we know (or are in a position to know) that we have
it. For instance, it could mean that the fact that we have an intuition that
P is typically such that we know (or are in a position to know) that we know
it, whereas P, the content of the intuition, is typically not such that we know
(or are in a position to know) that we know it. E, of course, is not necessarily
psychological evidence.
Second, Operational Evidence could be read such that from the total ev-
idence a subject has which bears a certain claim, some evidence E is in fact
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such that we know (or are in a position to know) that we have it whereas some
other evidence E* is in fact not such that we know (or are in a position to
know) that we have it, whatever kind of evidence E* and E are. For instance,
it could mean that in one case, the fact that we have an intuition that P is such
that we know (or are in a position to know) that we know it, and in another
case, the content of the intuition P is such that we know (or are in a position
to know) that we know it. Again, E is not necessarily psychological evidence.
If Operational Evidence is true, we can hold an Operational Norm as a
constraint on evidence in philosophy:
Operational Norm*. A proposition P constitutes evidence in philosophy
only if it is the kind of evidence for which we usually know (or are in
a position to know) that it is part of our evidence.
Operational Norm**. A proposition P constitutes evidence in philosophy
only if we in fact know (or are in a position to know) that P is part of
our evidence.
Either of these norms could at least explain why we sometimes appeal to the
fact that we have an intuition as evidence from a thought experiment. Since
the diﬀerences will not matter in what follows, I will refer to both versions as
the Operational Norm. As a methodological norm for evidence in philosophy,
the Operational Norm does not tell us anything about the nature of evidence in
general, or about the evidence we have against a certain claim. Instead, it tells
us something about which evidence can play a role in philosophy. We thereby
distinguish between the epistemic situation a subject is in and methodological
constraints on the evidence she can use in her research.
The Operational Norm therefore is compatible with Williamson’s general
picture of knowledge and evidence. First, we do not have to deny the anti-
luminosity thesis, because we only need to presuppose that some of our evi-
dence is such that we know we have it, which Williamson grants. Second and
closely related, a philosopher defending an operational norm for evidence in
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philosophy can stick with Williamson’s denial of a general operational stan-
dard of evidence.13 Third, even though the subject might not be able to use
all her evidence which bears on a certain claim in a philosophical context, we
can endorse the view that the total evidence a subject has in the case where
the content of the intuition is true is diﬀerent from the total evidence the sub-
ject has in the case where the content of the intuition is false.14 In the case
where the content is true and the subject has knowledge, the subject’s evidence
consists in both the content of the intuition and the fact that the subject has
the intuition. In the case where the content is false, it consists only of the fact
that the subject has an intuition.
However, mere consistency with Williamson’s general epistemic picture is
not suﬃcient to make the Operational Norm plausible within this picture. It
seems that there is no motivation for a Williamsonian externalist to endorse an
operational standard of evidence in philosophy. Williamson often emphasizes
the similarity of philosophy to ordinary thinking.15 It seems then that there is
no motivation for an operational standard of evidence in philosophical thinking,
if this thinking is not supposed to be much diﬀerent from ordinary thinking.16
I will suggest a weaker methodological constraint on evidence in philoso-
phy in section 5.5. However, I first address two further suggestions Williamson
makes in order to explain why some contemporary philosophers misguidedly
appeal to the fact that they have an intuition as evidence from thought exper-
iments.
13Williamson [138, pp. 116-125].
14See Williamson [140, chapter 7].
15For instance with respect to thought experiments: ‘The main overall aim is to subsume
the epistemology of thought experiments under the epistemology of counterfactual condi-
tionals and metaphysical modality [. . . ] and thereby to reveal it as an application of quite
ordinary ways of thinking, not as something peculiarly philosophical.’ Williamson [140, p.
180].
16Sosa [113, pp. 135-153] holds a view similar to the one suggested. He thinks that there
are at least two diﬀerent kinds of knowledge, animal knowledge and reflective knowledge.
While animal knowledge does not require that the subject has an epistemic perspective on
her believe, reflective knowledge requires that the subject endorses the reliability of the source
of her knowledge. In philosophy, we are obviously interested in gaining reflective knowledge.
CHAPTER 5. KNOWLEDGE AND EVIDENCE IN PHILOSOPHY 138
Rejecting Evidence Neutrality
In The Philosophy of Philosophy [140], Williamson claims that philosophers
appeal to the fact that they have an intuition because they believe in Evidence
Neutrality. Evidence Neutrality is the thesis that
[. . . ] whether a proposition constitutes evidence is in principle un-
contentiously decidable, in the sense that a community of inquirers
can always in principle achieve common knowledge as to whether
any given proposition constitutes evidence for the inquiry. [140, p.
210]
It is not entirely clear what exactly Evidence Neutrality entails. First, it
is not clear whether it is meant as an epistemic norm or as a methodologi-
cal norm, i.e., whether it is meant to concern all our evidence or merely the
evidence to be used in philosophical research. Given that the passage men-
tions a community of inquirers, it at least seems to be a norm which holds
in philosophy but not necessarily in other contexts. Second, it is not clear
whether Evidence Neutrality is meant to say that the inquirers ought to be
able to gain common knowledge as to whether a proposition is evidence (and
hence, as to whether it is knowledge), or whether the inquirers ought to be
able to gain common knowledge as to whether a proposition is true. The first
would be an even stricter constraint than the Operational Norm, adding the
requirement that the community be in a position to agree on the operational
evidence. Third, it is not clear what it means that a community of inquirers
can always ‘in principle’ achieve common knowledge. If we take ‘in principle’
to mean anything substantial and not to be trivial (such as that in principle,
we could agree on every single proposition), it should be understood such that
the community of inquirers ought to either agree or be in a position to agree on
what the evidence is. This corresponds to how Brian Weatherson [132] seems
to understand Evidence Neutrality :
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Neutrality Norm. A proposition P constitutes evidence in philosophy only
if the philosophical community agrees that P is true.17
Weatherson defends the Neutrality Norm as a methodological norm. He
claims that not only in philosophy, but also in the sciences ought we to appeal
only to evidence which is agreed upon by all parties of a debate. A subject who
follows the Neutrality Norm, Weatherson argues, will acquire more knowledge
and contribute to more knowledge of the community than a subject who does
not.
The Neutrality Norm, however, seems to be a rather unrealistic methodolog-
ical constraint. Even within a non-sceptical philosophical community, philoso-
phers radically disagree on many topics, and using only evidence that everyone
agrees on would reduce our evidence drastically. Moreover, philosophical dis-
pute often takes on a conditional form. We do not necessarily endorse the
premisses of our opponents, but we engage in conditional reasoning on the ba-
sis of our opponents’ premisses. Having to agree on every single step would not
get anyone anywhere, and progress is often made through working out theses
on the basis of claims we do not endorse. Hence, the Neutrality Norm does not
correspond to our practice and hence cannot explain our practice, so even if
for some reason the Neutrality Norm would be ideal and lead to more common
knowledge, we would constantly violate it. We are, however, looking for a norm
which can explain our practice.
Rejecting Conversational Norms
One might want to argue that other than in the sciences, we can explain our
practice in philosophy on a conversational level. While I take methodological
norms to concern specifically the sciences and philosophy, conversational norms
are more general and apply in any context in which we communicate.
17Weatherson [132] points out that this claim is ambiguous. It could either mean that a
community can in principle agree that P is true, or it could mean that a community can in
principle agree that P bears on a certain issue. Like Weatherson, I take it to mean the first.
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Williamson considers Evidence Neutrality as a conversational norm and
suggests the following:
In debate, one cannot hope to persuade opponents by appealing
to evidence that they do not accept. Predictably, they will accuse
one of begging the question. A fact can function as evidence in the
debate only if both sides are willing to accept it. If one party asserts
that P while the other party denies that P, they cannot use the fact
that P as shared evidence, but they can use the fact that the first
party asserts that P as shared evidence, because they presumably
agree on that. [138, p. 121]
Even though Williamson thinks that in a conversation, ‘it is dialectically
pointless, rude’ to oﬀer as evidence propositions that the opponent rejects, he
thinks that we ought not retreat to evidence the sceptic accepts, because a
‘suﬃciently ruthless sceptic can challenge everything that we oﬀer as evidence,
by always demanding a proof’18. For this reason, Williamson rejects Evidence
Neutrality as a conversational norm as well.
To begin with, Evidence Neutrality as a conversational norm confronts the
same problems as the methodological Neutrality Norm: it does not correspond
with our practice, because we simply do not only use evidence everyone agrees
on. Furthermore, such an explanation is not a charitable reading as to what
philosophers believe, because it presupposes that they have a pretty general
false belief about what they do. Not only would their belief be false, it would
also be a rather sophisticated meta-philosophical assumption, namely that a
community of philosophers can always in principle agree about what constitutes
evidence.
If we want to explain why we appeal to the fact that we have an intuition on
a conversational level, we can do so on the basis of Gricean maxims, which is
more charitable than Williamson’s explanation. In order to establish that our
18Williamson [138, p. 124, p. 152].
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false belief in Evidence Neutrality is the reason why we appeal to the fact that
we have an intuition, Williamson assumes that facts about psychological states
are ‘easier to accept’ than facts about the world.19 His explanation presupposes
at least that we believe that they are better accessible than the facts about the
world. This is a plausible assumption for the following reason. We rarely give
evidence for the claim that we have a certain intuition, which indicates that
we are quite confident with respect to whether we have an intuition or not.
Moreover, we usually do not question someone else’s claim that they have an
intuition, we rather just accept it as true. (I will argue in section 5.5 that
it is true that facts about our intuitions are usually easier to access than the
contents of intuitions.)
If it is true that we believe that facts about our intuitions are easier to access
in the relevant cases, we can analyse the appeal to intuitions from thought
experiments by applying some Gricean maxims of conversation. The idea is
that there are two pragmatic rules in conflict with each other, the Maxim of
Quantity and the Maxim of Quality.
1*. Maxim of Quantity : Make your contribution as informative as is required
(for the current purposes of exchange)
2*. Maxim of Quality : Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence
Here is an example Grice gives in which theMaxim of Quantity is violated, and
its violation is to be explained by the supposition of a clash with the Maxim
of Quality.
A is planning with B an itinerary for a holiday in France. Both
know that A wants to see his friend C, if to do so would not involve
too great a prolongation of his journey [. . . ]
A: Where does C live?
B: Somewhere in the South of France
19Williamson [140, p. 210].
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[50, pp. 32-33]
According to Grice, B’s answer is less informative than is required to meet
A’s needs. The violation of the Maxim of Quantity it best explained by the
supposition that B is aware that being more informative would possibly lead
to a violation of the Maxim of Quality, since he does not know where exactly
in the South of France C lives.
Applied to situations in which we first come up with thought experiments
as counterexamples, the Maxim of Quantity tells us to appeal directly to the
fact about the world as evidence, because this is the best evidence we have.
Appealing to the fact about the world as evidence would mean to make the
most informative claim possible, because giving the strongest evidence against
the theory in question makes the theory most unlikely. However, the Maxim
of Quality most of the time tells us to appeal to the fact that we have an
intuition in such a situation, because we believe that this fact is much easier to
access and hence our claim is more likely to be true. Whenever these conditions
hold, the conflict between the rules explains why we appeal to our intuitions as
evidence. As in the example given by Grice, it is more appropriate to violate
the Maxim of Quantity than to violate the Maxim of Quality.
While I take it that this is a more charitable explanation than Williamson’s,
there is an objection to any kind of explanation on the conversational level.
Philosophical work usually does not take place in ordinary conversation. To
engage in philosophical research in its paradigmatic form means to write pa-
pers or books for publication within an institutional context. Gricean norms
might explain some of our philosophical conversations, but when it comes to
explaining our practice of publishing our ideas and arguments in peer reviewed
journals, it seems that we have to look at methodological norms and not at
norms of conversation, just like in the sciences.
In the next section, I propose a methodological norm which is a natural fit
for a Williamsonian epistemic externalist.
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5.5 Philosophical Evidence and Accessibility
As mentioned in section 5.4, Williamson assumes that facts about psychological
states are ‘easier to accept’ than facts about the world when he argues that
our false belief in Evidence Neutrality is the reason of why we appeal to the
fact that we have an intuition.20 In cases where we disagree with our peers
on whether a proposition about the world is evidence, we draw on a fact that
is easier to accept by them, namely the fact that someone has an intuition.
The fact that someone has an intuition then is supposed to count as shared
evidence.
However, to motivate the appeal to the contents of our intuitions, Williamson
claims that ‘we frequently have better epistemic access to our immediate phys-
ical environment than to our own psychology.’21 It is certainly true that we
frequently have better epistemic access to facts about the world than to some
of our own psychological states. For instance, it is probably true that I have
better access to the fact that there is a table in front of me than to why exactly
I am in a really good mood today. However, in the case of thought experiments
as counterexamples to philosophical theories, it seems quite implausible that
we have better access to the content of the intuition than to the fact that we
have an intuition. First, thought experiments usually are not about mundane
things such as whether there is a table in front of me, but rather about abstract
matters of fact such as whether a person has knowledge or only justified true
belief. Second, the psychological fact that we have an intuition does not belong
to the realm of the unconscious which is diﬃcult to access, as for instance the
reason for my good mood might do. Third, even if we can be wrong about our
intuitions, the history of the discipline strongly suggests that in philosophy, we
are much more likely to be wrong concerning the contents of our intuitions. At
least it is obvious that we have to work tremendously hard to get to the facts.
We give arguments, examples and counterexamples—and we sometimes realise
20Williamson [140, p. 210].
21Williamson [140, p. 5].
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only decades later that we were wrong. Although we might occasionally be
wrong about ourselves having an intuition or not, it is quite plausible to think
that we have better access to the fact that we have an intuition than to the
content of our intuition in the case of thought experiments.
Given that in any case, some evidence is better accessible than other evi-
dence, the Williamsonian externalist can accept the following claim about the
relative accessibility of facts:
Accessible Evidence. Some facts F are better accessible than other facts
F*.22
This, again, could mean two things. First, it could mean that some kinds of
facts F are typically better accessible than other kinds of facts F*. For instance,
it could mean that the fact that we have an intuition that P is typically better
accessible than the content of the intuition P. F, of course, is not necessarily
internal or psychological in nature, and F* is not necessarily a fact about the
world. Second, it could mean that from the total evidence a subject has for a
certain claim, some facts F are in fact better accessible than other facts F*,
whatever kind of facts F and F* are. For instance, it could mean that in one
case, the fact that we have an intuition that P is better accessible than P, and
in another case, P is better accessible than the fact that we have the intuition
that P. Again, F is not necessarily psychological evidence.
For the purpose of this chapter, nothing depends on how we spell out Acces-
sible Evidence. If there is evidence that is accessible, we can hold the following
methodological norm for evidence in philosophy:
Accessibility Norm*. From our total evidence which bears on a certain the-
sis we ought to appeal to the part which is usually easiest to access.
Accessibility Norm**. From our total evidence which bears on a certain
thesis we ought to appeal to the part which is in fact easiest to access.
22This concerns only facts that are in principle accessible.
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Since the diﬀerences will not matter in what follows, I will refer to both
versions as the Accessibility Norm. Like the Operational Norm, the Accessi-
bility Norm is compatible with Williamson’s epistemic views if we take it to be
a methodological norm only.
I will now give some reasons why I think the Accessibility Norm explains
our practice correctly and has advantages over the Operational Norm or the
Neutrality Norm. First, given that philosophy is mainly about the acquisition
of knowledge (as I argued in section 5.4), we might want to proceed carefully,
and more carefully than in cases where we need to make practical decisions.
Since we do not have to act on knowledge gained in philosophy, we can aﬀord
to proceed carefully. Rather then risking anything (even in cases where the
method is in principle reliable), we better appeal to the fact which is easier to
access.
Second, appealing to better accessible evidence will often mean appealing
to weaker evidence and force us to acquire more evidence, which then leads
to more knowledge. I have shown in Chapter 4 that intuitions from thought
experiments as counterexamples to philosophical theories play a role as initial
evidence only, which implies that we need to produce more evidence in order
to refute a philosophical theory.
Third, from a methodological point of view, it is more reasonable to appeal
to evidence which is easier to access in order to establish facts which are harder
to access. Sherilynn Roush [102] has recently defended the view that for a
proposition E to serve as evidence for a proposition P, it should be easier to
access the truth of E than the truth of P.23 Roush refers to this feature of
evidence as ‘leverage’ and gives the following picture:
[. . . ] knowing that the evidence statement is true is usually a lot
easier than knowing that the hypothesis statement is true, and we
use the former to help us make progress on the latter where we
could not have made progress directly. This is analogous to the
23Roush [102, chapter 5].
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way in which we use a lever—a plank and a well-placed fulcrum—
and our ability to lift a small weight in order to move a large weight
we could not have lifted directly. The lever would not help us to
move weights, of course, if for some reason the plank always had to
be as heavy as the larger weight itself. For then we could not set
up the connection between the smaller and the larger weight, for
the same reason as we could not move the larger weight directly:
the plank would be too heavy to put in place. It is similar with
evidence. [102, p. 158]
Roush argues that in order to establish the truth or falsehood of a claim we
need evidence which bears on the claim, but in order to be useful, it has to be
easier to establish the truth of the evidence than the truth of the hypothesis.
If we already knew whether the hypothesis was true, we wouldn’t need the
evidence, just as we would not need a lever if we could already lift the heavy
object. However, if we cannot lift the heavy object, then an equally heavy lever
would not serve our purposes.
Fourth, it seems plausible that if we appeal to the evidence which is bet-
ter accessible, we more often know what our evidence is and diﬀerent parties
more often agree on what the evidence is. Hence, while the Accessibility Norm
does not entail anything as strong as the Operational Norm and the Neutral-
ity Norm, appealing to evidence that is relatively easy to access often means
appealing to evidence that we know we have and that others agree with us
on.24 Hence, following the Accessibility Norm is conducive to both the idea
that we should know what our evidence is and the idea that we should be able
to share our evidence with our peers, even if as methodological constraints,
these requirements would be too strong.
24Williamson says that Williamson says that [o]f course, we can often decide whether a
proposition constitutes evidence prior to deciding the main issue, otherwise the notion of
evidence would be useless’, [140, pp. 212-213].
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5.6 Conclusion: Appealing to Intuitions and Scepticism
Let me summarize what I argued in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 (the present chapter).
In Chapter 3, I argued that attempts to show that intuitions do not play a role
as evidence in philosophy fail. In Chapter 4, I argued that using the fact that we
have an intuition as evidence from a thought experiment is a common practice.
To show that we do so for methodological reasons, I argued in this chapter that
there is a methodological constraint on evidence in philosophy. I first showed
that there are methodological constraints in the sciences (sections 5.2 and 5.3).
Given that academic philosophy is similar to the sciences in relevant aspects,
there are likely to be methodological constraints on our evidence in philosophy
as well. I considered several possible methodological norms and then suggested
that a norm according to which we ought to use evidence that is relatively
easy to access can explain why we appeal to the fact that we have an intuition
as evidence from thought experiments even if we endorse the Inclusive View
(sections 5.4 and 5.5).
I mentioned in Chapter 3 that Williamson [140] thinks appealing to psy-
chological facts opens a gap which is not easy to close and causes scepticism.25
I will now show how what I have argued in chapter 4 and in this chapter
addresses this problem.
As a first reply to the worry of scepticism caused by the appeal to facts
about our psychology, note that prima facie, there is nothing special about the
gap between these facts and facts about the world: we often appeal to the fact
that some theory is simple as evidence for its truth, we often use semantic facts
as evidence for metaphysical facts, and we use syntactic facts as evidence for
semantic facts. These strategies all open a gap which has to be closed and,
according to many philosophers, can in fact be closed.
Here are some examples in more detail. Most scientists as well as philoso-
phers think that, other things being equal, the fact that a theory T is simpler
25Williamson [140, p. 234].
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than an alternative theory T* is a reason to choose T over T*.26 According to
Elliott Sober, philosophers take the simplicity of a theory to be evidence for
it’s truth:
Scientists sometimes choose between rival hypotheses on the ba-
sis of their simplicity. Non-scientists do the same thing; this is no
surprise, given that the methods used in science often reflect pat-
terns of reasoning that are at work in everyday life. When people
choose the simpler of two theories, this ‘choosing’ can mean diﬀerent
things. The simpler theory may be chosen because it is aesthetically
more pleasing, because it is easier to understand or remember, or
because it is easier to test. However, when philosophers talk about
the ‘problem of simplicity’, they are usually thinking about another
sort of choosing. The idea is that choosing the simpler theory means
regarding it as more plausible than its more complex rival. [109, p.
13]
To take a second example, one of Williamson’s [140] concerns is to make
clear that the (main) subject matter of philosophy is neither language nor
concepts. Philosophy is as much about the world as any other science. Never-
theless, Williamson thinks that it is sometimes useful to study the meaning of
our words and the semantic structure of our sentences when we are interested
in metaphysical facts. Since in philosophy, we have to reason ‘in areas where
it is very hard to distinguish valid from invalid reasoning’, we must pay atten-
tion to the semantic form of the premises, conclusion and intermediate steps,
which requires semantic beliefs and sometimes explicit testing of these beliefs.
Because semantic theories ‘have the great methodological advantage of being
comparatively easy to test in comparatively uncontentious ways’ and hence
are easier to test than facts about the world, we sometimes have to engage in
26Simplicity can be understood in many ways. It may stand for the paucity of parameters,
for theoretical plausibility or elegance, communicability, metaphysical parsimony and many
other things. See Baker [5], Zellner et al. [143].
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semantic theorizing.27 The semantic facts can then be used as evidence for
metaphysical facts, according to Williamson.
The attempt to provide a semantic theory that coheres with a given
metaphysical claim can therefore constitute a searching test of the
latter claim, even though semantics and metaphysics have diﬀerent
objects. [140, p. 285]
As a third example, take facts about the structure of ordinary language on
the one hand and semantic facts on the other hand. Philosophers sometimes
take syntactic facts to be evidence for semantic facts, for instance in the de-
bate about the nature of propositional attitudes. Throughout the history of
philosophy, the available views were variations of relational views of proposi-
tional attitudes. According to these views, propositional attitudes are relations
between a subject and a propositional content (be it an abstract object as ac-
cording to Frege and Russell or a psychological object in a Fodorian language
of thought). The problem with relational views is that they do not meet all
widely accepted adequacy conditions for propositional attitudes. Quine and
others have come up with non-relational dispositional or functional accounts of
propositional attitudes. These views, however, face the diﬃculty that they do
not match the structure of ordinary language attitude attributions. Accord-
ing to ordinary language, we can conclude from the fact that Jones believes
that Bill will be late both that there is something that Jones believes and that
there is someone who Jones believes will be late. Non-relational views cannot
account for this fact, because they cannot account for the fact that we can
quantify over the predicate’s that-clause and over the subject position of the
embedded sentence.28 Robert Matthews summarizes the non-relational view
and its main challenge as follows:
What looks to be a relational predicate, they argue, is in fact a
monadic predicate in which the constituent terms are semantically
27Williamson [140, p. 284-285].
28See Matthews [83, p. 1-2].
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‘fused’, such that we can imagine these terms being linked by in-
visible hyphens (e.g., believes-that-Bill-will-be-late) [. . . ] if we are
going to be non-relationalists about the attitudes [. . . ] then we
are going to have to find some way of abandoning the assumption
shared by relationalists and non-relationalists alike, that the adicity
of propositional attitudes must match the adicity of the predicates
by which we standardly attribute them. [83, p. 1-2]
It seems to claim that we should not appeal to facts about our psycho-
logical states because there is a gap between these facts and the content of
our psychological states is not suﬃcient to make the case against this practice.
There is a similar gap between facts about theoretical virtues, semantic facts,
or syntactic facts on the one hand and facts about the subject matter we are
actually interested in on the other hand. However, we often appeal to facts
about theoretical virtues, or to semantic or syntactic facts as evidence.
Closing the gap between evidence that is easier and evidence that is harder
to access might not be that hard. However, we should not expect one general
strategy to do the work here, because the kinds of evidence that are easier to
access as well as the kinds of subject matter our theories are about diﬀer. It
seems that each link needs to be defended or proved unreliable independently
(they might run parallel of course).
Whether semantic facts mirror metaphysical facts and whether the struc-
ture of language tells us something about its semantics are both ongoing sub-
jects of discussion in philosophy. As an example of the second, I mentioned the
debate about propositional attitudes. As to simplicity (both parsimony and
elegance), philosophers have been giving both a priori and a posteriori argu-
ments as to why, other things being equal, the simpler theory is more likely
to be true.29 Amongst the a priori justifications there are theological (e.g.,
Smart [107]), and metaphysical (e.g., Lewis [73]) justifications and such that
claim that there is intrinsic value in simplicity (e.g., Sober [109]). However,
29For a summary of arguments, see Baker [5].
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philosophers have also given naturalistic justifications. The important point to
note is that philosophers have been trying to close these gaps, which requires
philosophical work.
Let us see how the gap between facts about our psychological states and the
contents of these states could be closed. This case should be less controversial
than any of the cases mentioned above. The reason is that if our intuitions
(e.g., from thought experiments) are reliable, we are both reliable at getting
the fact that P right as well as at having an intuition that P, because whenever
we get a fact that P right (e.g., in the case of thought experiments) we get it
right by having an intuition. In other words, whenever we know that P in these
cases, it is also true that we have an intuition that P. Hence, any argument for
why we are reliable in judging in a certain area or as part of a certain method
is also good as an argument for why we can take the fact that we have an
intuition as evidence. Whether we are reliable has to be shown separately for
any area or method, it certainly does not generalize to intuitions in general,
but I was concerned with intuitions in thought experiments only.
Jessica Brown [10] argues that we can close this gap within an externalist
picture of epistemology, which I mentioned in Chapter 3. Brown refers to per-
ceptual evidence and claims that we might be able to use the same strategies
in the case of intuitions. Brown compares the gap we are concerned with with
a gap between psychological evidence from perceptual experiences and facts
about the world. Just as we can close the gap between perceptual experience
and facts about the world, we can close the gap between facts about our in-
tuitions and facts about the world by appeal to an externalist approach to
justification and/or knowledge:
Suppose that whenever one has such an experience, one forms an
appropriately related belief. For instance, that when one has an
experience as of a large barking dog in front of one, one forms the
belief that there is a large barking dog in front of one. On an ex-
ternalist approach to justification, such as reliabilism, as long as
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the appropriate external relations hold, the beliefs so formed are
justified. One might hope to apply this solution to the gap prob-
lem in the case of perception to the gap problem facing the psy-
chological view of thought-experiment evidence. Suppose that, in
fact, the method of forming beliefs about the nonpsychological sub-
ject matter of philosophy on the basis of the relevant psychological
propositions is reliable. Combining this supposition with a relia-
bilist approach to justification has the result that beliefs formed in
this manner are justified. [10, p. 513]
I argued in sections 5.4 and 5.5 that there is a methodological constraint on
evidence in philosophy which explains why we appeal to the fact that we have
an intuition as evidence from thought experiments even if we endorse what I
called the Inclusive View : the Accessibility Norm. Note that the Accessibility
Norm could also explain why we often appeal to facts about theoretical virtues,
to semantic or syntactic facts. It seems that it is easier to access facts about the
simplicity of a theory than to access the truth of the theory. Similarly, it seems
easier to access facts about semantics than metaphysical facts, and it seems
easier to access facts about the structure of ordinary language than to access
semantic facts. To retreat to pieces of our total evidence that are typically or
in fact relatively easy to access is a common strategy in philosophy.
I presupposed that we do not have to endorse the sceptical consequences
some experimental philosophers draw from their studies and that philosophers’
intuitions are more reliable than laypeople’s intuitions (see Introduction). If
we appeal to the fact that we have an intuition, however, we have to argue
from this psychological fact to a fact about the world. Since we appeal to the
fact that we have an intuition for methodological reasons only, it follows that
we have to close the gap for methodological reasons only. This, however, does
not aﬀect our knowledge, and hence does not constitute a sceptical threat.
While we know that a thought experiment undermines the target theory,
we might not have succeeded in refuting the theory. I showed in Chapter 4 that
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there are several ways to challenge an intuitive counterexample and to argue
that a particular intuition does not lead us to the truth or is not inconsistent
with the target theory. I think that for methodological reasons, we have to
show that these strategies do not apply for any particular case we are concerned
with. It might, therefore, be hard to show that a counterexample is not merely
intuitive but instead undermines a certain theory. This does not seem to come
as a surprise. The history of philosophy proves that it is very hard to refute a
philosophical theory.
Chapter 6
Reflective Equilibrium and
Counterexamples
Abstract
Reflective equilibrium has been considered a paradigm method involving
intuitions. Some philosophers have recently claimed that it is trivial
and can even accommodate the sort of scepticism about the reliability
of intuitions advocated by experimental philosophers. In order to see
whether it is as trivial as some philosophers think, I discuss whether
reflective equilibrium is compatible with diﬀerent views concerning our
practice of appealing to intuitions as evidence from thought experiments.
I first argue that reflective equilibrium is not compatible with scepticism
about the reliability of intuitions. I then argue that reflective equilibrium
is compatible with the view I have defended in Chapters 3 to 5, but that
we have to make some more specific methodological claims to account
for it.
6.1 Introduction
Reflective equilibrium has been considered a paradigm philosophical method
involving intuitions. It has been extensively discussed in normative ethics and
political philosophy. The key idea of reflective equilibrium as introduced by
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John Rawls [99], [100] for moral and political philosophy is that we test our
moral judgments (or intuitions) and moral principles against each other and
revise and refine both when they are inconsistent.1 In the literature, ‘reflective
equilibrium’ ambiguously stands for the method of reflective equilibrium and
for the state in which all our beliefs are in equilibrium, i.e., in which we have
reached coherence amongst our beliefs. I am concerned with the method of
reflective equilibrium (MRE in what follows).
Without specifying what exactly they mean by it, philosophers in all areas
of research frequently use the term ‘reflective equilibrium’ when they mention
the methods and aims of their inquiry. It has been suggested that ‘reflective
equilibrium’ is nothing more than a metaphor for the rational performance of
philosophy: for taking into account all relevant information available and for
working out the most plausible, coherent, and comprehensive theory of the sub-
ject matter under investigation.2 Michael DePaul [25] and Peter Singer [104]
suggest that it could even be compatible with scepticism about the reliability of
intuitions, i.e., with a view according to which we ought not take our intuitions
into account at all.
I am interested in the question whether MRE is as trivial as some philoso-
phers think or whether it gives us some helpful methodological advice. If it
gives us methodological advice, having followed reflective equilibrium could
provide us with some evidence as to the truth of the resultant theory which is
relatively easy to access and hence is evidence we ought to appeal to in order to
establish this theory (as argued in Chapter 5). Diﬀerent views concerning the
role of intuitions that have been defended in the recent debate on the method-
ology of philosophy have not yet been reflected in the literature on MRE. The
current chapter looks at MRE in particular in light of the distinction between
the appeal to the content of an intuition and the appeal to the fact that we
1Even though the term ‘reflective equilibrium’ was introduced by Rawls, Nelson Good-
man was the first to discuss the method behind the name in ‘The New Riddle of Induction’
(originally 1953) in his Fact, Fiction, and Forecast [47]. Goodman defends reflective equi-
librium as a method of justification in logic and inductive reasoning; see also Resnik [101].
2E.g., DePaul [24], [25], Foley [36], Singer [104], Williamson [140].
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have an intuition.
The chapter consists of two main parts. In the first part (sections 6.2 to 6.4),
I present MRE as it has been discussed in moral philosophy (section 6.2) and
apply it to epistemology, more precisely to Sophie, a fictional philosopher who
thinks about the Gettier Cases as counterexamples to the theory of knowledge
as justified true belief (the JTB theory of knowledge) (section 6.3). I then
specify what philosophers mean when they say that MRE is trivial (section 6.4).
In the second part (sections 6.5 and 6.6), I look at diﬀerent views philosophers
hold in the current debate concerning the role of intuitions in philosophy. I
argue that the sceptical view according to which intuitions ought not play any
role in philosophy is not compatible with MRE (section 6.5). I moreover argue
that the view I defended in Chapters 3 to 5, according to which we ought to
appeal to the fact that we have an intuition as initial evidence from thought
experiments is compatible with MRE, but more specific methodological claims
have to be made in order to distinguish it from other views and in order for
MRE to serve as a methodological guide (section 6.6). I conclude that MRE is
not as trivial as some philosophers think (section 6.7).
6.2 The Method of Reflective Equilibrium
Let us look at what exactly MRE amounts to according to some moral philoso-
phers. Two versions of MRE have been distinguished, narrow and wide MRE.3
According to narrow MRE, we take (a) a set of considered moral judgments
(i.e., judgments made or intuitions had in certain circumstances conducive to
the truth of their content) held by a particular person and (b) a set of gen-
eral moral principles and produce a coherent theory by adjusting either (a)
or (b), or both. In wide MRE, we extend the area of considered judgments
and principles we take into consideration to reach coherence among our widest
set of beliefs. The following is the general idea which lies behind wide MRE,
3Daniels finds this distinction implicit in Rawls [99] and explicit in Rawls [100], see
Daniels [19, p. 257, footnote 2].
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according to Norman Daniels:
The method of wide reflective equilibrium is an attempt to produce
coherence in an ordered triple of sets of beliefs held by a particu-
lar person, namely, (a) a set of considered moral judgments, (b) a
set of moral principles, and (c) a set of relevant background theo-
ries. We begin by collecting the person’s initial moral judgments
and filter them to include only those of which he is relatively con-
fident and which have been made under conditions conducive to
avoiding errors of judgment. For example, the person is calm and
has adequate information about cases being judged. We then pro-
pose alternative sets of moral principles that have varying degrees
of ‘fit’ with the moral judgments. We do not simply settle for the
best fit of principles with judgments, however, which would give us
only a narrow equilibrium. Instead, we advance philosophical argu-
ments intended to bring out the relative strengths and weaknesses
of the alternative sets of principles (or competing moral concep-
tions). These arguments can be construed as inferences from some
set of relevant background theories [. . . ] [19, p. 258]
Wide MRE obviously shares some features with narrow MRE. As with narrow
MRE, we determine a set of considered moral judgments and the best-fitting
principles. However, we also propose alternative sets of principles and use
some of our background theories to provide arguments for and against our
competing sets of principles. We finally choose between the diﬀerent sets of
principles based on arguments from the background theories. In this process,
we are prepared to adjust the considered judgments, the principles, and the
background theories.4
Rawls, Daniels, and other proponents of MRE in moral and political philos-
ophy think that the inclusion of alternative sets of principles and background
4See also Daniels [20, p. 25].
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theories is essential to a method in these areas.5 My focus lies on the question
of how MRE applies to areas such as epistemology, metaphysics, or philoso-
phy of language, where the subject matter under investigation does not consist
of moral or similar norms. In these areas at least, it seems that background
theories play a role when we solve conflicts between our intuitions and beliefs.
Narrow MRE will therefore not be discussed any further, and I will use ‘MRE’
for wide MRE in what follows.
I will focus on Daniels’ [19], [20], [21] formulation of MRE. It can be given
in several steps, which will facilitate the application of MRE to our practice of
debating thought experiments as counterexamples to philosophical theories. I
will take ‘intuitions’ as synonymous with ‘initial moral judgments’ and ‘consid-
ered moral judgments’, and I will take theories to be the counterparts of moral
principles in non-moral philosophy.
Step 1. The relevant intuitions. Amongst all our intuitions, we
choose a set of intuitions of which we are relatively confident, and
which we had under ideal conditions, such as having adequate in-
formation about the subject matter under investigation and being
in a state of mind that is not conducive to error.
Step 2. The best-fitting theory. We determine a theory that fits
best with the set of intuitions, i.e., that is directly supported by
the set of intuitions.
Step 3. Alternative theories. We determine alternative theories
that are not directly supported by the set of intuitions, but do
concern the subject matter under investigation. In the case of a
counterexample to an accepted philosophical theory, our currently
accepted theory will be amongst these theories.
Step 4. The relevant background theories. We look for empirical
and philosophical background theories that deliver arguments for
5See, e.g., Rawls [99, p. 49]. Nelson Goodman [47], in contrast, defends narrow MRE for
the justification of inductive and deductive forms of reasoning.
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or against the competing theories.
Step 5. Restoring coherence. We use arguments from our back-
ground theories and our intuitions to figure out the best and most
coherent theory by either disregarding our intuitions, adjusting our
accepted theory, or adjusting our background theories, or all three.
In the next section, section 6.3, I will give an example to see how exactly
steps 1 to 5 of MRE could apply to thought experiments as counterexamples
to philosophical theories.
6.3 Reflective Equilibrium Applied to Counterexamples
Whenever some philosopher comes up with an intuitive counterexample to an
accepted philosophical theory, we confront the task of resolving the resultant
inconsistency in one or the other way. MRE could be the method we ought to
apply to regain consistency. I will go through the steps of MRE as presented
above and apply them to a well-known case of inconsistency in epistemology:
the JTB theory of knowledge and the Gettier intuitions. I will refer back to this
case when I discuss what philosophers mean when they say that MRE is trivial
and whether it is compatible with diﬀerent views on our practice of debating
thought experiments as counterexamples to philosophical theories (sections 6.4
to 6.6).
Step 1. The relevant intuitions
Let us imagine an epistemologist Sophie who lives in the year 1963. Sophie
has been thinking about knowledge for a long time, and one day she gets to
read Edmund Gettier’s paper ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’. Here is
one of Gettier’s cases (for present purposes, Gettier’s second case is suﬃciently
similar that we do not need to describe it as well):
Suppose that while Smith has strong evidence that his friend Jones
owns a Ford, he has no idea where his friend Brown is. Smith
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randomly selects three place-names and constructs the following
three propositions: either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Boston;
either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona; either Jones
owns a Ford or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk. Even though Smith has
no idea where Brown is, he is justified in believing each of these
three propositions, because he has correctly inferred them from a
proposition for which he has strong evidence, namely that Jones
owns a Ford. However, Jones does in fact not own a Ford, but is
driving a rented car. Unknown to Smith, Brown happens to be in
Barcelona. It seems that Smith does not know that either Jones
owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, even though it is true, Smith
believes that it is true, and Smith is justified in believing that it is
true.6
Sophie agrees with the description of the case. She has the intuition that
Smith does not know that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.
However, the theory of knowledge that Sophie holds, the JTB theory, predicts
that Smith knows that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.
Hence, the content of Sophie’s intuition is clearly inconsistent with what follows
from the JTB theory.
Suppose that Sophie notices the inconsistency and strives to resolve it.
Suppose furthermore that Sophie’s intuition meets the relevant criteria: Sophie
is relatively confident of the intuition, and she had it under ideal conditions.
Her intuition therefore qualifies for MRE (in Daniels’ terms, the intuition is a
‘considered judgment’ as opposed to an ‘initial judgment’).
Step 2. The best-fitting theory and Step 3. Alternative theories
Sophie finds the JTB theory supported by a set of her intuitions about cases
where justified true belief seemingly is knowledge. For instance, Sophie has the
following intuition: if she hears her cat meowing in the kitchen she is justified
6Gettier [41, p. 14-15].
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in believing that her cat is in the kitchen, and if it is also true that her cat is
in the kitchen, then she knows that her cat is in the kitchen. Her intuitions in
the Gettier Cases are not part of this set of intuitions, and Sophie now has to
determine the theory that fits her Gettier intuitions best as well as alternative
theories that compete with the best-fitting theory.
Sophie reads Michael Clark’s response to Gettier, ‘Knowledge and Grounds:
A comment on Mr. Gettier’s Paper’. She spends a long time thinking about
the cases and about Clark’s no-false-lemma reply to Gettier. In both Gettier
Cases, Smith’s reasoning is based on a false premise. In the case quoted above,
Smith gains his justified true belief by reasoning from the justified false belief
that Jones owns a Ford. The case Clark gives in reply has it that knowledge is
justified true belief where the justification is not based on a false assumption.
Sophie also comes up with her own theories, of which the first is a defea-
sibility analysis of knowledge. The defeasibility account has it that knowledge
is justified true belief absent a defeater.7 The second theory is a causal theory,
on which the belief that P is knowledge only if it is appropriately causally
connected to the fact that P.8 The third theory Sophie comes up with involves
a simple reliability condition. According to such an account, S knows that P
if and only if S ’s belief that P is true and justified, where S ’s belief that P is
justified if and only if the belief that P was produced by a reliable cognitive
process.9
Sophie decides that Clark’s adjusted JTB theory fits best with her intu-
itions in the Gettier Cases (step 2). The JTB theory, the causal theory, the
defeasibility account, and the reliability account are alternative theories Sophie
has to consider (step 3).
Step 4. The relevant background theories
7See Lehrer & Paxon: A defeasibility condition requires that there is no other true
statement, d, such that the conjunction of S ’s present evidence for p with d would fail to
make S justified in believing p.’ [72, p. 230].
8See, e.g., Goldmann [43].
9See, e.g., Goldman [44].
CHAPTER 6. MRE AND COUNTEREXAMPLES 162
Sophie needs to think about her background theories which will help her to
decide between the JTB theory, Clark’s account and the alternative theo-
ries. Which theory of knowledge Sophie chooses certainly depends on what she
thinks justification is. Theories of justification are relevant yet do not directly
concern the question of what knowledge is. To keep Sophie’s case simple, let
us suppose that she has externalist views about justification, which means that
she will not consider internalist theories of knowledge. Moreover, metaphysical
accounts of causation might influence Sophie’s choice. Since metaphysics of
causation suggests that abstract and future facts cannot be causes, this counts
against the causal theory of knowledge. Other background theories will prob-
ably influence Sophie’s preferences tacitly.
Step 5. Restoring coherence
What Sophie has done so far should help her to remove the inconsistency
between the content of her intuition that Smith does not know the relevant
proposition and her accepted theory of knowledge, the JTB theory.
Sophie thinks that Clark’s account is the one that fits her Gettier intuitions
best, but she now wonders whether it covers other cases as well and tries to
come up with a counterexample. After a while of thinking, she comes up with
a case where the justification does not rest on a false assumption, similar to
Keith Lehrer’s [71] Nogot case. In Lehrer’s case, Nogot in S ’s oﬃce has given
S evidence that he, Nogot, owns a Ford. S directly moves from his evidence
to the conclusion that someone in S ’s oﬃce owns a Ford, without arguing via
the assumption that Nogot owns a Ford. Nogot does not own a Ford, however,
someone else in the oﬃce, Havit, owns one, which makes S ’s belief true. Let
us suppose that Sophie’s case is very similar to this case in that the subject’s
reasoning somehow does not rest on a false assumption. Sophie comes to the
conclusion that Clark’s analysis is not correct, because it cannot account for
some cases that are very similar to the original Gettier Cases.
Let us say that the causal theory is not consistent with Sophie’s background
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theory on causality. The defeasibility analysis she came up with covers more
cases than Clark’s analysis, but Sophie thinks it is also extremely complicated.
Sophie thinks about the advantages and disadvantages of the JTB theory,
the theory she thinks fits her Gettier intuitions best, and the alternative theo-
ries. She weighs them against each other and, given her views on justification
and causation which she does not want to give up, decides that a reliabilist
account of knowledge is the best choice.
While Sophie’s case is fictional and could have been told diﬀerently, it obviously
roughly corresponds to how parts of the debate about the Gettier Cases were
conducted in the literature, and some philosophers made a similar decision as
Sophie.
6.4 Rational Belief Revision
One main aim of the chapter is to see whether MRE is as trivial as some
philosophers have claimed. To specify what exactly they mean, let us look at
two obvious ways in which MRE could be interpreted as non-trivial or mis-
guided.
First, some philosophers understand MRE as a theory of justification (e.g.,
Rawls [98], Daniels [19], [21], [22], Elgin [32], Stich [117], and Goodman [47]).
According to MRE as a theory of justification, the beliefs we reach as a result
of applying MRE to a certain topic are thereby justified. For instance, if So-
phie comes to the conclusion that Smith in the Gettier Case does not know
that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, then Sophie’s belief
that Smith does not have knowledge of this proposition is justified if it is in
reflective equilibrium, i.e., if it coheres with all her other beliefs about knowl-
edge as a result of having appropriately followed steps 1 to 5. As such, MRE is
most naturally understood as a coherentist theory of justification. According
to coherentist theories of justification, our beliefs are justified through their
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relation to other beliefs.10 Coherentist theories of justification are controver-
sial, especially for the justification of our beliefs in areas other than moral or
political philosophy. Clearly philosophers such as Williamson [140] who claim
that reflective equilibrium is trivial do not have reflective equilibrium as an
account of justification in mind.
What else could MRE be if not a theory of justification? Besides merely
aiming for true beliefs, we aim to build our theories or revise our beliefs in a
rational manner. Ideally, we want a methodology in the sense of rules that
guide us in the process of building a theory or revising our beliefs. MRE could
simply be understood as a method of rational belief revision that does not
carry any commitment with regard to what exactly we gain when we apply
MRE.11 As a method of rational belief revision, MRE is neutral with respect
to epistemic theories such as foundationism or coherentism, and it is neutral
with respect to epistemic externalism or internalism as well. Distinguishing
a method of rational belief revision from the question whether our beliefs are
justified or true accounts for the strong intuition that our opponents sometimes
are as rational in holding the beliefs they hold as we ourselves are, even if either
our opponents or we ourselves have unjustified and false beliefs.12 Supposing
that we are not in a sceptical situation, MRE as a method of rational belief
revision could nevertheless be conducive to the justification of our beliefs. It is
prima facie plausible that if a subject S is not deceived by a Cartesian demon
and starts out with beliefs that are rational for her to hold, and if she revises
her beliefs in a rational way to reach a theory T, then it is more likely that T
10See Daniels [23].
11Philosophers have discussed several ways in which MRE could be a useful method in
moral philosophy. Geoﬀrey Sayre-McCord [103] mentions three approaches that do not in-
volve the justification of beliefs. According to the first, MRE is a heuristic method, i.e.,
MRE is useful to discover the fundamental truths of morality, but it does not justify the
beliefs reached through it’s application. Acccording to a second approach, there is a moral
obligation to act only upon moral principles that are in reflective equilibrium with all our
other beliefs. According to a third and pragmatic view, it is in some sense useful to act upon
a principle which is in reflective equilibrium with all other beliefs we hold. See also Kappel
[57], who is pessimistic concerning the role of MRE in epistemic justification, but mentions
that a pragmatic or otherwise not truth-related account of MRE might be defendable.
12See also Kelly & McGrath [58], who think that MRE ought to lead to beliefs that are
rational for us to hold.
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is justified than that T is not justified.
In diﬀerent terms, if S is not victim of a Cartesian demon and starts out
with beliefs that are rational for her to hold, and if she revises her beliefs in
a rational way to reach a theory T, then this is at least some evidence for the
truth of T. This does not mean that coherence of T is the only or even the
best evidence for the truth of T. However, it could be evidence which is easier
to access than the truth of T or some alternative evidence for T, and hence it
could be evidence we ought to appeal to in order to establish T (see Chapter
5, where I defend the idea that for methodological reasons, we ought to appeal
to evidence that is relatively easy to access). In what follows, I will take MRE
to be a method of rational belief revision. I will assume that having applied
MRE to a certain subject matter gives us some evidence as to the truth of the
resultant theory T on the subject matter.
Here is a second way in which MRE could be interpreted as non-trivial: it
could be understood as misguided because it idealizes our practice of revising
beliefs. DePaul [25] claims that this is the most serious problem MRE con-
fronts, and that MRE can be understood as idealizing our practice with regard
to two aspects. First, the order in which we ought to proceed according to
MRE does not correspond with what we in fact do: we hardly ever start out
with first determining the relevant intuitions (step 1), figuring out a set of the-
ories that matches (step 2), then taking alternative theories into consideration
(step 3), and finally using our background theories (step 4) to build the most
comprehensive and coherent theory on the subject matter (step 5). We rather
‘naturally bring all kinds of considerations [. . . ] into play helter skelter as they
occur to us’13. Second, the quantity of intuitions and theories we take into ac-
count is limited. It is simply not possible for us to take all relevant alternative
theories into account (step 3), and it is not possible to test our intuitions con-
cerning all relevant aspects (step 1), because ‘one would need to reflect upon
and form [intuitions] about far too many kinds of hypothetical cases’14.
13DePaul [25, p. xcii].
14DePaul [25, p. xcii].
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Looking at Sophie’s case, one might think this is indeed a problem. Surely
the way Sophie applies MRE to the Gettier Cases is an idealization. No single
philosopher did apply or could have applied MRE in the way Sophie does:
Sophie starts out with step 1 and then goes through steps 2 to 5. She also
takes far more theories into consideration in steps 2 and 3 before she moves on
to the final step 5 than philosophers did in 1963.
There are two ways to reply to the idealization objection. First, we might
say that MRE has to be understood as making claims about what we should
ideally do, not as telling us what we ought to do given our temporal and intel-
lectual constraints. MRE says that we should consider all possible alternatives,
but this does not mean that it is not rational for us to stop at a certain point
to settle for a coherent theory. Let us look at Sophie again. Even though she
considers many alternative theories, one could still criticize her for not doing
everything she ought to do in order to appropriately follow the advice MRE
gives. Maybe Sophie should not have made a decision as to which theory to en-
dorse, since the debate over the Gettier Cases is ongoing and philosophers are
still coming up with theories to cover our intuitions in the Gettier Cases and
numerous variations of the Gettier Cases. Ideally, Sophie would even be much
smarter. However, just as it seems rational for Sophie to stop considering alter-
native thought experiments and alternative theories, other philosophers could
be rational relative to their limits.15
It is unproblematic to stop considering alternative theories because MRE
can be applied to a minimal set of intuitions and theories. MRE can be re-
applied whenever someone comes up with a new theory or a new thought
experiment, and the accepted theory can be revised again. This is a reply to
both aspects of the idealization objection, the worry that we do not always go
through the steps in the right order and the worry that we cannot consider
15One might want to determine such a point where we we could be allowed to stop con-
sidering alternative theories. For instance, one could argue that we are entitled to settle for
a coherent theory as soon as there is widespread agreement on the subject matter amongst
our peers. Or one could argue that we are entitled to stop considering new cases and theories
as soon as our arguments are convincing to us. Or one could argue that we are entitled to
stop considering new cases and theories as soon as we simply run out of ideas.
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all relevant theories and intuitions. To engage in MRE could simply mean to
engage in an ongoing series of applications of MRE. As Rawls claims: once a
subject has reached a coherent theory,
[. . . ] this equilibrium is not necessarily stable. It is liable to be
upset by further examination [. . . ] and by particular cases which
may lead us to revise our judgments [. . . ] [99, p. 18]
In fact, as I presented Sophie’s case, Sophie comes up with a new thought
experiment in step 5, namely with a case that is similar to Lehrer’s Nogot
case. The reason why I let Sophie come up with this case in step 5 is that
she compares diﬀerent theories in step 5, and hence she thinks about whether
Clark’s account can accommodate as true all or enough intuitions only in step
5. Strictly speaking, Sophie goes back to step 1. However, it seems that this is
not a problem for MRE: the order in which we follow the steps does not seem
to be crucial.
A second way to reply to the idealization objection is to say that MRE ought
to be applied by a group of researchers instead of a single philosopher. Whereas
Rawls, Daniels, and DePaul think that MRE is to be pursued by an individual
researcher, Goodman [47] defends such a collective MRE. The view is that as
individual philosophers, we work on diﬀerent ends: we discover inconsistencies,
we develop theories that cover our intuitions best, and we develop background
theories. We do all this in much detail, which might require a whole career or
life-time. As a community of researchers, we might eventually reach the aim
of step 5: one single theory wins. Maybe Sophie might better be understood
as representing a group of researchers, not an individual philosopher.
DePaul [25] argues that MRE cannot possibly be understood as the de-
scription of what we are supposed to do as a group of philosophers:
Because of the way revisions are determined, [reflective equilibrium]
must be a first-person inquiry. Propositions do not seem true to a
group of people except in the derivative sense that they seem true
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to each member of the group. Any disagreement within a group
and there will be nothing to determine how conflicts are to be re-
solved, and hence, nothing to determine the group’s state of [reflec-
tive equilibrium]. Moral inquiry can be a joint endeavor according
to [reflective equilibrium] only insofar as we agree or insofar as one
person is willing to assist another in her individual attempt to bring
her beliefs into equilibrium by doing such things as pointing out po-
tential conflicts in her beliefs, presenting examples that might elicit
interesting intuitions or proposing theories that might account for
her [intuitions]. Alternatively, one might approach some other per-
son as a subject, taking that person’s beliefs and seemings as data
and attempting to work out what that person’s state of [reflective
equilibrium] would be. [25, p. 1xxxi]
DePaul thinks that disagreement in intuitions makes a collective MRE im-
possible. However, disagreement might simply show that we have not yet
reached the final state of reflective equilibrium. There surely is a lot of dis-
agreement in philosophy, and this disagreement concerns our theories as much
as our intuitions. We could nevertheless all be concerned with the same project,
namely with finding the best theory of a certain subject matter, and it is still
possible that in the end one theory will win in the sense that it will be accepted
by everyone.
While I do not think that disagreement makes collective MRE impossible, I
agree with DePaul that MRE should be understood as a method an individual
philosopher ought to pursue. The reason is that if MRE is what a group of
philosophers ought to engage in, it is unclear what the advice for the indi-
vidual philosopher would be and how we would access whether an individual
philosopher is revising her beliefs in a rational way. This, however, is what
we are interested in when we talk about a method of rational belief revision.
We want such a method to give us advice on how to revise our beliefs as in-
dividual philosophers and we want to be able to decide whether an individual
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philosopher is revising her beliefs rationally.
Even if other people’s intuitions matter, it does not follow that MRE is a
collective enterprise. As I argued in Chapter 3, it is plausible to think that
we do not only take our own intuitions into consideration but rather rely on
other philosophers with respect to intuitions as much as we do with respect to
theories. Endorsing MRE as a method for an individual philosopher does not
mean that we cannot rely on work other people have done, on their intuitions
or on the theories they developed.
If we do not understand MRE as a theory of justification and if we think
it does not have to be viewed as an idealization of our practice, the concern
is that step 1 to 4 of MRE are trivial and step 5 gives us only very general
instructions. According to Rawls, we have to go ‘back and forth’, sometimes to
adjust the principles to our judgments, sometimes to conform the judgments
to our principles.16 Similarly vaguely, Daniels claims that we are ‘expected
to revise our beliefs at all levels as we work back and forth among them and
subject them to various criticisms’.17 It seems that MRE collapses into a
trivial and uncontroversial claim about philosophical methodology, as Timothy
Williamson expresses in the following passage about MRE:
The question is not whether philosophers engage in the mutual
adjustment of general theory and judgments about specific cases—
they manifestly do—but whether such descriptions of it are suﬃ-
ciently informative for epistemological purposes. [140, p. 244]
Similarly, Foley thinks that MRE is too general to be useful:
The problem with this recommendation is familiar. It is not so
much mistaken as unhelpful. At best, it is meta-advice [. . . ] It tells
you essentially this: take into account all the data that you think
to be relevant and then reflect on the data, solving conflicts in the
16Rawls [99, p. 20].
17Daniels [23].
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way that you judge best. On the other hand, it does not tell you
what kinds of data are relevant, nor does it tell you what is the
best way to resolve conflicts among the data. It leaves you to muck
about on these questions as best you can. [36, p. 128]
DePaul [24], [25] goes so far as to argue that MRE is the only rational
method in philosophy. In a nutshell, DePaul’s version of MRE says that we
should reflect upon the logical and evidential relations between all our relevant
beliefs, and that we should resolve conflicts which might emerge during this
process in the best possible way we can figure out. DePaul then argues that
it is diﬃcult to think of a rational alternative to MRE thus construed, and
that an opponent of MRE would have to make one of the following claims:
(A) we should abandon reflection altogether; (B) our method should direct
the inquirer to reflect, but to do so incompletely, i.e., to leave certain beliefs,
principles, or theories out of account; (C) our method should not allow the
results of the inquirer’s reflections to determine what the inquirer goes on to
believe.18 Unsurprisingly, DePaul concludes from his discussion of (A), (B),
and (C) that any method endorsing at least one of these claims would be
irrational.
In the recent debate over the methodology of philosophy, diﬀerent views
concerning the role of intuitions in philosophy have been defended. One way of
deciding whether MRE is trivial is to see whether it is compatible with these
diﬀerent views. If it is not, then it seems that MRE is not trivial. I argue that
MRE is not compatible with the sort of scepticism about the reliability of intu-
itions advocated by experimental philosophers (section 6.5). I then show that
MRE is compatible with diﬀerent views according to which intuitions (either
the psychological states or the contents) play a role in philosophy. However,
more specific methodological claims have to be made in order to distinguish
the practice I have defended in Chapters 3 to 5 from other views and in order
to serve as a methodological guide (section 6.6).
18DePaul [24, p. 301].
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6.5 Reflective Equilibrium and Scepticism
We saw in Chapter 3 that some experimental philosophers draw a radical con-
clusion from their studies: using intuitions as evidence for or against philo-
sophical theories is an unreliable method which should not be pursued.19 Some
philosophers have claimed that MRE can accommodate scepticism about the
reliability of intuitions as advocated by experimental philosophers. I rejected
such scepticism, but in order to see whether MRE is trivial, let us look at how
it could be compatible with MRE.
I will first look at a view according to which sceptical considerations are not
supposed to be part of MRE because meta-theories in general are not supposed
to be part of MRE. I will then look at Singer’s view which, I will argue, is not
compatible with MRE. Finally, I will look at DePaul’s view according to which
scepticism is compatible with MRE because it could come as a result of applying
MRE that we disregard every single intuition. I will argue that if this was the
case, MRE would be self-defeating.
MRE and meta-theories
One way to argue that scepticism about the reliability of intuitions is not com-
patible with MRE is to exclude meta-considerations from the beginning. De-
Paul mentions that according to Rawls’ original account, meta-considerations
and arguments from philosophy of language and metaphysics that have been
used for or against metaethical theories such as moral relativism, moral real-
ism, or noncognitivism are not supposed to be considered in MRE. The reason
is that while MRE is supposed to help us decide between diﬀerent moral the-
ories, meta-theories do not bear directly on the moral subject matter under
consideration.20 The same would apply to contemporary empirical research on
the reliability of our intuitions, according to DePaul:
19See, e.g., Alexander & Weinberg [2], Weinberg [133].
20DePaul [25, p. lxxxix].
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Eﬀorts to use results from psychology or neuroscience or evolution-
ary theory to question the reliability of some or all of our [intuitions]
are now extremely prominent [. . . ] As Rawls conceived of [wide re-
flective equilibrium], these background theories would not be part
of the equilibrium. Because they provide premises for a broad skep-
ticism regarding morality, they would not serve as premises of argu-
ments for, or against, any particular [moral theory]. [25, p. lxxxix]
Exactly the same would be true for results from psychology or experimental
philosophy in epistemology. Take Sophie and her epistemic intuitions. Sophie is
interested to know whether Smith has knowledge in the Gettier Case, and more
generally what knowledge is. Questions concerning the relevance of empirical
research on intuitions do not bear directly on the question whether Smith has
knowledge of the relevant proposition or not, so it seems not to help Sophie to
answer her question.
DePaul mentions that Rawls’ main reason to exclude meta-theories from
MRE is that he is interested in MRE as a method to detect our moral sensibil-
ities rather than to detect the truth about moral issues. In order to determine
which moral theory captures our moral sensibilities best, meta-theories are ob-
viously not relevant. To compare it with a simple case: if I am interested to
find out about my food preferences and notice that I do not like broccoli, the
fact that broccoli is healthy and it would be much better for me to like broccoli
is irrelevant to my concern.
However, if we are ultimately interested in the truth of our theories rather
than merely in the systematization of our beliefs and intuitions, the question
of whether our intuitions are reliable is highly relevant. Hence, if MRE told
us to ignore doubts as to their reliability, it could not be a method of rational
belief revision. Excluding meta-considerations such as scepticism about the
reliability of intuitions from the beginning is therefore not an option for MRE
as a method of rational belief revision.
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MRE without intuitions
In line with some experimental philosophers, Singer [104] draws sceptical con-
clusions from recent empirical studies and defends a view according to which
we should not assign any plausibility to our moral intuitions. Singer objects to
‘any method of doing ethics that judges a normative theory either entirely, or
in part, by the extent to which it matches our moral intuitions’.21
As an example of evidence for the insignificance of moral intuitions, Singer
discusses Joshua Greene et al.’s [48] studies on intuitions people have when
confronted with diﬀerent versions of the Trolley Case. In one version of the
Tolley Case (the one presented in the Introduction to this thesis), we are asked
whether a fat man should be pushed down a bridge to stop the trolley, in
which case only one person dies and five people who would otherwise be killed
survive. Most of us have the intuition that pushing the fat man oﬀ the bridge
would be wrong. In another version, we are asked if the driver of the trolley
should side-track the trolley, which would again kill only one person instead of
five people. Most of us have the intuition that the driver should side-track the
trolley. Greene et al. [48] conducted brain scans of subjects while they had
intuitive reactions to cases very similar to the two versions of the Trolley Case.
The results suggest that diﬀerent intuitive responses have to be explained by
diﬀerences in the emotional pull of situations which involve causing someone’s
death in a close-up, personal way vs. causing someone’s death in a way which
is at a distance and less personal.22 Singer thinks that more research is likely to
show that Greene ‘has not only explained, but explained away the philosophical
puzzle’ of why our intuitions in diﬀerent versions of the Trolley Case diﬀer.
Based on Greene et al.’s results and arguments from evolution23, Singer draws
21Singer [104, p. 346].
22Greene et. al [48, p. 2106].
23According to Singer, ‘[. . . ] the salient feature that explains our diﬀerent intuitive judg-
ments concerning the two cases is that the footbridge case is the kind of situation that was
likely to arise during the eons of time over which we were evolving; whereas the standard
trolley case describes a way of bringing about someone’s death that has only been possible
in the past century or two, a time far too short to have any impact on our inherited patterns
of emotional response.’ [104, p. 348].
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the following sceptical conclusions for moral intuitions and for MRE:
Thus recent scientific advances in our understanding do have some
normative significance, and at diﬀerent levels. At the particular
level of the analysis of moral problems like those posed by trolley
cases, a better understanding of the nature of our intuitive responses
suggests that there is no point in trying to find moral principles
that justify the diﬀering intuitions to which the various cases give
rise. Very probably, there is no morally relevant distinction between
the cases. At the more general level of method in ethics, this same
understanding of how we make moral judgments casts serious doubt
on the method of reflective equilibrium. There is little point in
constructing a moral theory designed to match considered moral
judgments that themselves stem from our evolved responses to the
situations in which we and our ancestors lived during the period
of our evolution as social mammals, primates, and finally, human
beings. [104, p. 348]
We are interested in the second claim on a more general level, according to
which empirical studies cast doubt on MRE. Even though Singer does not think
it would be a good idea, he mentions that MRE could possibly be interpreted
‘wide enough’ to accommodate a practice where we do not take any of our
intuitions into account. In that case, MRE might be compatible with the idea
that intuitions should not play any role in philosophy, but it would no longer
be a distinctive method for normative ethics.24
Scepticism about the reliability of intuitions entails prima facie that step 1
is misguided: we ought not take our intuitions into account. In a concrete case
of a thought experiment such as the Gettier Cases, this means that a subject
ought not assign any plausibility to the fact that she has an intuition that P
or to the content of the intuition that P :
24Singer [104, p. 347].
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No Plausibility. The subject assigns no plausibility to her intuition that P.
A method that rules out intuitions (either the fact that we have an intuition
that P or the content of the intuition that P) as evidence from the beginning
does not seem to be compatible with MRE, at least not with MRE as pre-
sented in section 6.2. According to MRE, we remove an inconsistency between
an intuition and our accepted theory either by disregarding the intuition and
revising our judgment or by adjusting our accepted theory (or our background
theories, or all three). The crucial point is that two options are available with
respect to the intuition that P : either to accommodate it as true or to disregard
it. In principle, MRE leaves Sophie the choice to either endorse that Smith has
no knowledge, or to reject it and either stick with the JTB theory or endorse a
diﬀerent theory. Which option she chooses depends on her background theories
and on how good the alternative theories she comes up with are, but neither
is ruled out from the beginning.
Proponents of MRE might disagree about how exactly the process of restor-
ing coherence in step 5 ought to take place. We said that background theories
are relevant to the areas we are interested in, i.e., the relevant MRE is wide
MRE. This means that we use arguments from background theories in step
5, and it also means that background theories are amongst the theories that
can be adjusted. However, that there are two ways of dealing with the intu-
ition seems to be widely shared. Here is how Ernest Sosa [111] puts it (using
‘principle’ for ‘theory’):
If a conflict pits the intuitive pull of an example against the tug of
a familiar principle, we seek to remove or revise one or the other,
so as to remove the tension. Sometimes the particular intuition(s)
will win, but sometimes the tug of the principle must prevail. [111,
p. 262]
Roy Sorensen [110] writes (using ‘theoretical principles’ for ‘theories’ and
‘atheoretical judgment’ for ‘intuition’):
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You attain reflective equilibrium when your theoretical principles
cohere with your atheoretical judgments. To reach this state, you
must remove conflicts between them. Sometimes the conflict is
resolved by giving up the principle and sometimes by giving up the
intuition. [110, p. 83]
It seems that step 5 of MRE, applied to thought experiments as counterex-
amples to philosophical theories, entails the following methodological claim
with respect to intuitions.
Coherence. In case of a conflict between our intuitions and our accepted the-
ory on a certain subject matter it is sometimes permissible to disregard
an intuition that P and sometimes permissible to adjust theory to ac-
commodate as true an intuition that P.
If we endorse No Plausibility, Coherence must be false. Since according
to scepticism about the reliability of intuitions, we ought not assign any plau-
sibility to our intuitions, it is not true that we have two options to regain
coherence. According to this view, thought experiments simply would not be
potential counterexamples and would not have to be taken into consideration
at all. Sophie, for instance, would have to disregard her intuition in the Gettier
Case and stick with her accepted theory, the JTB theory of knowledge—or use
other kinds of evidence to support a diﬀerent theory of knowledge. According
to MRE, however, we have to assign at least some initial plausibility to our
intuitions. Hence, if scepticism about the reliability of intuitions entails No
Plausibility, it is not compatible with MRE.
Scepticism as a consequence of MRE
However, there might be a way to account for scepticism about the reliability of
intuitions that does not entail No Plausibility. Let us look at DePaul’s view. In
contrast to Singer, DePaul thinks that moral intuitions play an important role,
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but he agrees that MRE could accommodate scepticism about the reliability of
intuitions.25 As a consequence, DePaul’s characterization of MRE is indeed so
general that it could be true of any kind of truth-directed activity: the essence
of MRE is that it ‘directs one to leave nothing out of consideration and to
believe what seems likely to be true upon due consideration’.26 It seems that
MRE understood as broadly as this can no longer count as a method of rational
belief revision since it does not entail any advice as to how to revise our beliefs.
DePaul thinks that scepticism about the reliability of intuitions could come
as a result of applying MRE. If we take empirical research on particular intu-
itions such as psychological and neuroscientific evidence into account, it could
turn out that we end up rejecting every single one of our intuitions. This seems
to be what DePaul has in mind when he says the following:
Suppose the data provided by the research seems much more likely
to be true to S than any of her intuitive moral judgments, and that
she follows the arguments from the data and has no doubts about
them. So, S excises all normative moral beliefs from her overall
system. She ends up accepting no moral theory; she makes no
moral judgments. She only has beliefs about morality, e.g., that all
the moral judgments she previously made were mistaken and that
all the moral judgments other people make are mistaken. Does
it follow that S would have abandoned the method of [reflective
equilibrium]? Not at all—she would have done exactly what that
method dictates. [25, p. c]
Since he thinks that all moral theory in the end amounts to intuitions, DePaul
concludes that if the subject rejected all her moral intuitions, she would have
no moral views at all. We would not have to take this extreme stance on
the role of intuitions in non-moral philosophy, but we could imagine ending
25DePaul [25, p. c].
26DePaul [25, p. cii].
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up disregarding all intuitions from thought experiments, because it turned out
that we have reasons to do so for every single intuition.
DePaul’s idea is that since it would come as a result of applying MRE,
disregarding all intuitions would be compatible with MRE. However, such a
result would certainly raise serious doubts about the reliability of intuitions
more generally. We would then have to adjust our meta-philosophical view: it
would hardly be rational to consider further intuitions, and we would rather
have to assign no initial plausibility to intuitions anymore. We would have
to endorse No Plausibility, which entails the denial of Coherence (as discussed
above). Hence, if MRE leads to the rejection of every single of our intuitions,
it is self-defeating.
However, MRE could be compatible with taking empirical evidence about
the reliability of particular intuitions into account, as long as this does not lead
us to disregard all our intuitions. In the next section, section 6.6, I discuss how
exactly taking such empirical evidence into account is compatible with MRE.
6.6 Reflective Equilibrium and the Appeal to Intuitions
In this section, I show that MRE is compatible with the view that we ought to
use the fact that we have an intuition as evidence (as defended in Chapters 3
to 5) as well as with the view that we ought to use the content of an intuition
as evidence. I will first look at a view according to which MRE ought to be
applied to our psychological states only (e.g., to our beliefs and intuitions about
knowledge). I will then look at a view which has it that we ought to apply
MRE to the contents of our psychological states (e.g., to the contents of our
beliefs and intuitions about knowledge). I will in particular look at the role
the fact that we have an intuition could play in MRE according to the second
view.
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MRE applied to psychological states
As mentioned in section 6.5, MRE has been understood as a method that
merely systematizes our opinions. However, that MRE systematizes our beliefs
and intuitions does not necessarily mean that it merely systematizes our beliefs
and intuitions. DePaul thinks that even though a systematization is what MRE
aims at, a coherent system of beliefs on a moral subject matter might ‘reveal
the plain truth about morality’.27
In his discussion of step 5 of MRE, DePaul claims that it is unclear what
our criteria are when we try to work out the most coherent theory, and that
proponents of MRE have not paid much attention to this question. He then
makes several suggestions, of which at least one seems to clearly concern our
psychological states only. DePaul suggests that one might appeal to one’s
degree of belief, or to the degree of confidence in the belief, or to the belief’s
credence.28 To take our case again, what Sophie would take into account in
step 1 and 2 are her current intuitions and beliefs, she would consider possible
alternative beliefs in step 3, and she would take her background beliefs into
account in step 4. She would then choose the beliefs and intuitions with the
highest degree of confidence or with the highest credence in step 5. Hence, she
would apply MRE to her psychological states rather than to the contents of
her states. According to such an account of MRE, there is no problem when it
comes to taking evidence about the reliability of our intuitions into account.
MRE applied to contents
As mentioned in Chapters 3 to 5, Williamson [140] criticizes an approach to
philosophical methodology according to which we are concerned with psycho-
logical states. Williamson argues that it is not clear how we could get from
facts about our psychology to facts about the world such as facts about knowl-
27See DePaul [25, p. xciii], see also DePaul [25, pp. xc-xci].
28DePaul [25, p. 1xxx]. DePaul endorses a view according to which one ought to revise
one’s beliefs depending on which belief seems to be true to one, see DePaul [25, pp. 1xxx-
1xxxi].
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edge, which are the facts we are ultimately interested in. Having to argue from
facts about psychological states to facts about the world provokes scepticism
and should therefore be avoided.
Williamson gives two main arguments against MRE understood as a method
to be applied to psychological states. First, he argues that there is no point
in applying MRE to psychological states when we still rely on some first-order
claims: when weighing diﬀerent beliefs against each other on the basis of criteria
such as coherence, we already use first order criteria to decide what is coherent
and what is not. We do not use our beliefs about coherence, and we might as
well simply talk about the contents of our psychological states.29 Williamson
then repeats one of his arguments against the psychologization of evidence, the
argument from exceptionalism (see Chapter 4), and applies it to MRE:
To say that mathematicians or biochemists or historians strive to
bring their opinions into equilibrium would be sadly inadequate
as even a summary description of their method of research [. . . ]
Is philosophy so diﬀerent that in its case such a description will
suﬃce? If so, it should give up any claim to be an evidence-based
discipline. [140, p. 246]
In this quote, Williamson presupposes that MRE is meant to be applied
to psychological states rather than to the contents of these states. However,
note that an interpretation of MRE according to which it has to be applied
to our psychological states does not follow in any way from MRE as presented
in section 6.1. Daniels’ account has it that we use our background theories
to argue for and against diﬀerent views, and we decide on the basis of these
arguments which theory to endorse. Such an interpretation of MRE does not
presuppose that we are concerned with psychological states only.
If we think that in philosophy, we are concerned with facts about the world
(e.g., facts about knowledge) and not merely with facts about our psychological
29Williamson [140, p. 246].
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states (e.g., beliefs and intuitions about knowledge), we should understand
MRE to be applied to the contents of our psychological states rather than to
our psychological states only.
I argued in Chapters 3 to 5 that in our current practice, the fact that we
have an intuition plays a role in the process of deciding how to revise our
beliefs even if we are interested in facts about the world (e.g., in knowledge)
rather than in facts about our having of intuitions (e.g., about knowledge).
While the fact that we have an intuition can serve as initial evidence against a
philosophical theory, we then move on to further investigations as to why we
have the intuition and into the truth or falsity of the content of the intuition.
I moreover showed in section 4.5 of Chapter 4 that we can distinguish several
ways of explaining away the significance of an intuition to the truth or falsity of
its content. Such an explanation could, e.g., rely on some general psychological
dispositions of the intuiters (strategy i)), some pragmatic rules of conversation
(strategy ii)), some properties of our reaction to the presentation of the thought
experiment scenario (strategy iii)), or some properties of the theory’s subject
matter (strategy iv)). In all these cases, we give an explanation of the fact
that we have an intuition by appeal to some facts other than the truth of the
content of the intuition.
In what follows, I will discuss how exactly MRE can account for the appeal
to the fact that we have an intuition as evidence. I will consider the practice
of appealing to the fact that we have an intuition first as part of step 1 and
then as part of step 5 of MRE.
Intuitions in step 1 of MRE
One might think that MRE can accommodate our practice of appealing to the
fact that we have an intuition if we take it to be part of step 1. We take the
fact that we have an intuition as initial evidence, and then we seek and rule out
alternative explanations as to why we have the intuition before we eventually
move on with steps 2 to 5 of MRE.
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As presented above, in step 1, we select intuitions that are likely to be re-
liable because we had them under ideal conditions, such as having adequate
information about the subject matter and being in a state of mind that is not
conducive to error. A view I have endorsed is that only expert intuitions are
had under these conditions, so we should only take those intuitions into ac-
count. I discussed the so-called expertise defence in Chapter 3, and I described
the practice of excluding intuitions on the basis of some general psychological
dispositions in Chapter 4 (section 4.5, strategy i)). Take Sophie and the Gettier
Cases again. As mentioned in previous chapters, Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich
[135] have conducted empirical studies on versions of the Gettier Cases. They
presented cases to East Asian, Indian sub-continental and European Ameri-
can undergraduate students. They found that the majority of the European
American’s intuitions correspond with most philosophers’ reaction to the Get-
tier Cases: the person in the case does not have knowledge. The majority
of the East Asian and Indian sub-continental students, however, had diﬀerent
intuitions: they thought that the person in the case has knowledge. Unlike the
students who took part in the study, Sophie is not a layperson but an expert
epistemologist. If it is correct that philosophers are not prone to the same
cultural eﬀects, Sophie should only take her and other expert epistemologists’
intuitions into account in step 1 and ignore laypeople’s intuitions as irrelevant.
This corresponds to a suggestion Stephen Stich makes. He says that one
way in which MRE could be seen as compatible with experimental philosophers’
work is
[. . . ] to restrict the class of people whose reflective equilibrium is to
count in assessing the justification of inferential principles. For ex-
ample, Nisbett and I proposed that in saying an inferential principle
is justified, what we are saying is that it would pass the (narrow)
reflective equilibrium test for those people whom we regard as ex-
perts in the relevant inferential domain (Stich and Nisbett 1980).
[117, p. 101]
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However, not all strategies of explaining away the relevance of an intuition
to the truth or falsity of its content can be accommodated in step 1. I showed
in Chapter 4 that even if we only take expert intuitions into account, there are
still several strategies of explaining away the relevance of an intuition to the
truth or falsity of its content (section 4.5, strategies ii) to iv)). Step 1 is not able
to accommodate these strategies because they do not serve to define conditions
under which our intuitions are reliable. They rather help us to decide whether
a particular intuition ought to be trusted and its content accommodated as
true in our theory. This, however, is exactly what is supposed to be done in
step 5 of MRE. Let us therefore see if there is a way to accommodate these
strategies in step 5 of MRE.
Intuitions in step 5 of MRE
We are concerned with the question of whether MRE can accommodate the
practice of using to the fact that we have an intuition as initial evidence even if
we apply MRE to the contents of our psychological states. If we take the fact
that some expert philosophers have an intuition as the relevant initial evidence
which gets selected in step 1 of MRE, this fact about our psychological state
confronts facts about the subject matter we are interested in. However, facts
about our psychology and facts about the subject matter we are interested in
are not in direct conflict with each other. Hence, there is no direct conflict to
be solved.
To apply it to our case: Sophie is supposed to take the fact that she has
an intuition that Smith has no knowledge in step 1 and the JTB theory and
alternative theories in step 2 and 3 into account. However, facts about Sophie’s
psychology and facts about knowledge are not in direct conflict with each other.
The fact that Sophie has an intuition about Smith having no knowledge is,
moreover, not supposed to be part of her theory of knowledge, just as the
fact that she has some other beliefs is not supposed to be part of her theory of
knowledge. It is the content of her intuition that Sophie is eventually interested
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in, not the fact that she has an intuition.
In other words, given that we are interested in facts about, e.g., knowl-
edge, the problem is that we switch topics when we talk about our intuitions.
With respect to the Go¨del Case, Jonathan Ichikawa [52] expresses this point
as follows:
If I’m to theorize about, say, the nature of reference, I should not
feel at all guilty if I fail to explain why people like chocolate, or why
the Detroit Lions are so bad. Why should I feel diﬀerently about
the fact that some people think that in Kripke’s story, the name
‘Go¨del’ refers to Schmidt? This psychological fact is interesting,
and is, it seems to me, well worth explaining. But it is not clear
why it should be the reference theorist’s job to explain it. His job is
to explain reference, not to explain intuitions about reference. [52,
p. 109]
However, if our practice is to first seek and then rule out alternative expla-
nations of our intuitions (as I argued in Chapters 3 to 5), we have to switch to
a meta-level before we actually come to our original question.
I do not think that this is a problem. Searching for and ruling out alterna-
tive explanations of our intuitions is not the only occasion in which we switch
to a meta-level in philosophy. Meta-considerations clearly play a role when we
are concerned with philosophical questions such as what knowledge is. Klemens
Kappel [57] has suggested a view of MRE that takes theoretical desiderata, i.e.,
features of our theories, into account in step 5. According to Kappel, many
moral theorists as well as moral epistemologists agree that the aim of MRE is
to achieve a set of moral beliefs featuring the following epistemic desiderata:
consistency, systematicity (a theory should involve explanatory relations), gen-
erality (a theory should involve general beliefs that cover a larger area rather
than a smaller one) and simplicity (general explanatory beliefs should be few
and simple rather than many and complex). Kappel claims that in MRE, in-
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creases in consistency, systematicity, generality, or simplicity are purchased at
the cost of a decrease in intuitive acceptability.30 Intuitive acceptability is the
desideratum according to which sets of beliefs ought to fit our intuitions or, in
other words, according to which the contents of our intuitions are made true
in our theory. Whether it is true that we trade fit with intuitions against other
criteria or not, these criteria certainly play a role when we revise our beliefs.
Brian Weatherson [131] discusses the following desiderata for any philosoph-
ical theory: the theory shouldn’t have too many counterexamples, not too
many unacceptable theoretical consequences, and it should be significant and
simple.31 Even in the sciences, theoretical desiderata such as coherence, sim-
plicity, explanatory power and explanatory unification play an important role
when it comes to deciding which theory we ought to endorse.32 If it is correct
that it is part of the process of finding the correct theory that we sometimes
switch to a meta-level to consider the simplicity, coherence, etc. of our theory,
we might as well include meta-considerations concerning the reliability of our
intuitions.
One might then wonder why we usually do not also try to rule out psycho-
logical, pragmatic or other explanations as to why we hold a certain theory.
Nothing in principle speaks against it. If we had a plausible psychological or
pragmatic explanation as to why we hold a certain theory, say the JTB theory,
this explanation could certainly be taken into account. However, I think there
are reasons why we do not give psychological or pragmatic explanations as to
why we hold a certain theory. First, our accepted theory usually meets the-
oretical desiderata such as consistency, systematicity, and generality. Hence,
we already have some evidence for the truth of that theory. Second, intuitions
from thought experiments as counterexamples to philosophical theories have
a special status, because their contents create inconsistencies. It is therefore
not surprising that we try to rule out alternative explanations of our intuitions
30Kappel [57, p. 132].
31Weatherson [131, pp. 8–10].
32See, e.g., van Fraassen [125], Kitcher [59], Churchland [17].
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before we revise our theory.
MRE can accommodate the practice I have defended in Chapters 3 to 5, but
in order to get methodological advice, we have to say something more specific
about the role of intuitions. We said that MRE entails the following claim:
Coherence. In case of a conflict between our intuitions and our accepted the-
ory on a certain subject matter it is sometimes permissible to disregard
an intuition that P and sometimes permissible to adjust theory to ac-
commodate as true an intuition that P.
The following two methodological claims have to be added, given our current
practice as described and defended in Chapters 3 to 5. In the case of a conflict
between an accepted theory and an intuition, we ought to
1. search for an explanation as to why we have the intuition that P which
is not based on the truth of the content of the intuition and
2. search for the best-fitting theory that can accommodate as true the con-
tent of the intuition that P.
MRE can accommodate 1. and 2. But without these further claims, it is
not specific enough to give us concrete methodological advice.
6.7 Conclusion
The question I aimed to answer in this chapter was whether MRE understood
as a method of rational belief revision reduces to a trivial claim about philo-
sophical methodology. I argued that contrary to what some philosophers think,
MRE is not compatible with scepticism about the reliability of intuitions. I
showed that MRE is compatible with a view according to which we are con-
cerned with our psychological states only as well as with a view according to
which we are concerned with the contents of these states. I moreover showed
that MRE is compatible with the practice I defended in Chapters 3 to 5, namely
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the practice of appealing to the fact that we have an intuition as initial evidence
even if we are interested in the contents of our psychological states.
The conclusion to be drawn is that MRE is not as trivial as some philoso-
phers think because it is not compatible with scepticism about the reliability
of intuitions. But as long as we think that either facts about our having of
intuitions or the contents of our intuitions play some role in the process of
revising our beliefs, our view is compatible with MRE.
In order to get useful methodological advice, however, we need to add more
specific methodological claims with respect to intuitions. I suggested such
claims in section 6.6. I take it that having followed MRE plus the additional
advice can give us some evidence as to the truth of the resultant theory which
is relatively easy to access and hence, as I argued in Chapter 5, is evidence we
ought to appeal to in order to establish a philosophical theory.
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